“Y” SHIPPING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. MAXIMO ERISPE, AND JUDGE ARSENIO SANTOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF CFI, MANILA, RESPONDENTS.

Y Shipping versus Erispe

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction brought by "Y" Shipping Corporation against Maximo Erispe and the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The corporation attacks a judgment of that court which, acting on a petition for execution of a final workmen's compensation award, ordered it to pay Erispe the balance of his compensation and his weekly allowance until his temporary total disability ceased. The case matters because it fixes two rules every labor and remedial law candidate must know: the enforcement of a final workmen's compensation award is a ministerial act requiring no formal complaint or hearing, and the word jurisdiction in the enforcement provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act really means venue, which is waived if not timely objected to.

Procedural History

The Administrator of Regional Office Number 4 of the Department of Labor issued a letter-award in favor of Erispe. When the corporation failed to pay the weekly compensation, the Administrator issued a supplemental letter-award for the accumulated balance and medical expenses. Both awards became final without appeal, and the Administrator then issued a writ of execution. The corporation challenged that writ before the Court of First Instance of Manila in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. The court granted the writ of prohibition, holding that a regional administrator cannot issue writs of execution because that power belongs to the courts.

Erispe then filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for execution of the award. The court rendered judgment in his favor, ordering the corporation to pay the balance of the compensation, the weekly sum until his temporary total disability ceased, and the costs, and directing that a writ of execution issue immediately. The corporation's motion for reconsideration was denied. It then came to the Supreme Court by certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and the Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent judge from enforcing the decision.

Facts

On September 2, 1958, the Administrator of Regional Office Number 4 of the Department of Labor issued a letter-award ordering "Y" Shipping Corporation to pay Maximo Erispe 380.27 pesos plus a weekly compensation of 19.43 pesos until his temporary total disability ceased, but not exceeding 4,000 pesos, with Erispe's right to additional compensation reserved should his injury result in permanent disability.

On September 10, 1958, the corporation sent a request for reconsideration seeking to set aside the award. Yet on October 6, 1958, twenty-six days after sending that request, it partially paid Erispe 420 pesos in compliance with the award, and Erispe was made to sign an unsubscribed affidavit acknowledging the payment, apparently intended to waive all his future claims.

Because the corporation failed and refused to pay the weekly compensation, the Administrator issued a supplemental letter-award dated March 1, 1961, requiring payment of 2,488.95 pesos as the balance of accumulated weekly compensation plus 189 pesos as reimbursement of partial medical expenses. Copies were received by the corporation and its counsel. On May 30, 1961, after both awards had become final without any appeal, the Regional Administrator issued a writ of execution directing the Sheriff of Manila to satisfy Erispe's claims.

Issues

• Whether or not the corporation was denied due process because the decision ordering execution was rendered without a hearing on the merits or requiring the parties to present evidence.
• Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila lacked jurisdiction to order the issuance of the writ of execution because the accident occurred in Cebu and not in Manila.

Applicable Provisions

Section 51 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides:

Section 51. Enforcement of Award. Any party in interest may file in any court of record in the jurisdiction of which the accident occurred a certified copy of a decision of any referee or the Commissioner, from which no petition for review or appeal has been taken within the time allowed therefore, as the case maybe, or a certified copy of a memorandum of agreement duly approved by the Commissioner, whereupon the Court shall render a decree or judgment in accordance therewith and notify the parties thereof.

The decree or judgment shall have the same effect, and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same, as though the decree or judgment had been rendered in a suit duly heard and tried by the court, except that there shall be no appeal therefrom.

The Commissioner shall, upon application by the proper party or the court before which such action is instituted, issue a certification that no petition for review or appeal within the time prescribed by section forty-nine thereof has been taken by the respondent.

This provision is the very basis of the execution proceedings, and its language on the court in the jurisdiction of which the accident occurred is what the corporation invoked against the Manila court.

Rule 4, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as cited in the decision, provides:

When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss it is deemed waived.

This rule defeats the corporation's belated objection, since it raised the matter only in its motion for reconsideration.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the issuance of a writ of execution, upon a finding of the finality of an award of a referee or commissioner, is ministerial. A formal complaint need not be filed with the Court of First Instance for the enforcement of a final award; all that is required is the filing of a certified copy of the award with that court. The corporation's claim that the award had not become final because of its pending request for reconsideration failed on two circumstances. First, it partially paid Erispe in compliance with the award while its request was pending, which showed the request was merely pro forma and meant only to gain time to settle for less than what was awarded. Second, the supplemental letter-award of March 1, 1961 amounted to a virtual denial of the request and itself became final when no appeal was taken within fifteen days. The proceeding for execution was therefore in order.

On the second issue, the Court held that the word jurisdiction in Section 51 really relates to venue. It quoted its earlier ruling that the law refers to any court of record in the jurisdiction of which the accident occurred, and that the word is there used to refer to the place where the proceedings should be instituted, so it does not affect jurisdiction as such but only venue. Since the corporation never questioned jurisdiction or venue in its answer to the petition for execution, and raised the point only in its motion for reconsideration, the objection came too late and was deemed waived.

On the alleged denial of due process, the Court relied on the finding of the Court of First Instance of Manila that the corporation had full opportunity to appear before the Administrator regarding the claim but did not do so notwithstanding various communications sent to it, appearing only after the award had become final. There was therefore no denial of due process at all.

Doctrine

First, the enforcement of a final workmen's compensation award is ministerial. All that the law requires is the filing in the proper court of a certified copy of the decision or award with a certification that no appeal has been taken, and upon such filing the court shall render a decree or judgment in accordance therewith. No formal complaint and no hearing on the merits are needed, and the decree has the same effect as a judgment in a suit duly heard and tried, except that there is no appeal therefrom.

Second, the word jurisdiction in Section 51 of the Workmen's Compensation Act refers only to venue, that is, the place where the proceedings should be instituted. An objection on this ground must be raised at the earliest opportunity, for when improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss it is deemed waived.

Third, a request for reconsideration that is not seriously pursued, as shown by partial payment in compliance with the award while the request is pending, is merely pro forma and does not prevent the award from becoming final.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from, dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and taxed the costs against "Y" Shipping Corporation.

Remember This

Memorize the line that enforcement of a final workmen's compensation award is ministerial and requires only the filing of a certified copy of the award, with no complaint and no hearing. Examiners use this case to test the ministerial nature of execution of labor awards and the rule that jurisdiction in Section 51 means venue, which is waived if not timely raised.