JANUARIO T. SENO, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE M. MENDOZA OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU AND CARLOS A. GO THONG & CO., RESPONDENTS.

This is an original
action in certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction brought by the
above-named petitioners against the Honorable Jose M. Mendoza, presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, and Carlos A. Go Thong and Company.

It appears that petitioners other than Januario
T. Seno, who is their counsel,
were members of the United Seamen’s Union
of the Philippines.  Pursuant to a letter-request of the Union
stating that they “had ceased to be members in good standing” and
citing a closed shop clause in its bargaining agreement^[1]
with respondent Carlos A. Go Thong & Co., the latter dismissed said petitioners.  Through counsel, petitioners requested that
they be reinstated to their former
positions and paid their backwages, otherwise they would picket respondent’s offices and
vessels.  The request was denied on the
ground that the dismissal was unavoidable under the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. 
Conciliation conferences in the Regional Office of the Department of
Labor in Cebu
City failed to resolve the dispute, and on the
morning of November
7, 1962,
petitioners, together with their sympathizers, picketed the vessels of
respondent Carlos A. Go Thong & Co.  On the same day petitioners filed a charge of unfair labor practice against the company and the
United Seamen’s Union of the Philippines before the Special Prosecutor of the Court
of Industrial Relations, Cebu Branch, which charge was docketed as Case No.
322-ULP-Cebu.

On November
8, 1962 the company filed a complaint (Civil Case
No. R-7743) against the United
Seamen’s Union of
the Philippines and petitioners herein in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City, with the following prayer for
relief:

“(a) Ordering
the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) and such additional amounts representing actual damages which may be
proven during the trial of this case including attorney’s fees occasioned to
the plaintiff by reason of the illegal acts of the defendants.

(b)   Ordering the defendants, their agents, and
all persons acting on their behalf to forever refrain from molesting
plaintiff’s employees of its vessels, all actual and prospective passengers of
its vessels, all actual and prospective ship­pers of its vessels, and all
persons engaged in loading and unloading cargoes of plaintiff’s vessels, and
after trial to make said injunction permanent.

(c)   That pending the final termination of this
case a writ of preliminary injunc­tion be issued to all the defendants ordering
them and all their agents and persons acting in their behalf to refrain from molesting, disturbing, or in any
man­ner whatsoever hindering the free movements of all the employees of
plaintiff’s vessels, all actual and prospective passengers of plaintiff
vessels, all actual and prospective shippers of plaintiff’s vessels, and all
persons engaged in the loading and unloading of cargoes of plaintiff’s vessels.

(d)   That plaintiff be
exempted from complying with that provisions of paragraph 1 of Article II of
Annex “A” to the effect that the company hire all unlicensed members
of the crew needed for the service through the hiring office of the union (USUP).

(e)   That the defendants be ordered to pay the costs of this action.

Plaintiff further prays for such other reliefs
which may be just, legal and equitable in view of the premises.”

On
the same day, petitioners through counsel appeared before respondent Judge and
opposed the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, alleging that the case involved a labor dispute and that a charge of unfair labor practice had already
been filed with the Court of Industrial Relations.  They also requested that they be given until the next day, November 9, 1962, to file a memorandum on the matter, with
citations of authorities.  However, on
that same day respondent Judge issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which reads:

“After hearing the arguments of all the parties, the Court is of the opinion and so holds that
for the interest of all parties
concerned and in
order to maintain a status quo
during the pendency of this action, a writ of preliminary injunction issue upon the
filing of the plaintiff of a bond
of P5,000.00, which maybe increased or decreased as circumstances may afterward
warrant, duly approved by this Honorable Court, directing all the defendants
United Seamen’s Union of the Philippines, Atty. Januario
T. Seno, and all persons, agents and sympathizers to refrain from molesting,
disturbing, or in any manner whatsoever hindering the free movements of all the
employees of plaintiff’s vessels, all actual and prospective shippers of
plaintiff’s vessels, and all persons engaged in the loading and unloading of cargoes
of plaintiff’s vessels.

Let this case be called again for tomorrow, November 9, 1962, at 8:00
o’clock in the morning, to give the defendants another opportunity
to show cause if any, why the aforementioned writ of preliminary injunction
should be dissolved.”

On November
9, 1962 petitioners
moved to reconsider, but the motion was denied on November 13, 1962.

Petitioners have come to us contesting the juris­diction of the
lower court in taking cognizance of the case (Civil Case No. R-7743).  Pursuant to one of the prayers in the
petition we issued a writ of preliminary injunction on December 2, 1962, ordering respondent Judge to
desist from further proceeding in the case and from enforcing the injunction he
had issued.

In support of the contention that the Industrial Court and not
the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the matters
involved in Civil Case No. R-7743 petitioners claim:  (1) that a labor dispute exists and (2) that
their dismissal constitutes an unfair labor practice, being an act of
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment.

There is no question that a labor dispute arose when petitioners
were dismissed from their employment. 
Under Section 2(j) of Republic Act 875 a question involving tenure of
employment is included in the term “labor dis­pute.”

The
main issue, however, is whether such dismissal cons­titutes an unfair labor
practice so as to bring the case under the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court.  Sus­taining
the affirmative of the issue, petitioners contend that the closed shop
agreement between the United Seamen’s Union of the Philippines and the
respondent company, on the strength of which petitioners were dismissed, is
null and void for being violative of Sections 4(a)
(1) and 4(a) (4), of Republic Act 875, inasmuch as the matter of union
representation of the employees was still pending before the Court of
Industrial Relations at the time said closed shop agreement was executed.

The following facts are
pertinent to the resolution of the issue: 
On October 4, 1957 respondent company entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with the United Seamen’s Union of the Philippines,
effective for a period of two (2) years, and thereafter for another period of
one (1) year unless either party should notify the other in writing, not less than sixty (60) days prior
to the expiry date, of its intention and election to terminate the agreement as
of the end of the current term.

On July 18, 1959
said collective bargaining agree­ment was extended for another period of two
(2) years, counted from October 4,
1959.

On October 6 and 31, 1959 the Philippine Labor Federation and the
General Maritime Stevedores Union of the Philippines filed separate petitions
for certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations, to which the
United Seamen’s Union of the Philippines presented an opposition.  On January
17, 1961 respondent company and the United Seamen’s Union
of the Philippines
renewed their collective bargaining agreement, with additional conditions for a
period of five (5) years counted from its execution.^[2]

We agree with respondent company that the pendency
of the petitions for certification election did not bar or preclude the renewal
of the collective bargaining agreement with the United Seamen’s Union
of the Philippines.^[3] Other­wise
there would be a gap or interregnum during which no agreement would govern,
that is, from the time the old collective bargaining contract expired to the
time the peti­tion for certification election is decided and a new agreement
entered into with the Union that may be duly certified as the proper bargaining unit.  Without any agreement to govern the relations between labor and management in the
interim, the situation would well be productive of confusion and result in
breaches of the law by either party (Victorias Milling
Co. vs. Victorias-Manapla
Workers Organization vs. Court of Industrial Relations and Free Visayan Workers, Nos. L-18467 & 18470, Sept. 30, 1963).  The question may be asked:  What
would be the effect on the renewed
bargaining agreement if a union
other than the one that
executed it should be certified?  In a similar case it has been held that the union thus certified would have to respect the contract, but that
it may bargain with the management to shorten the life of the contract if it is too long (General Maritime Stevedores Union of the Philippines, et al., vs. South Sea Shipping Lines, et al., 108 Phil. 1112).

Section
4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act provides that it shall be unfair labor
practice for an employer:

“(4)  to
discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organ­ization:  Provided, That nothing in this Act or in any other Act or
statute of the Republic of the Philippines shall preclude an employer from
making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a con­dition of
employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the repre­sentative
of the employees as provided in section twelve, but such agreement shall not
cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization.” (As amended by
Republic Act 3350 which took effect on
June 17, 1961).

The dismissal of
petitioners was in compliance with an existing collective bargaining agreement,
the validity of which is sanctioned by the provision just quoted, and therefore
does not constitute an unfair labor practice exclusively cognizable by the
Industrial Court.

Because of their
dismissal petitioners picketed the vessels of respondent company.  This gave rise to the complaint in the Court
of First Instance (Civil Case No. R-7743) to enforce the contract with the
United Seamen’s Union of the Philippines, to recover damages, and at the same
time to restrain petitioners from “molesting, stopping, obstructing, and interfering with the free move­ments of the employees
of plaintiff’s vessels and all its passengers, prospective and actual, as well
as shippers, prospective and actual, within the port of the City of Cebu“. 
Actually, the intention of respondent company in filing the action was
to shift to the union the liabilities that arose by virtue of petitioners‘ dismissal as provided in the renewed
collective bargaining contract, particularly the first paragraph of Article II,
which states:  ” x x x provided, however,
that the UNION shall assume all the responsibilities and shall answer for
any and all liabilities that may arise by virtue of such dismissal.”

As the issue involved in
the instant case, although arising from a labor dispute, does not refer to one
affect­ing an industry which is indispensable to the national interest
and certified by the President to the Industrial Court, nor to minimum wage
under the Minimum Wage Law, or to hours of employment under the Eight-Hour
Labor Law, nor to an unfair labor practice, but seeks the enforcement of a provision of the collective bargaining agreement, and to recover
damages occasioned by the alleged unlawful acts of petitioner, jurisdiction
pertains to the ordinary courts and not to the Industrial Court.  (PAFLU et al. vs. Tan & REMA, Inc., 99
Phil. 854; Dee Cho Lumber Workers’ Union vs. Dee Cho Lumber Co., 101 Phil. 417; Cebu
Port Labor Union
vs. State Marine Corp., et al., 101 Phil. 468; Phil. Sugar Institute vs.
CIR, 106 Phil. 401, and in Elizalde Paint & Oil
Factory vs. Bautista, G. R. No. L-15994, Nov. 23, 1960).

The remaining question to
be resolved is whether or not the procedure followed by the lower court in is­suing
the injunction is correct.  In associated
Watch­men & Security Union vs. Union States Lines, et al., (101 Phil. 896), it was held that if a labor dispute exists
the provisions of the Magna Charta of Labor (R.A. 875) should be strictly
followed.  The same ruling was laid down
in PAFLU vs. TAN, et al., supra, and in PAFLU vs. Barot, et al. (99
Phil. 1008).  On
the other hand, if no labor dispute exists the court may issue an ordinary in­junction
in accordance with the Rules of Court. 
While the trial court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case,
the injunction issued by it was
nevertheless void because the
procedure laid down by Section 9 (d) of R.A. 875 was not followed in its
issuance.  The law provides that the
testimony of witnesses in open court (with opportunity for
cross-examination) in support of
the allegations of the complaint made under oath, and the testimony in op­position
thereto, if offered, should be heard and that a finding of fact by the court
must be made, to the effect that unlawful acts have been threatened and will be
com­mitted unless restrained; that substantial and irreparable injury to
complainant’s property will follow; that as to each item or relief granted
greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than
will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief; that complainant
has no adequate remedy at law; and that public officers charged with the
duty to protect complainant’s property are unable or unwilling to furnish
adequate protection.  The instant case being an outgrowth of a
labor dispute, the trial court cannot grant the injunction merely under Section
6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court (now Section 6, Rule 58), but must follow what
is provided for in R.A. 875 (Allied Free Workers’ Union, et al. vs. Hon. Judge
Segundo Apostol, et al., 102 Phil. 292).

Wherefore, the order of the lower court dated November
8, 1962 is set aside
and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.  The preliminary injunction issued by this
Court is modified ac­cordingly.  No
pronouncement as to costs.

Dizon, Acting C.J., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Ruiz
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Reyes, J., on official leave of absence.

Sanchez, J., concurs in the
result.

^[1]
“That the Company hire all
unlicensed members of the crew needed for the service of the Company through
the hiring office of the Union and that membership in good standing with the
Union shall be a strict requirement as a
condition of employment of all unlicensed members employed by the said Company x x
x x“

“Upon written notification by
the Union that an unlicensed member of
the crew is no longer in good standing with the UNION, the COMPANY shall
immediately dismiss such crew member from employ­ment; provided, however, that
the UNION shall assume all the responsibilities and shall answer for any and
all liabilities that may arise by virtue of such dismissal.” [Paragraph 1 and 2, Article II, Close Shop Agreement.]

^[2]
The petitions for certification election were still pending when the collective
bargaining agreement was renewed, and also when respond­ents herein filed their
answer to the instant petition for certiorari.

^[3]
Petitioners here were not members of either the Philippine Labor Federation or
the General Maritime Stevedores Union.