JUAN N. EVANGELISTA AND TEODORA EVANGELISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. LUIS B. REYES, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that respondent
judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila be ordered to desist
from proceeding with the trial of the case and to remand the same to
the Municipal Court of Manila for.further proceedings.

On October 25, 1960, the spouses Cabral filed a civil complaint,
entitled “Foreclosure of Chattel Mortgage”, in the Municipal court of
Manila against George Tunaya and the spouses Juan and Teodora
Evangelista, praying that in the event of defendants’ failure to pay
the plaintiffs the sum of P1,000.00, jointly and solidarity with
interest, the said defendants be ordered to deliver to the Sheriff of
Manila properties mortgaged by Tunaya to the plaintiffs (by way of
chattel mortgage); that the Sheriff be ordered to sell said properties
at auction to satisfy the judgment debt; and for other relief, just and
equitable, in the premises. The defendants, spouses Evangelista, were
the judgment creditors and successful bidders of the properties of
Tunaya, subject of the chattel mortgage in question, when the same were
sold under execution issued pursuant to a judgment in Civil Case No.
5550 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered on June 2, 1960,
subsequent to the execution and registration of said chattel mortgage
deed in favor of plaintiff spouses Cabral on December 12 and 14, 1959,
respectively. Petitioners (defendants below) moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action, while defendant
Tunaya confessed judgment on the date set for hearing. In spite of
opposition to the motion to dismiss, the municipal court rendered
judgment by confession against Tunaya, but dismissed the case against
herein petitioners; so that respondents Cabral (plaintiffs below)
appealed the decision of the municipal court to the Court of First
Instance of Manila.

On March 24, 1981, defendants Evangelista filed a motion in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to affirm the decision of the
inferior court, and to dismiss the appeal of the spouses Cabral, which
motion was subsequently denied by respondent judge on April 4, 1961 in
open court, giving no reasons to support its denial. On April 17, 1961,
defendants Evangelista filed an answer pleading prescription with
counterclaim for damages, which pleading for respondent spouses Cabral
controverted. Although the case was set for trial by respondent judge,
the same was postponed several times to enable the parties to submit
memoranda in connection with the application of Section 10, Rule 40, of
the Rules of Court to the ease. In their memorandum, petitioners sought
a remand of the case to the inferior court for further proceedings in
accordance with Section 10 of Rule 40, supra; but opposition
thereto having been registered by plaintiffs Cabral, respondent judge
denied the motion to remand on August 31, 1962, and re-set the case for
hearing on October 25, 1962. Motion for reconsideration of this order
having been likewise denied, petitioners moved for another
postponement, and interposed the present petition against the
last-mentioned order of the respondent court.

Petitioners urge that the refusal to remand the case was contrary to
jurisprudence and law (Section 10, Rule 40, of the Rules of Court);
that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
from the questioned orders of respondent judge other than by the
present special civil action; and pray that respondent judge be
ordered, after hearing, to remand the case to the inferior court for
further proceedings because respondent court had no jurisdiction to
hear the case on the merits either on its appellate or original
jurisdiction.

We see no merit in the petition. By filing an answer in the court of
first instance, where, the case lay on appeal, the petitioners herein
withdrew their objections to the court’s taking cognizance of the case
pursuant to its original jurisdiction, as expressly authorized by the
last portion of section 11,  Rule 40, which is as follows:

“* * * But instead of dismissing the case, the Court
of First Instance in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may
try the case on the merits if the parties therein file their pleadings
and go to the trial without any objection to such jurisdiction.”

Once they had assented to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction,
petitioners are not permitted thereafter to alter the position thus
voluntarily chosen, and insist once more that the case be returned to
the municipal court. Any other rule would allow the parties to confuse
and delay at will the course of litigation.

The argument that the suit was for the recovery of only P1,000 and
could not be taken cognizance of by the court of first instance in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction because the amount involved was
below the minimum prescribed by the Judiciary Act is untenable. Such a
stand mistakenly assumes that the recovery of the indebtedness was the
sole object of the suit, when the pleadings show that the respondents
Cabral (plaintiffs below) likewise sought to recover the possession of
the mortgaged chattels in order that foreclosure might proceed, and
there was no proper showing that the value of these properties was not
within the original jurisdiction of the court of first instance.
Petitioners had the burden of proof in this regard, since they are the
ones contesting the court’s jurisdiction; but they failed to satisfy
the charge.

Wherefore, the writs applied for are denied, with costs against petitioners Evangelista.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.