G.R. No. 20438. September 27, 1966
NEW MANILA LUMBER CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. FERMIN CENTINO AND THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS., RESPONDENTS.
ZALDIVAR. J.:
Lumber Co. Inc. were complainant and respondent respectively in an
unfair labor practice case, docketed as Case No. 2178-ULP, in the Court
of Industrial Relations. After hearing, the Court of Industrial
Relations rendered a decision, on March 24, 1961, ordering herein
petitioner to reinstate herein respondent Centino to his work and to
pay him back wages from August 10, 1959 up to his actual reinstatement.
This decision was affirmed by the Court of Industrial Relations en banc
on April 17, 1961. On May 24, 1961 this Court, in G. R. No. L-18337,
dismissed the petition for certiorari to review said decision. On
September 1, 1961 the Court of Industrial Relations issued a writ of
execution.
On September 21, 1961, petitioner herein filed in the court below an
urgent motion praying: (1) that the case be reopened on the grounds
that it had found out, only after the Honorable Supreme Court had
denied the appeal, that respondent Centino had been employed in the
Manila Mahogany Manufacturing Corporation during the pendency of the
ULP case so that his earnings therefrom should be deducted from the
back wages that were due him, and that a further study of the evidence
and the jurisprudence pertinent to the case shows that Centino was not
entitled to reinstatement; and (2) that a hearing on the issues thus
raised be ordered.
The urgent motion was heard on June 7, 1962, and petitioner herein
adduced evidence regarding the earnings of respondent Centino at the
Manila Mahogany Manufacturing Corporation. After presenting said
evidence petitioner moved for the continuance of the hearing to enable
it to present evidence of earnings of Centino in other establishments.
This motion for continuance was denied verbally by the trial Judge on
the ground that the urgent motion did not allege about earnings other
than those from the Manila Mahogany Manufacturing Corporation. This
verbal denial was later embodied in a written order on June 20, 1962. A
motion for reconsideration of the verbal order of June 7, 1962
alleging, among others, “that discovery of other employment and source
of livelihood of complainant were only recently made” was filed on June
13, 1962, and in support thereof were filed a memorandum on June 20,
1962 and a supplemental memorandum on June 23, 1962. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court en banc on July 17, 1962.
Counsel for respondent Centino filed, on August 16, 1962, with respondent court an ex parte
motion for partial execution of the decision of March 24, 1961.
Respondent court, without previous hearing, issued on September 8, 1962
an order granting the ex parte motion for execution, directing the
chief of the examining division of the court, or his duly authorized
representative, “to compute the amount due to petitioner Fermin Centino
representing as back wages from August 10, 1959 up to September 27,
1961, inclusive, at the rate of P6.90 a day, deducting therefrom the
sum of P226.95 as the amount earned by him during the days he worked
with the Manila Mahogany Manufacturing Corporation.”[1]
Petitioner herein received on September 13, 1962 a copy of the order
of September 8, 1962, and on September 18, 1962 filed a motion for the
reconsideration of said order; and on September 27, 1962 he filed a
memorandum in support of its motion, alleging among other things that
the order of denial of June 7, 1962 had never become final and
executory. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution dated October 2,
1962 on the ground that the motion for reconsideration of the order
dated September 8, 1962 was only a reiteration of the previous motion
for reconsideration of the order of June 7, 1962 which had already been
denied by the court en banc.
On October 19, 1962 petitioner herein received a copy of the
above-mentioned resolution of October 2, 1962, and on October 27, 1962
it filed with the respondent court a notice of its intention to appeal
from the order dated September 8, 1962 (Annex I) and from the
resolution dated October 2, 1962 (Annex K).
This petition for certiorari was filed on November 16, 1962 praying
that the order (Annex I) and the resolution (Annex K), above adverted
to, be set aside and that an order issue directing respondent court to
allow petitioner to adduce additional evidence on deductible earnings
of respondent Centino during the pendency of CIR case No. 2178-ULP.
In this appeal, the contention of the petitioner may be reduced to
the following propositions, to wit: That the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations committed a grave abuse of discretion: (1) in
holding that the order of June 7, 1962 had become final and executory,
when not all the issues raised in the urgent motion of September 21,
1962, had been resolved; (2) in denying petitioner’s motion to adduce
evidence on deductible earnings of respondent Centino from other firms;
and (3) in issuing the writ of execution without having previously
given petitioner its day in court.
We find no merit in this appeal.
The decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in Case No.
2178-ULP, dated March 24, 1961, ordering respondent therein, now
petitioner New Manila Lumber Co., Inc, (a) to reinstate complainant
Fermin Centino and (b) to pay him his back wages from August 10, 1959
to the date of his actual reinstatement, and affirmed by this Court on
May 24, 1961, had long become final and executory, and on September 1,
1961 the CIR issued a writ of execution of the decision in said case.
In spite of the fact that the decision had become final and a writ of
execution had been issued, still the Court of Industrial Relations,
exercising its powers under Sections 14 and 17 of Commonwealth Act 103,
entertained the urgent motion of petitioner dated September 21, 1961
alleging that after the decision had become final and executory it had
found out that respondent Centino had been employed during the pendency
of the case in the Manila Mahogany Manufacturing Co, from March 21,
1960 to May 20, 1961, and his earnings therefrom should be deducted
from the back wages to be paid to him. The so-called urgent motion,
however, also alleged that further study of the evidence and
jurisprudence in the case shows that Centino was not entitled to
reinstatement, and so it was prayed that the case be reopened, and a
hearing on the issues thus raised be ordered.
The records show, and petitioner itself had so stated in his instant
petition for certiorari, that the urgent motion was heard on June 7,
1962 and it had introduced evidence to prove the employment of
respondent in the Manila Mahogany Manufacturing Co. Inc. as alleged in
its urgent motion; but after petitioner had thus presented its evidence
it orally moved for continuance of the hearing to enable it to present
other evidence showing the earnings of respondent in other companies.
This “other evidence” appears to be evidence allegedly gathered after
the urgent petition was filed on September 21, 1961. The motion for
continuance was verbally denied in open court, and this verbal denial
was affirmed in a written order that was issued on June 20, 1962. A
motion for reconsideration of the verbal order of June 7, 1962, as
embodied in the order of June 20, 1962, was denied by the Court en banc
on July 17, 1962. These orders of June 7, 1962 and July 17, 1962 had
determined what earnings of respondent should be deducted from the back
wages due him and they became final in so far as they relate to the
deductible earnings. The petitioner did not appeal from those orders,
so that they had thereby became final. These orders being corollary to
the decision of March 24, 1961 in Case 2178-ULP which had become final
and which the respondent court had in fact ordered to be executed on
September 1, 1961, there was nothing left for the Court of Industrial
Relations to do but to order its execution, which it did by order dated
September 8, 1962. The Court of Industrial Relations can order the
execution of its decision or order which is already final and executory
upon a motion ex-parte by the prevailing party, or even motu proprio.
It is not necessary that notice of the motion for a writ of execution
be served on herein petitioner in a case like this, much less is a
hearing on the motion for execution necessary. The matters in issue in
Case 2178-ULP had been finally disposed of. Section 23 of Commonwealth
Act No. 103, as amended, provides that:
“In case of non-compliance with any award, order or
decision of the Court of Industrial Relations after it has become
final, conclusive, and executory, the judgment may be enforced by a
writ of execution or any other remedy provided by law in respect to
enforcement and execution of orders, decisions or judgments of the
Courts of First Instance.”
Execution should issue as matter of right upon a final judgment or
order, and is mandatory. Sec. 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court so
provides:
“Execution shall issue only upon a judgment or order
that finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution shall
issue as a matter of right upon the expiration of the period to appeal
therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.”
We believe that the Court of Industrial Relations had acted within
its jurisdiction, and neither did it abuse its discretion, when it
issued the order of September 8, 1962 granting the ex-parte motion for
execution, and the action of the respondent court in this respect
cannot be corrected in the present action for certiorari.
It is urged by herein petitioner that had it been previously
notified of the issuance of the writ of execution it could have brought
to the attention of the court that there was an agreement between the
parties that the “judgment of back wages shall only be made after the
hearing of said urgent motion on the merits.”[2]
But there was already a hearing on the merits of that urgent motion.
There was no reason, therefore, for herein petitioner to complain.
Petitioner also claims that the issues raised in its urgent motion
of September 21, 1961 had not been resolved before the order of
execution was issued, and that the denial of its motion to adduce
evidence on earnings of respondent in firms other than the Manila
Mahogany Manufacturing Corporation was an abuse of discretion. This
claim is untenable. The issue raised in the urgent motion was the
earnings of herein respondent in the Mahogany Manufacturing
Corporation. This issue was heard and the court found that respondent
earned P226.95. Earnings from other companies were not alleged in the
urgent motion. Even under Section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103,
whereby the Court of Industrial Relations is empowered to modify, alter
or reopen any award, order, or decision, on application of an
interested party, during the period of its effectiveness, this power
can be exercised only upon grounds coming into existence after the
decision was rendered, not upon grounds already directly or impliedly
litigated and decided, or which were, or could be, available to the
parties during the original hearings. To hold otherwise would give way
to vicious and vexatious repetitions of proceedings.[3]
The petitioner also claims that the respondent court abused its
discretion when it denied the motion for the continuance of the hearing
of the urgent motion of September 21, 1961, with a view to a reopening
of the case upon the ground “that a further study of the evidence and
jurisprudence, pertinent to this case, show that complainant is not
entitled to reinstatement.” This claim of petitioner deserves no
consideration, because the matter about the right of respondent Fermin
Centino to be reinstated had been conclusively and finally decided in
the decision of the respondent court in Case No. 2178-ULP which had
been affirmed by this Court in L-18337 on May 24, 1961.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is dismissed, and the writ of certiorari prayed for is denied; with costs against the petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.
Regala, J., on leave.
[1] As copied from the order, Annex I to the petition.
[2] This refers to the urgent motion of September 21, 1961.
[3] Rattan Art and
Decorations Inc. vs. Rattan Art and Decorations Union, L-6466, May 21,
1954, citing the case of Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. etc. vs. Philippine
Labor Organization, G.R. No. L-3506, January 31, 1951.