HEIRS OF BONDSMAN BASILIO NEPOMUCENO, NAMELY: DELSA N. TRASMONTE, MARILOU N. DECENA, AND FE VALENZUELA; AND HEIRS OF BONDSMAN REMEDIOS CATA-AG, NAMELY AMELIA CATA-AG TUMAKIN, PE…

Heirs of Bondsman Basilio Nepomuceno versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the heirs of two bondspersons, Basilio Nepomuceno and Remedios Cata-ag, against the People of the Philippines. The heirs ask the Supreme Court to reverse the Court of Appeals, which had dismissed their petition for certiorari and upheld the Regional Trial Court's refusal to let them pay cash in place of a forfeited property bond. The case matters because it draws the line every bar candidate must know: an order of forfeiture is not a judgment on the bond. The first is interlocutory and merely compels the bondsperson to show cause; the second finally fixes liability and may be executed. The lower courts blurred that line, and the Supreme Court had to restore it.

Procedural History

The story begins in the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 12, which convicted Daniel Nepomuceno of homicide and later dealt with the bond posted for him. When the bondspersons failed to produce Daniel, that court issued an order on November 25, 1994 forfeiting the property bond. It denied their motions for reconsideration, and in its order of January 27, 1995 it gave them sixty days to produce Daniel, after which it said it would render judgment against the bond. Years passed. On May 8, 2008 the bondspersons moved to pay the amount of the bond in cash in place of the property bond. On June 24, 2008 the trial court, through Acting Presiding Judge Castillo, denied the motion, declaring that the January 27, 1995 order had long become final and directing execution. It denied reconsideration on August 5, 2008.

The heirs then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, claiming grave abuse of discretion. On November 23, 2011 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, holding that the bond had been forfeited and that the November 25, 1994 order was already a judgment on the bond. It denied reconsideration on November 26, 2012. The heirs then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review.

Facts

Basilio Nepomuceno and Remedios Cata-ag posted a property bond for Daniel Nepomuceno, who was adjudged guilty of homicide by the Ormoc City Regional Trial Court on June 27, 1990. The bondspersons were immediate members of Daniel's family. Daniel appealed, and on June 28, 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction with modification of the civil indemnity. The conviction became final and an entry of judgment followed.

When the records returned to the trial court, the bondspersons were ordered on June 27, 1994 to bring Daniel to court within five days from notice. They asked for extensions, which the trial court granted, first ten days and then thirty days. They never produced Daniel. On November 14, 1994 they submitted a written explanation and an alternative motion to replace the property bond with cash. On November 25, 1994 the trial court issued an order stating that judgment was rendered in favor of the Republic forfeiting the property bond.

The bondspersons moved for reconsideration. On January 27, 1995 the trial court denied the motion but gave them sixty days from receipt to produce Daniel, and said that upon expiration of that period it would render judgment against the bond in favor of the Republic. No such judgment was ever rendered. Years passed without Daniel being detained. In 2008 the bondspersons moved to pay the amount of the bond in cash, and the trial court denied the motion on the ground that the January 27, 1995 order had become final and that the judgment on the bond should now be executed.

Issues

• Whether or not the November 25, 1994 order is a judgment on the bond, or merely an order of forfeiture.
• Whether or not the bondspersons may, in lieu of the property bond, pay the amount of bail in cash.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the assailed orders.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, on the conditions of the bail, provides:

SECTION 2. Conditions of the Bail; Requirements.—All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions: a. The undertaking shall be effective upon approval and remain in force at all stages of the case until its final determination, unless the proper court directs otherwise; b. The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules. c. The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, the trial may proceed in absentia; and d. The accused shall surrender himself for execution of the final judgment.

This fixes the bondsperson's undertaking, including the duty to surrender the accused for execution of the final judgment, which Daniel's bondspersons failed to do.

Section 18 of Rule 114 of the same Rules, on forfeiture of the bail bond, provides:

SECTION 18. Forfeiture of Bail Bond. — When the presence of the accused is specifically required by the court, or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, the bond shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen are given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why a judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of their bond. Within the said period, the bondsmen: (a) must produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and (b) must explain satisfactorily why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so. Falling in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bond, and the court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, except when the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.

This is the provision that separates the forfeiture from the judgment on the bond, and it is the heart of the Court's ruling.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The November 25, 1994 order is not a judgment on the bond but merely an order of forfeiture. The Court explained that when the accused fails to appear, the judge may summarily declare the bond forfeited, and only after the thirty-day period, during which the bondspersons may produce the principal or show cause, may a judgment on the bond be rendered. The Court quoted its earlier ruling in Mendoza versus Alarma:

An order of forfeiture of the bail bond is conditional and interlocutory, there being something more to be done such as the production of the accused within 30 days. This process is also called confiscation of bond. In People v. Dizon, we held that an order of forfeiture is interlocutory and merely requires appellant "to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against it for the amount of the bond." Such order is different from a judgment on the bond which is issued if the accused was not produced within the 30-day period. The judgment on the bond is the one that ultimately determines the liability of the surety, and when it becomes final, execution may issue at once.

The Court stressed that the November 25, 1994 order neither determined the bondspersons' liability nor fixed the amount for which they were accountable. The trial court's own January 27, 1995 order confirmed this, for it gave sixty days to produce Daniel and stated that judgment against the bond would follow. No such judgment was ever rendered. The lower courts therefore erred in treating the forfeiture as a final judgment on the bond.

On the second issue, the Court held that the bondspersons may pay the amount of bail in cash in place of the property bond. Since no judgment on the bond had been rendered, there was nothing final to execute, and the motion to substitute cash for the property bond should have been entertained. The Court granted the petition in part and set aside the rulings below to the extent they treated the forfeiture as a final judgment.

Doctrine

An order of forfeiture is interlocutory and conditional. It merely requires the bondsperson to show cause why judgment should not be rendered for the amount of the bond. A judgment on the bond is different: it ultimately determines the surety's liability, and once final, execution may issue at once. A judgment against the bondsperson cannot be entered unless it is preceded by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to produce the accused or to adduce a satisfactory reason for the failure to do so. Until that judgment is rendered, the bondsperson may still be allowed to substitute cash for the property bond.

Disposition

The petition was partly granted. The Court set aside the rulings treating the November 25, 1994 order as a final judgment on the bond and allowed the bondspersons to pay the amount of bail in cash in place of the property bond.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an order of forfeiture is interlocutory and merely compels the bondsperson to show cause, while a judgment on the bond finally fixes liability and may be executed. Examiners use this case to test whether you can distinguish the two, and to test the rule that no judgment on the bond may issue without the prior forfeiture and an opportunity to be heard.