YUK LING ONG, PETITIONER, VS. BENJAMIN T. CO, RESPONDENT.

Yuk Ling Ong versus Benjamin Co

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Yuk Ling Ong, a British-Hong Kong national, against her husband Benjamin Co, a Filipino citizen, arising from a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. Ong discovered that her marriage had been declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity in a case of which, she claims, she was never notified. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's clearest restatement of the rigorous, three-part test for substituted service of summons, and of the consequence that follows when that test is not met: a judgment void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, struck down regardless of the consequences.

Procedural History

Benjamin Co filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260, docketed as Civil Case Number 02-0306. Summons was issued, substituted service was effected on a security officer at Ong's townhouse, and Ong failed to file a responsive pleading. The trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage void ab initio.

Ong then filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals, invoking extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding that there was no sufficient proof of fraud and that the substituted service was valid, relying on the townhouse practice of the security guard receiving communications for homeowners and on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Ong's motion for reconsideration was denied. She elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

Yuk Ling Ong and Benjamin Co were married on October 3, 1982 at Ellinwood-Malate Church. In November 2008, Ong received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation concerning the cancellation of her permanent residence visa, reportedly because her marriage had been nullified by a court. When she appeared, she was furnished copies of two petitions for declaration of nullity, a decision dated December 11, 2002 in Civil Case Number 02-0306 declaring her marriage void ab initio, and her marriage contract bearing an annotation of that decision.

The records showed that Co had first filed a nullity petition in April 2001, stating Ong's address in Binondo, Manila, with no showing of its status. In July 2002, he filed a second petition, this time stating her address at Manresa Garden Homes in Quezon City. Summons issued on July 29, 2002. On August 1, 2002, only two days later, the process server resorted to substituted service, leaving the summons and petition with Roly Espinosa, a security officer at the townhouse.

The trial court, noting that Ong failed to file a responsive pleading and that the public prosecutor saw no indicia of collusion, concluded that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations and declared the marriage void ab initio. Ong maintained that she was never notified of the case and that the substituted service was invalid.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court in Civil Case Number 02-0306 validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of Yuk Ling Ong.
• Whether or not the facts proven by Ong constitute extrinsic fraud within the purview of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

This establishes personal service as the rule, so that substituted service is permitted only when personal service is not practicable.

Section 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 7. Substituted Service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

This is the provision whose requirements the process server's return failed to satisfy, and on which the validity of the trial court's jurisdiction over Ong turns.

Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 20. Voluntary Appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

This is the alternative route to jurisdiction over the person, which the Court notes was never invoked because Ong never appeared in the nullity case.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over Ong's person. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either by valid service of summons or by voluntary appearance. Here there was no voluntary appearance, so the validity of the substituted service was decisive. The Court adopted the rigorous requirements laid down in Manotoc versus Court of Appeals: impossibility of prompt personal service, shown by several attempts, meaning at least three tries, preferably on at least two different dates, with the sheriff citing why the efforts failed; specific details in the return, narrating the dates and times of the attempts, the inquiries made, the names of occupants of the residence, and all other acts done; and a showing that the recipient is a person of suitable age and discretion who comprehends the significance of the summons and the duty to deliver it.

Measured against these requirements, the server's return utterly lacked sufficient detail. It made only the general statement that service was effected after several futile attempts, without stating the number of attempts, their dates and times, or the reason for each failure. It did not describe the competence of the security officer to receive the summons. The Court held that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty does not apply where it is patent that the return is defective, and that the Court of Appeals' reliance on Robinson versus Miralles was misplaced because the return there described the attempts in thorough detail.

On the second issue, the Court found Ong's contention of extrinsic fraud too unsubstantial to warrant consideration, and focused its discussion on lack of jurisdiction. The Court stressed that annulment of judgment is an equitable recourse allowed only in exceptional cases, and that it exists not to reopen a judgment long final, but to discharge a party from the burden of a judgment that is an absolute nullity from the start.

Doctrine

Substituted service of summons is exceptional and must strictly comply with Section 7 of Rule 14. The return must show, first, impossibility of prompt personal service, established by at least three attempts, preferably on at least two different dates, with the reasons for failure stated; second, specific details of those attempts, including dates, times, inquiries made, and the occupants of the residence; and third, that the recipient is of suitable age and discretion and comprehends the significance of the summons and the duty to deliver it.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty does not cure a patently defective return. Where substituted service is invalid and the defendant never voluntarily appeared, the trial court acquires no jurisdiction over the person, and its judgment is void and must be struck down regardless of the consequences, even if it was rendered years earlier. The remedy is annulment of judgment under Rule 47, which lies only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the Court of Appeals decision and resolution were reversed and set aside, and the December 11, 2002 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City was declared void, leaving Benjamin Co to institute his nullity action anew with Yuk Ling Ong fully aware and ready for litigation.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a void judgment is struck down regardless of the consequences, because the right to be heard begins with a valid summons. Examiners use this case to test the Manotoc requirements for substituted service and the rule that the presumption of regularity cannot save a defective server's return.