FILIPINO PIPE & FOUNDRY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is an original action for
certiorari to annul an award made by respondent Workmen’s Compensation
Commission.

Petitioner Filipino Pipe &
Foundry Corporation was admittedly the employer of respondent Guillermo
Hiwatig, who on October 11, 1961 filed with Regional Office No. 4 of the
Department of Labor in Manila a claim for compensation due to temporary total
disability allegedly caused by an accident that took place in petitioner’s
premises on May 3, 1961, notice of which had been given to petitioner’s company
physician on this same date. On February 5, 1962, the Regional Commissioner of
said office issued an award considering the claim uncontroverted, because of
petitioner’s failure to contest it within the reglementary period, and
directing petitioner to pay to Hiwatig the sum of P269.90, as compensation, and
a weekly compensation of P14.76, thereafter, until his temporary total
disability for labor ceases, but not exceeding P4,000.00 plus P5.00 as costs,
under section 55 of Act. No. 3428, without prejudice to Hiwatig’s right to
claim additional compensation should his injury result in any further
disability.

On March 5, 1962, petitioner filed
a “petition for new hearing”, stating, that it was only upon receipt
of copy of the award that petitioner learned of its failure to answer Hiwatig’s
claim within the statutory period and that on January 15,1962, or two (2) days
after petitioner’s president had received from his secretary copy of said
claim, petitioner contested the same, and praying that “in the interest of
justice and a better elucidation of the facts of the case,” the petitioner
be “given the opportunity to cross-examine the claimant and his witnesses
and to present its defenses.” This petitioner was denied on June 6, 1962.
Later on, or on July 11, 1962, petitioner filed a “petition for relief
from judgment,” which was denied in an order dated August 20, 1962.

Hence, the present original action
for certiorari, which is predicated upon the theory that the aforementioned
award had been made without notice and hearing, thereby denying due process to
herein petitioner, and that the latter has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.

It is clear from the record that
petitioner is not entitled to the relief prayed for, because:

(1) It is not denied that
petitioner’s answer to Hiwatig’s claim had not been filed within ten (10) days
from notice of Hiwatig’s claim. Pursuant to section 45 of Act No. 3428
petitioner is deemed, therefore, to have renounced its right to controvert said
claim. In other words, the same was deemed admitted by petitioner, which,
accordingly, had no more right to demand a day in court. This situation is not
affected by the circumstance that it was all due to the fact that one Miss
Villaluz, the secretary of petitioner’s president, had not delivered to him
copy of said claim until January 13, 1962. Petitioner must suffer the effects
of the omission or negligence of its own employee.

(2) Copy of the award of February
5, 1962 was served upon the petitioner on the 16th of the same month. Yet
petitioner’s “petition for new hearing” was not filed until March 5,
1962, or more than fifteen (15) days from notice of said award. The same was,
therefore, final and executory at the time of the filing of said “petition
for new hearing” (section 50, Act No. 3428).

(3) Said “petition for new
hearing” partook of the nature of a motion for “relief from
judgment”, which motion was fatally defective, for no affidavit of merit
was attached thereto (Rule 38, Section 3, Rules of Court).

(4) Petitioner’s “petition for
relief from judgment”, could not possibly be entertained, it having been
filed on June 16, 1962, more than sixty (60) days from notice of the
aforementioned award (Rule 38, Section 3, Rules of Court).

(5) Petitioner could have appealed,
not only from said award, but, also, from the order denying the “petition
for new hearing”, and the order denying the “petition for relief from
judgment”. In other words, it had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition herein must be, as
it is hereby, denied, and the case dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista
Angelo, Parades, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.