G.R. No. 203478. June 23, 2021
ARMANDO H. DE JESUS, PETITIONER, VS. INTER-ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., INTERORIENT MARITIME ENT., INC. LIBERIA, GRIGOROUSSA I MARIN’E S.A.-MONROVIA LIBERIA, RESPONDENTS.
HERNANDO, J.:
Factual Antecedents:
De Jesus exclusively worked as a seafarer on board the ocean-going
vessels of Inter-Orient Maritime Enterprises Inc. (Inter-Orient) for 20
years prior to the present controversy. For every employment contract he
has entered with Inter-Orient, De Jesus underwent the requisite
pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was consistently declared
“fit for sea service.”[5]
On July 4, 2005, De Jesus executed another employment contract[6]
withI nter-Orient, on behalf of its principal, Inter-Orient Maritime
Ent., Inc-Liberia-Grigoroussa I- Maritime S.A, as Second Mate on board
MIT Grigoroussa I, for nine months.[7]
On his seventh month on board the vessel and while it was docked in
the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Egypt, De Jesus felt severe chest
pains and had difficulty breathing. The master of the vessel then
instructed that De Jesus be brought to the nearest hospital. On March
28, 2006 he was admitted at the Suez General Hospital in Egypt (United
Doctors Hospital) where he was diagnosed with Acute Extensive Myocardial
Infarction.[8]
On April 7, 2006, Dr. Edward Youssef of United Doctors Hospital
cleared De Jesus to travel by plane back to the Philippines. However, he
was declared unfit for physical work and was advised to immediately
undergo a coronary angiography.[9]
Upon his arrival in the Philippines on April 12, 2006, De Jesus
proceeded directly to the office of the respondent company. He inquired
about his unpaid salaries and was told that he needed to sign a
Quitclaim before his salaries could be released. Due to exhaustion and
desperation brought about by his medical condition, he signed the
Quitclaim without fully understanding its consequences.[10]
On the next day, April 13, 2006, De Jesus had himself examined by a
specialist from YGEIA Medical Clinic upon the advice and referral of
respondent company. It was confirmed that he had Myocardial Infarction
and that he must undergo rehabilitation and continuous medication. No
medical report was given to him. He then requested to have his treatment
conducted in Cebu, his hometown, under the supervision of the company’s
accredited doctors. Inter-Orient agreed to the arrangement provided De
Jesus sign a letter stating that he will hold the company free and
harmless from any liability.[11]
On April 18, 2006, representatives from Inter-Orient accompanied De
Jesus to the National Labor Relations Commission in Quezon City to sign a
number of Inter-Orient-prepared documents as pre-requisite for the
processing and release of his bonuses and allowances. Among the
documents which were executed by the parties were:
a) Computerized NLRC-NCR Complaint form[12] for non-payment of wages, overtime pay, vacation pay and sick leave pay docketed as NLRC NCR OFW Case No. 06-04-011699-00;
b) Quitclaim and Release submitted before the NLRC;[13]
c) Release of All Rights in Filipino and English versions;[14] and
d) A pro-forma Motion to Dismiss. [15]
De Jesus received the amount of Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Nine Dollars (US$5,749.00) upon signing the documents.
Accordingly, Labor Arbiter Jovencio LI. Mayor, Jr. issued an Order
dated April 19, 2006 dismissing with prejudice the complaint docketed as
NLRC NCR OFW Case No. 06-04-011699-00.[16]
Hence, on April 26, 2006, De Jesus returned to Cebu and continued
his treatment under the supervision of Dr. Marie Geraldine SJ. Lim of
Cebu Doctor’s University Hospital.[17]
All expenses for his treatment were for his own account since
respondent company informed him that he already received all that was
due him[18]
On February 12, 2007, De Jesus filed before the NLRC Regional
Arbitration Branch in Cebu a complaint docketed as NLRC RAB VII OFW Case
No. 02-0014-2007 for disability benefits and sickness allowance under
the POEA-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) and for moral and
exemplary damages.[19]
Inter-Orient filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of res judicata
in view of the previous dismissal of the similar complaint earlier
filed by De Jesus against the respondent company. In addition,
Inter-Orient pointed out that De Jesus had already executed a quitclaim
and release in the prior case docketed as NCR OFW Case No.
06-04-0ll699-00.[20]
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter:
The Arbiter denied Inter-Orient’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that De Jesus signed the release and quitclaim without the aid of a
counsel and the consideration contained therein was unconscionable.
Moreover, he found as irregular the filing on the same day of the
complaint and the Motion to Dismiss in NLRC NCR OFW Case No.
06-04-011699-00.[21]
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Motion To Dismiss
is DENIED. This case is therefore, set for another conference on May 23,
2007 at 2:00 P.M.[22]SO ORDERED.[23]
Inter-Orient appealed the denial of its Motion to Dismiss with the
NLRC but it was denied by the labor tribunal for being a prohibited
pleading. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied
for the same reason.[24]
Hence, the parties were required to submit their position papers. De
Jesus alleged that his illness, i.e. cardiovascular disease, which he
acquired during his employment with respondent company, was compensable
considering that it was listed as an occupational disease under Section
32-A of the POEA SEC.[25]
Also, the Quitclaim was void since the consideration therein was
unconscionable and it was signed without the assistance of counsel.’
Moreover, the complaint, quitclaim, and the motion to dismiss were all
executed on the same day, a clear departure from the usual process in
labor complaints, and proof of the irregularity in the execution of the
quitclaim. As such, the dismissal of N’LRC NCR OFW Case No.
06-04-011699-00 should not be considered as bar to his subsequent claim
of disability benefits from respondent company.[26]
Meanwhile, Inter-Orient reiterated its arguments in the Motion to
Dismiss that De Jesus’ illness was not compensable because he failed to
prove that it was work-related or work-aggravated. Furthermore, De Jesus
executed a Quitclaim with full consent and comprehension, thus he
cannot renege from its terms. Inter-Orient insisted that the amount of
Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty-Nine Dollars (US$5,749.00) can hardly
be considered unconscionably low.[27]
In a Decision[28] dated February 25, 2009, the Labor Arbiter found in favor of De Jesus. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered directing the Respondents to jointly and solidarily pay
complainant the following:
SO ORDERED.[29]
The Labor Arbiter found De Jesus’ Quitclaim to be invalid since the
consideration was unconscionably low and was entered by De Jesus without
the aid of counsel. There was umeasonable, irregular and apparent haste
in the execution of the complaint, motion to dismiss and quitclaim all
in one day. The arbiter found it unbelievable for De Jesus to have
prepared the subject documents all in one day, particularly as they
pertained to the release of all his rights. Moreover, the Affidavit of
the Reader/Interpreter/Translator was not acknowledged before a Notary
Public. Thus, the Quitclaim could not be considered as having validly
extinguished all ofDe Jesus’ claims.
The Arbiter also found that De Jesus’ illness is compensable.
Inasmuch as he suffered a heart attack while on board the vessel, the
presumption is that it is work-related and the employer has the burden
of proof to show otherwise.
The arbiter thus granted De Jesus permanent disability benefits,
sickness allowance, and attorney’s fees. The amount that he earlier
received from respondents was treated as cash advance.
Inter-Orient appealed the Decision of the arbiter to the NLRC.
Ruling of the National Labor
Relations Commission:
The NLRC reversed and set aside the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and
held that De Jesus’ illness was not work-related. It accorded great
weight to the Medical Report submitted by Inter-Orient.
The labor tribunal further declared that for his illness to be
compensable, it was incumbent upon De Jesus to prove that it was
work-related. Section 20 of the POEA SEC mandates that for the illness
to be compensable, the employee must be able to prove that the illness
was acquired during the period of his employment or that it was at least
aggravated thereat or was workrelated.[30] De Jesus failed to present substantial evidence to prove the foregoing.
The dipositive portion of the September 30, 2009 NLRC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated 25 February 2009 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a NEW ONE is
entered DISMISSING the complaint.SO ORDERED.[31]
Aggrieved, De Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration bt it was denied by the NLRC.[32] He thus filed a Petition for Certiorari[33] before the appellate court assailing the reversal by the NLRC of the LA’s ruling.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
The appellate court, in its November 23, 2010 Resolution[34] dismissed De Jesus’ petition on the following grounds:
1) the petition does not show the date when petitioner received the
copy of the assailed September 30, 2009 Decision, as well as when the
motion for reconsideration was filed, in violation of Sec. 3, 2nd paragraph, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court;2) petitioner failed to furnish the public respondent, NLRC, with a copy of the petition, in violation of Sec. 3, 3rd paragraph, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court;
3) the attached copy of the assailed Resolution is neither a
duplicate original nor certified true copy of the same, in violation of
Sec. 1, 2nd paragraph, Rule 65, in relation to Sec. 3, 3rd paragraph of Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court; and4) the Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping does not
bear the signature of petitioner, and its execution does not conform
with the 2004 Notarial Rules.[35]
De Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration[36]
citing inadvertence and submitted anew supporting documents. The Motion
for Reconsideration was however denied by the appellate court in its
August 8, 2012 Resolution.[37]
Thus, De Jesus filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the issuances of the CA. He raised the following-
Issues:
I.
The Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed outright petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari and denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration based purely [on] procedural and technical grounds.
II.
The Court of Appeals erred when it failed to resolve the petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari based on the merits thereof and reinstate the Decision of the Regional Arbitration Branch VII of Cebu dated February 25, 2009.[38]
Petitioner’s Arguments:
Petitioner submits that the appellate court erred in dismissing outright his Petition for Certiorari
based purely on procedural and technical grounds. At the same time, he
attached copies of the following: Certification from Cebu Central Post
Office of the proof service to the NLRC of the Petition for Certiorari;[39] signed Verification and Certificate of Forum Shopping dated June 4, 2010 notarized by Atty. Charter Antonio L. Tayurang;[40] copy of the Notarial Commission of Atty. Tayurang;[41] and Order dated December 11, 2009 granting Atty. Tayurang’s notarial commission up to December 31, 2011.[42]
Petitioner pleads that the case be resolved based on the merits.[43]
He prays for the reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter’s ruling
declaring his illness as work-related in accordance with the POEA SEC
and existing jurisprudence. He argues that the NLRC erred in giving full
credit to the biased Medical Report of the company-designated doctor.
Moreover, it was the employer who has the burden to show that his
illness was not related to his work. Lastly, in cases where the evidence
of the parties are in conflict with each other, it is incumbent upon
the court to resolve the case in favor of the employee.[44]
Respondents’ Arguments:
Respondents, in their Comment,[45]
maintain that the petition should be dismissed due to the formal
infirmities contained therein. Bare invocation of interest of justice is
not a ground to automatically suspend procedural rules. Petitioner
clearly failed to timely rectify the defects and ignored the
requirements. Moreover, respondents aver that the case is already barred
by res judicata considering the prior quitclaim voluntarily executed by De Jesus in favor of the respondents.[46]
Our Ruling
Exceptions to Questions of Law:
The issues raised by petitioner are factual. It must be stressed that
questions of fact are generally beyond the domain of a Petition for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as it is limited to reviewing
only questions of law. This Court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally reassess the credibility and probative weight of the evidence
of the parties and the findings and conclusions of the Arbiter, the NLRC
and the CA.
However, this rule admits of exceptions wherein this Court expands
the coverage of a Petition for Review to include a resolution of
questions of fact. One of those exceptions is when the lower court
misapprehended facts or overlooked relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justifY a different conclusion.[47]
Such exception finds application in the instant case considering that
the findings of facts and conclusion on relevant facts by the NLRC
differed from that of the Arbiter. This Court is thus compelled to take a
second look at the facts of the case to arrive at the correct
conclusion.
Substantial compliance to formal
requisites allowed; procedural
rules are mandatory but must
not frustrate the administration
of justice.
Heirs of Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines[48] declared that:
Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid
application of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice. As held in Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo:
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. If the application of the Rules
would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from
their operation. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative
to relax compliance with the procedural rules, even the most mandatory
in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put an end to
litigation speedily and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be
heard.Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive:
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary
situations that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us,
depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and
give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the
technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of
the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not
stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear
need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system
and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between
the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every
litigant be given the full opportur.Jty for the just and proper
disposition of his cause.[49] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Durban Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan,[50]
the appellate court dismissed the petition on procedural grounds for
failure of the petitioner therein to attach a copy of the assailed
decision but upon review by this Court, the case was decided on its
merits. This Court held:
[I]n the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the Court
may disregard procedural lapses so that a case may be resolved on its
merits. Rules of procedure should promote, not defeat, substantial
justice. Hence, the Court may opt to apply the Rules liberally to
resolve substantial issues raised by the parties.It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has
consistently held that cases shall be determined on the merits, after
full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.
In so doing, the ends of justice would be better served. The
dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the
rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
justice, and thereby defeat their very ends. Indeed, rules of procedure
are mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other
matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of the rules
that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice must be avoided.[51] (Emphasis Ours; Citations omitted)
Following the above guidelines and upon Our review of the records,
the outright dismissal of the case based on procedural defects alone was
not proper.
Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, the petitioner
attached a Certified True Copy (original stamped) of the NLRC Decision[52] and only the Resolution[53]
denying his Motion for Reconsideration was a photocopy of the Certified
True Copy of the issuance. The photocopied Resolution nonetheless bears
the notation “Certified True Copy” as that found in the attached NLRC
Decision. As to the alleged defect in the Affidavit of Service in the
Petition for Certiorari, although petitioner failed to attach the
registry receipt as proof of service to NLRC, he nonetheless indicated
the registry receipt no. in the affidavit.
Moreover, a second perusal of the Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation[54]
filed by the petitioner before the appellate court would show that
there was a genuine attempt to rectify the procedural infirmities in the
petition. Petitioner subsequently submitted several supporting
documents together with the motion, to wit: photocopy of the issuances of the NLRC with photocopy stamp of Certified True Copy;[55] original Affidavit of Service indicating the Registry Receipt No.,[56]
Certification from Atty. Tayurang stating that the Verification and
Certification of Non Forum Shopping was signed before him by the
petitioner exhibiting his SSS ID and Seaman’s Book,[57] copies of the identification card,[58] Notarial Commission of Atty. Tayurang including the Order granting his notarial commission; and Affidavit of Merit[59]
fully explaining the reason for the formal infirmities. These, taken
together, should be considered as substantial compliance, enough to
support the reinstatement of the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner.
In addition, petitioner submitted before Us additional supporting documents[60] that essentially satisfy the lacking requirements in the Petition for Certiorari.
At this point, however, this Court admonishes petitioner’s counsel
for failing to strictly comply with the formal requirements vital in the
resolution of the Petition for Certiorari. We thus take this
opportunity to remind counsel that in seeking a review or reversal of a
judgment or order, the handling lawyer must fully and scrupulously
comply with the requisites prescribed by law, with keen awareness that
any error or imprecision in compliance therewith may well be fatal to
his client’s cause.[61]
Ultimately, this Court finds it proper to decide the case based on
the merits and brush aside the technicalities considering the
substantial compliance of the petitioner with the formal requirements
set out by the rules.
Compensability of disability:
The employment of seafarers is governed by the terms and conditions
of their employment contract, the law and the relevant regulations of
the POEA SEC, which are deemed integrated into every employment
contract, which employers are bound to observe as the minimum
requirements for the employment of Filipino seafarers.[62]
In this particular case, the 2000 POEA SEC[63] issued pursuant to DOLE Department Order No. 4, and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 9, both series of 2000, apply, viz.:
Sec. 20 B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers
work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as
follows:x x x x
2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment
in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the full cost of
such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment as well as
board and lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be
repatriated.However, if after repatriation; the seafarer still requires medical
attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided
at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree
of his disability has been established by the company-designated
physician.x x x x
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the
seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage
until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability
has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case
shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a
postemployment medical examination by a company-designated physician
within three working days upon his return, except when he is physically
incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency
within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer
to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his
forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the
assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer
and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be fmal and binding
on both parties.6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer
caused by either injury or illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in
accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of
this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or
disease shall be governed by the rates and rules of compensation
applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.
For a disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000
POEA SEC, it must be the result of a work-related injury or a
work-related or work-aggravated illness. The POEA SEC defines a
work-related injury as “injuries resulting in disability or death
arising out of and in the course of employment.’[64]
On the other hand, a work-related illness has been defined as “any
sickness resulting in disability or death as a result of an occupational
disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions
set therein satisfied.”[65]
Under the same rule, petitioner is obliged to submit himself to a
post employment medical examination by a company-designated physician
within three working days upon his return, except when he is physically
incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency
within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure to comply with
this mandatory reporting requirement shall result in forfeiture of the
right to claim disability benefits. It is likewise provided that if a
doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third
doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer whose
decision shall be fmal and binding on both parties.[66]
In this case, petitioner submitted himselfto a medical examination by
the company-designated doctor a day after his arrival in Manila. In
that examination, it was confirmed that he had Myocardial Infarction and
must undergo rehabilitation and continuous medication. Petitioner then
requested for his treatment to be continued in Cebu, his hometown under
the supervision of Inter-Orient’s accredited doctors.[67] Evidently, the Medical Report[68]
issued by Dr. Donna Delia S. Urlanda (Dr. Urlanda) of YGEIA Medical
Clinic declared petitioner’s illness as not work-related. Although
petitioner alleged that he did not receive a copy of the said report,
the same was unsubstantiated by evidence. Indeed, he never questioned
the findings of Dr. Urlanda and her recommendation. Thus, at that point,
petitioner clearly forfeited his right to claim any disability benefit.
De Jesus only questioned the company doctor’s integrity and the
correctness of her findings when he filed the complaint against
respondents before the Arbiter on February 12, 2007, or roughly 10
months after he was examined by the company-designated doctor. While
petitioner allegedly consulted his personal doctors since April 26 2006,
the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Lim, his own doctor, stating that
his illness was work-related, was only issued on December 5, 2008, or
about 30 months after his examination by the company-designated
physician.
This Court’s ruling in German Marine Agencies v. National Labor Relations Commission[69]
weighs heavily against petitioner’s claim for disability benefits. We
have consistently held that it is the company designated physician who
should determine the degree of disability of the seafarer or his fitness
to work, thus:
… In order to claim disability benefits under the Standard
Employment Contract, it is the “company-designated” physician who must
proclaim that the seaman suffered a permanent disability, whether total
or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the
latter’s employment…. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of
contracts that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt
upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of
its stipulation shall control. There is no ambiguity in the wording of
the Standard Employment Contract — the only qualification prescribed for
the physician entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman’s
disability is that he be “company-designated.”[70]
The 2000 POEA SEC provides for the company-designated doctor to
assess the illness of the seafarer or his fitness to return to sea
duties. In the event the seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the
company-designated physician, he ought to consult his doctor of choice.
Here, instead of consulting his own physician, De Jesus executed a
release and quitclaim in favor of respondents. In executing this
document, petitioner thus impliedly admitted the correctness of the
assessment of the company-designated physician, and acknowledged that he
could no longer claim for disability benefits.
Requisites for validity and
consequence of Quitclaims.
While quitclaims are frowned upon for being contrary to public
policy, this Court has nevertheless recognized legitimate waivers that
represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of a worker’s claim
Where the waiver was voluntarily executed with a full understanding
thereof, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding
undertaking.[71]
In the instant case, petitioner did not deny signing the documents
relinquishing all his claims against the respondents. It is not disputed
that he signed the “Quitclaim and Release”72 submitted before the labor
tribunal and was subscribed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter.
Tellingly, the relevant portion of which states:
xxx That for and in consideration of the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY NINE USDOLLARS & 00/100 CENTS ONLY
(USDS, 749.00) paid by INTERORIENT MARITIME ENT. INC., INTERORIENT
MARITIME ENT. INC. – LIBERIA and GRIGOROUSSA I MARINE S.S. -MONROVIA,
LIBERIA in settlement of my claims as fmancial assistance receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged to my complete and full satisfaction, I
hereby release and discharge the above said agency and principals and
its officer(s) from all claims by way of unpaid wages, separation pay,
overtime pay, differential pay or otherwise as may be due me in
connection with my past employment with said establishment and its
office.IN VIEW WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 18th day of April, 2006 in Quezon City, Philippines
(Sgd.) [Hand-Signed]
ARMANDO H. DE JESUS SR.
ComplainantSigned in the presence of:
(sgd.)(sgd.)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 18th day of April
2006 at Quezon City, Philippines.
(Sgd.)
JOVENCIO LI. MAYOR, JR (Hand-written)
Labor Arbiter[73]
Petitioner likewise signed another document “RELEASE OF ALL RIGHTS” and
its Filipino version “PAGPAPAUBAYA NG LAHAT NG KARAPATAN.”[74] The relevant portion of the document in Filipino states:
x x x x
BASAHING MABUTI – Sa pagpirma mo nito, isinusuko mo na LAHAT ng karapatan mo.
Ako, si ARMANDO H. DE JESUS SR., nasa hustong gulang xxx
kapalit ng halagang LIMANGDAAN (sic) LIDO PITONG DAAN APATNAPUT SIYAM NA
DOLYAR 00/100 (USD5,749.00) na natanggap ko, ay buong pusong NAGPAPAUBAYA [handwritten](isulat ang salitang NAGPAPAUBAYA) at habang buhay na pinalalaya ang mga sumusunod:
GRIGOROUSSA I MARINA S.A.-MONROVIA, LIBERIA INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC
kasama na ang kanilang tagapagmana, tagapagpatupad, administrator,
kahalili at itinalaga at kanilang mga barko, lalo na ang ” MIT
GRIGOROUSSA I “, at ang may-ari, ahente, nagpapatakbo, nagarkila,
kapitan, opisyal, mga tripulante, “underv.iter” at “P&I Club” ng mga
naturang barko sa lahat ng karapatan at paghahabol ko, maging ito ay
nagmula sa “tort”, kontrata, batas, o kahit anupamang basehan ng
paghahabol, dahil sa pagkakasakit ni ARMANDO H. DE JESUS , na nangyari ng ganito:CORONARY ARTERY DISEASE SIP ANTEROSEPTAL
MYCORDIAL INFRACTION; CHRONIC STABLE ANGINA
(Deskripsyon ng pagkakasakit ng seaman)Naiintindihan ko at pumapayag ako na ang pagbabayad ng may-ari ng
“Mff GRIGOROUSSA I” at ng kanyang mga taga-halili sa ilalim ng
Pagpapaubaya ng Labat ng karapatan na ito ay hindi tanda ng kanikang
pag-amin ng kasalanan o pananagutan sa pagkakasakit ni ARMANDO H.
DEJESUS SR;1. Alam ko na ang dokumentong ito ay higit pa sa resibo. ITO AY ISANG PAGPAPALAYA. ISINUSUKO KO NA LABAT NG KARAPATAN KO.
2. Alam ko na sa pagpirma ko ng dokumentong ito. tinatapos ko na
lahat ng karapatan ko na nag-uugat sa pagkakasakit ni ARMANDO H. DE
JESUS SR kasama na ang lahat ng maari kong maging karapatan sa hinaharap
maging ito man ay base sa kontrata, “tort” o kahit ano pa man dahilan.
kahit na ang naturang karapatan ay hindi nabancit sa dokumentong ito.3. Alam ko na ang pagbabayad sa akin ng perang nabanggit sa unang
bahagi ng dokurnentong ito ay hindi pag-amin ng sinurnan (kasama na ang
mayari ng barko at kanyang mga kahalili) ng kasalanan o pananagutan sa
kin.4. Pinipirmahan ko ang dokurnentong ito dahil sa tatangapin kong pera
na nagkakahalagang USD5,749.00. Hindi ako pinangangakuan nang anurnang
bagay.5. Ako ay nasisiyahan na.[75]
x x x x
The voluntariness in the execution of the foregoing document is evident.
Petitioner also appears to have fully understood the contents of the
document he was signing, as the important provisions thereof had been
relayed to him in Filipino and the questions requiring his own answer
were included in the document. The document reflected thus:
ANG MGA SUMUSUNOD AY KAILANGANG SAGUTIN NG NAGHAHABOL SA KANYANG SARILING SULAT-KAMAY
A. Binasa mo ba ang dokurnentong ito mula sa urnpisa hanggang sa hulihan? Opo
B. Alam mo ba kung ano ang dokurnentong ito na iyong pinipirmahan? Opo
C. Ano itong dokurnentong pinipirmahan mo? Pagpapaubaya ng Lahat ng Karapatan
D. Ginawa mo ba ang (5) limang pahayag na nakasulat sa itaas na may
intensyong ang mga partidong pinalalaya ay aasa sa mga naturang pahayag
bilang katotohanan? Opo.E. Alam mo ba na sa pagpirma mo ng Pagpapaubaya ng lahat ng
Karapatan na ito, tinatapos mo na ang lahat ng karapatan at paghahabol
mo, maging ito man ay base sa kontrata, “tort” o kahit ano pa mang
dahilan? Opo.x x x x
Ika 18th ng Abril, 2006
(Sgd.)
DE JESUS, ARMANDO H. (Hand-written with thumbprint)
ITO AY PAGPAUBAYATinulungan ni***
Mga Saksi:
(Sgd)
ROSARIO T. ESCALADA(Sgd.)
JOVENCIO LI. MAYOR, JR. (Handwritten)
LABOR ARBITER***kung meron abogado ang naghahabol[76]
Likewise, the amount of US$5,749.00 which he received in
consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable. As we held in
Periquet v. National Labor Relations Commission:[77]
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against
public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and
represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and
may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is
only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the
questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person
making the waiver did so voluntarily. with full understanding of what he
was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding
undertaking. x x x [78] [Emphasis Ours]
In sum, in order for a deed of release, waiver or quitclaim
pertaining to an existing right to be valid, it must meet the following
requirements: (1) that there was no fraud or deceit or coercion on the
part of any of the parties; (2) that the consideration for the quitclaim
is sufficient and reasonable; and (3) that the contract is not contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.[79]
At this point, petitioner was already aware of his medical condition
when he signed the waiver as he was examined by the company-designated
doctor. Moreover, there was no proof that respondents employed fraud,
malice, force or duress to compel him to sign the quitclaim. “Lack of
sleep and exhaustion”, can hardly be accepted as grounds to invalidate
the waiver considering that it was signed six days after his arrival.
For sure, as a seasoned seafarer, petitioner properly considered his
decision of giving up his rights before signing the quitclaim.
Furthermore, this Court is inclined to sustain the validity of the
quitclaim considering that it was signed before the Labor Arbiter.
Article 227 [233][80] of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 227. Compromise agreements. Any compromise settlement, including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or the regional office of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties.
The National Labor Relations Commission or any court, shall not assume
jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of
non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the
settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion.
Hence, the Quitclaim being valid, it legally serves as a bar to the present claim of petitioner for disability benefits.
All told, this Court finds no merit in the supplication of the
petitioner. He is not entitled to disability benefits for his failure to
validly and timely question the findings of the company-designated
physician declaring his disability not work-related or aggravated, and
in view of the valid quitclaim which he himself executed relinquishing
all his rights against the respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby PARTLY GRANTED.
The November 23, 2010 and August 8, 2012 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 05114 dismissing petitioner’s Petition
for Certiorari based solely on technical infirmities are hereby SET ASIDE.
The September 30, 2009 Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission declaring petitioner’s illness not work related and
dismissing the complaint for disability benefits is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, J., on wellness leave.
Caguioa, Inting, and Lopez, J. Y., JJ., concur.
**
Designated as additional member per raffle dated April21, 2021 vice J.
Delos Santos who recused due to prior action in the Court of Appeals.
*** The National Labor Relations Commission is dropped as party respondent pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[1] Rollo, pp. 7-51.
[2] Id. at 59-63; penned by
Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio and concurred in by Associate
Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos (now a member of this Court) and Ruben
C. Ayson.
[3] Id. at 64-66; penned by
Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos (now a member of this Court)
and concurred in by Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Zenaida T.
Galapate-Laguilles.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 3-39.
[5] Rollo, p. 12.
[6] Id. at 314.
[7] Id.
[8] Id. at 13.
[9] Id. at 316.
[10] Id. at 13-l4.
[11] Id. at 14-15.
[12] Id. at 86; docketed as NLRC NCR OFW Case No. 06-04-011699-00.
[13] Id. at 87.
[14] Id. at 88-95.
[15] Id. at 96.
[16] Id. at 97-98.
[17] Id. at 17.
[18] Id. at 80-84.
[19] Id. at 17.
[20] Id. at 80-85.
[21] Id. at 99.
[22] Id.
[23] Id. at 99.
[24] Id. at 101-102; penned by Commissioner Oscar S. Uy and concurred in by Commissioners Violeta O. Bantug and Aurelio D. Menzon.
[25] Id at. 106.
[26] Id. at 112·133.
[27] Id. at 147-159.
[28] Id. 201-209.
[29] Id. at 209.
[30] Id. at 71-73.
[31] Id. 74.
[32] Id. at 77-78.
[33] CA rollo, pp. 3-39.
[34] Rollo, pp. 59-62.
[35] Id. at 64-66.
[36] Id. at 210-230.
[37] Id. at 64-66.
[38] Id. at 21.
[39] Id at 320.
[40] Id. at 322.
[41] Id. at 323.
[42] Id. at 324.
[43] Id at 22-36.
[44] Id. at 37-55.
[45] Id. at 341-350.
[46] Id. at 341-349.
[47] Ico v. Systems Technology Institute, Inc., 738 Phil. 641 (2014).
[48] 666 Phil. 350 (2011).
[49] Id. at 371-372.
[50] 514 Phil. 187 (2005).
[51] Id. at
[52] CA rollo, pp. 42-50;
[53] Id. at 40-41.
[54] Id. at 192-200.
[55] Id. at 208-219.
[56] Id. at 207.
[57] Id. at 220-221.
[58] Id. at 222.
[59] Id. at 225-226.
[60] Rollo, pp.
320-324; Certification of Delivery of Registry No. 27290; Original of
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping for the Petition
for Certiorari filed before the CA; Notarial Commission documents of
Atty. Tayurang.
[61] Lebin v. Mirasol, 672 Phil. 477,488 (2011).
[62] Heirs of Olorvida, Jr. v. BSM Crew· Service Centre Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 218330, June 27, 2018.
[63] POEA Memorandum Circular No.9, Series of2000, dated June 4, 2000.
[64] Definition of Terms 2000 POEA-SEC.
[65] Phil-Man Marine Agency, Inc. v. Dedace, Jr., G.R. No. 199162, July 4, 2018.
[66] See Manila Shipmanagement & Manning, Inc. v. Aninang, CiR. No. 217135, January 31, 2018.
[67] Id. at 14-15.
[68] Id. at 163-164.
[69] 403 Phil. 572, 588 (2001).
[70] Id. at 588-589.
[71] Mendoza. J,v. San Miguel Foods. Inc, 497 Phil. 945 (2005).
[72] Rollo, p. 87.
[73] Id.
[74] Id. at 92-93.
[75] Id.
[76] Id. 93.
[77] 264 Phil. 1115 (1990).
[78] Id. at 1122.
[79] See Arlo Aluminum. Inc. v. Piñon, Jr, 813 Phil. 188 (2017).
[80] As renumbered.