REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, RESPONDENTS.

Reyes versus Commission on Elections

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, filed by Regina Ongsiako Reyes against the Commission on Elections and Joseph Socorro Tan, assailing the resolutions of the Commission on Elections that cancelled her certificate of candidacy for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. The case matters because it draws the boundary between two jurisdictions: the Commission on Elections, which decides who may be legally proclaimed, and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which is the sole judge of the qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives. The Court also settles whether a proclamation secured despite a final cancellation of a certificate of candidacy can vest the proclaimed person with the status of a member of the House, and whether the Commission on Elections may admit evidence in a summary proceeding without violating due process.

Procedural History

Joseph Socorro Tan filed before the Commission on Elections a petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes. The First Division of the Commission on Elections granted the petition and cancelled her certificate of candidacy. Reyes moved for reconsideration, but the Commission on Elections En Banc denied the motion, affirming the First Division. Despite the denial, Reyes was proclaimed on 18 May 2013 and took her oath of office. Reyes then filed before the Supreme Court an original and special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, questioning the First Division ruling and the En Banc decision. On 25 June 2013, the Court En Banc dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. Reyes moved for reconsideration of that dismissal. The Court, in the assailed resolution, denied the motion for reconsideration, affirmed the dismissal, and ordered entry of judgment. Several justices concurred, several dissented, and several took no part.

Facts

Joseph Socorro Tan sought the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. Tan submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that Reyes was a holder of a United States passport and that her status was that of a balikbayan. On the basis of this evidence, the First Division of the Commission on Elections concluded that Reyes had not shown compliance with the requirements for reacquiring Filipino citizenship and for renouncing her American citizenship, and cancelled her certificate of candidacy.

Reyes moved for reconsideration before the Commission on Elections En Banc. Attached to her motion was an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012, which she explained was attached only to show her desire to serve and to comply with the rules, even as a superfluity. The En Banc denied the motion on 14 May 2013, affirming the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. Reyes received a copy of the En Banc decision on 16 May 2013.

Two days later, on 18 May 2013, Reyes was proclaimed as the winner and took her oath of office. She then argued that, as a duly proclaimed winner who had taken her oath, all questions regarding her qualifications lay outside the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The Court held that the proclamation had no basis because it was made after the En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of her qualifications, and because no restraining order from the Supreme Court had removed the bar to her proclamation.

Issues

• Whether or not the Commission on Elections had jurisdiction over the petitioner, who claimed to be a duly proclaimed winner who had already taken her oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives.
• Whether or not the petitioner could be validly proclaimed on 18 May 2013, given the final cancellation of her certificate of candidacy.
• Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction over the qualifications of the petitioner at the time she filed her petition.
• Whether or not the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting newly discovered evidence and in proceeding in a summary manner, and whether or not the petitioner was denied due process.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 18, Section 13, paragraph b of the Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure provides:

In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En Banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

This provision fixes the moment when the En Banc decision cancelling the certificate of candidacy became final and executory, and it identifies the only remedy that could have removed the bar to the petitioner's proclamation, namely a restraining order from the Supreme Court.

Rule 18, Section 5 of the Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure provides:

Promulgation. The promulgation of a decision or resolutions of the Commission or a division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram.

This provision explains why no separate notice requirement appears in the five day rule, because notice is served in advance of the date of promulgation, and it supports the finding that the petitioner knew of the adverse decision.

Rule 1, Section 2 of the Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure provides:

These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission.

This provision supports the ruling that the Commission on Elections is not bound to strictly adhere to technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence.

Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, defining the special civil action of certiorari, provides:

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

This provision defines the narrow ground on which the petitioner's recourse before the Supreme Court could succeed, namely grave abuse of discretion, and not mere error of judgment.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Commission on Elections had jurisdiction over the petitioner. The action for cancellation of her certificate of candidacy was correctly lodged in the Commission on Elections, was fully litigated there, and was finally decided there. The Commission on Elections never ordered her proclamation as the rightful winner. The Court stressed that the petitioner's claim of exclusive jurisdiction in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal was unavailable to her because she was not a member of the House at the time, her proclamation having no legal basis.

On the second issue, the Court held that there was no basis for the proclamation of the petitioner on 18 May 2013. Four days before that proclamation, the Commission on Elections En Banc had already denied her motion for reconsideration and affirmed the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. The Court explained that the cancellation was a definite bar to her proclamation, and that the bar could be removed only by a restraining order from the Supreme Court within the five day period fixed by the rules. The petitioner received a copy of the En Banc decision on 16 May 2013, yet she made no attempt to obtain such a restraining order. The Court characterized her act as taking the law into her own hands and as indicative of bad faith.

On the third issue, the Court held that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the petitioner at that time, because she was not a member of the House. The Court clarified that the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the qualifications of a member is original and exclusive, and proceeds de novo, unhampered by the terminated proceedings in the Commission on Elections. But that jurisdiction presupposes a duly and legally based proclamation, which the petitioner did not have. The Court also noted that no hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque, because the duly proclaimed winner from the terminated cancellation case shall sit while the Tribunal proceedings are had.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, and the Commission on Elections is not bound to strictly adhere to technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. The Court defined grave abuse of discretion as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility. The Court also held that there was no denial of due process, because the petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her case, and because in administrative proceedings procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity or right to be heard. The Court further held that the petitioner failed to prove that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship and renounced her American citizenship in accordance with law, and that her oath of office as Provincial Administrator could not be considered the oath of allegiance required by law.

Doctrine

A certificate of candidacy that has been cancelled by a final and executory decision of the Commission on Elections is a definite bar to the proclamation of the candidate. The proclamation of a candidate despite such a final cancellation is without basis and cannot vest the candidate with the status of a member of the House of Representatives. Consequently, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, whose jurisdiction over the qualifications of a member is original and exclusive, cannot acquire jurisdiction over a person who was not validly proclaimed and who is not a member of the House. The remedy of a candidate aggrieved by a final En Banc decision of the Commission on Elections is to seek a restraining order from the Supreme Court within five days from promulgation, as provided in the rules. The Commission on Elections is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence in summary proceedings for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy, and procedural due process in administrative proceedings requires only the opportunity or right to be heard. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

Disposition

The motion for reconsideration was denied, the dismissal of the petition was affirmed, and entry of judgment was ordered. The petitioner did not prevail.

Remember This

A proclamation secured despite a final and executory cancellation of a certificate of candidacy is without basis and cannot confer membership in the House of Representatives, so the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person proclaimed. Examiners use this case to test the boundary between the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections over certificates of candidacy and the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal over the qualifications of members, and to test the requisites of grave abuse of discretion and procedural due process in summary administrative proceedings.