PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO EDAÑO AND NESTOR EDAÑO, ACCUSED, ANTONIO EDAÑO ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Edaño

The Case

This is the appeal of Antonio Edaño, who was charged with murder for the stabbing death of Leonardo Dabalos in the municipality of Leyte, Province of Leyte, on the evening of 21 March 1999. He was tried together with his cousin Nestor Edaño, who held the victim while Antonio stabbed him. The case matters because it gathers in one decision several doctrines a bar candidate must command: the admissibility of testimony given in a former proceeding by a witness who has since died, the sufficiency of a lone eyewitness, the effect of a moonlit night on identification, the meaning and requisites of treachery, the absorption of abuse of superior strength by treachery, and the rule that reclusion perpetua imposed under the death penalty law carries no eligibility for parole.

Procedural History

The Regional Trial Court of Carigara, Leyte, Branch 13, tried the case. Nestor was arrested in June 1999, tried, and convicted in November 2001. Antonio remained at large and was arrested only on 31 August 2005. On 28 September 2005 he entered a plea of not guilty, and trial proceeded against him. On 24 January 2008 the trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay 50,000 pesos as civil indemnity and 25,000 pesos as exemplary damages. He filed a notice of appeal on 29 January 2008. On 28 August 2012 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in full. The case then reached the Supreme Court by appeal, and the parties adopted their briefs filed before the appellate court.

Facts

At around six o'clock in the evening of 21 March 1999, Fernando Layson was on his way home and about to cross a riverbank when he heard someone moaning. He quietly followed the sound, hid behind some plants, and saw Antonio Edaño stabbing Leonardo Dabalos while Nestor Edaño held the victim by both arms. He saw Antonio stab the victim at least three times with a bolo of about eight inches. Frightened, Fernando did not go home but spent the night at his brother's house, to whom he told what he had seen. At first light the next day he reported the matter to the police and to the victim's family, and he accompanied the police and Monico Dabalos, the victim's son, to the scene, where Leonardo was found sprawled on the ground with seven stab wounds.

Florante Paa testified that there had been an altercation between the accused and the victim one week before the stabbing. Police Officer 2 Ruben Astilla received a report of the killing, Senior Police Officer 3 Roque Baronda identified the police blotter entry, and Police Officer 3 Margarito Delantar led the investigation and filed the complaint based on the testimonies of Fernando and Monico.

Antonio testified in his own defense and interposed denial and alibi. He claimed he was already residing in Babatngon, Leyte, when the incident happened. He admitted that Nestor is his cousin, and said that Nestor and Leonardo had fought at a cousin's wedding, where he even sided with Leonardo. He claimed a misunderstanding with Fernando, and explained that he did not surrender despite knowledge of the case because he was innocent.

Issues

• Whether or not the testimonies of Fernando Layson and Monico Dabalos, given in the earlier trial of Nestor and offered after both had died, may be received in evidence against Antonio.
• Whether or not the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Fernando, is sufficient to establish the guilt of Antonio beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the crime was attended by treachery, qualifying it to murder.
• Whether or not the penalty and the awards of damages were correctly imposed.

Applicable Provisions

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, on testimony given in a former proceeding, provides:

Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

This is the basis for admitting the testimonies of Fernando and Monico, who were already deceased during Antonio's trial.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, fixes the penalty for murder:

Article 248. Murder. The penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death.

This is the provision under which Antonio was convicted and sentenced.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346, on the prohibition against parole, provides:

Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

This is why the Court declared that Antonio is not eligible for parole.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court upheld the use of the former testimonies. Both witnesses were already deceased during Antonio's trial, and the earlier case involved the same parties and subject matter, with the opportunity to cross-examine. The prosecution properly offered their testimonies in the case against Nestor.

On the second issue, the Court held that the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Fernando, is sufficient to prove Antonio's complicity. He gave a straightforward narration and positively identified the assailants, consistent with his sworn statement taken two days after the incident. On the claim that identification was impossible in the dark, the Court held that illumination from the moon and even from the stars is fair and sufficient to identify perpetrators of crimes. On Fernando's failure to intervene or report at once, the Court held that no standard form of behavioral response can be expected from anyone confronted with a startling or frightful occurrence; the natural reaction is to secure one's safety, and Fernando reported to the authorities as early as five o'clock the following morning. On the discrepancy between three stabs seen and seven wounds found, the Court noted that the attack was ongoing when Fernando came upon it and continued after he left. On ill motive, Antonio failed to substantiate his claim, and his flight from arrest for six years is not consistent with his claim of innocence.

On the third issue, the Court held that treachery qualified the killing to murder. The requisites of treachery are the employment of means, method, or manner of execution which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate, and the deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of execution. Treachery was evident because both of the victim's arms were held by Nestor while Antonio stabbed him, leaving the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. Although the lower courts found abuse of superior strength, it was not appreciated, because when that circumstance concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed by the latter.

On the fourth issue, the Court affirmed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties, due to the absence of an aggravating circumstance, but declared that Antonio is not eligible for parole under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346. It increased the civil indemnity to 75,000 pesos and exemplary damages to 30,000 pesos, awarded moral damages of 75,000 pesos, and awarded temperate damages of 25,000 pesos since actual damages were not proved. All damages earn interest at six percent per annum from the finality of the judgment until fully paid.

Doctrine

First, the testimony or deposition of a witness who is deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him, under Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Second, the testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to sustain a conviction; the failure of a witness to intervene or to report the crime immediately does not impair credibility, because no standard form of behavioral response can be expected from a person confronted with a startling or frightful occurrence.

Third, moonlight and starlight may be sufficient illumination to identify perpetrators of a crime.

Fourth, there is treachery when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make; its requisites are that the means ensure the malefactor's safety from defensive or retaliating acts, no opportunity being given the victim to defend himself or retaliate, and the deliberate or conscious adoption of such means. When abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed by the latter.

Fifth, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death, and under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 a person convicted of an offense punished with reclusion perpetua is not eligible for parole.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the conviction of Antonio Edaño for murder with modifications, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim 75,000 pesos as civil indemnity, 75,000 pesos as moral damages, 30,000 pesos as exemplary damages, and 25,000 pesos as temperate damages, plus interest at six percent per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid.

Remember This

Remember the line that treachery is present when the method employed rendered the victim helpless, as when both his arms were held while he was stabbed, and that abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery when they concur. Examiners use this case for the requisites of treachery, the sufficiency of a lone eyewitness and moonlit identification, the admissibility of a deceased witness's former testimony, and the no-parole rule under Republic Act No. 9346.