ALICIA Y. LAUREL, SUBSTITUTED BY HER SOLE HEIR AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE JUAN MIGUEL Y. LAUREL, PETITIONER, VS. FERDINAND M. VARDELEON, RESPONDENT.

Laurel versus Vardeleon

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Alicia Y. Laurel, later substituted by her sole heir and legal representative Juan Miguel Y. Laurel, against Ferdinand M. Vardeleon. The action below was a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership and for quieting of title over a twenty thousand three hundred six square meter island in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan. The case matters because it fixes the standard for the dismissal of a complaint for failure to prosecute, and it teaches when a trial court may, and may not, cut short a plaintiff's day in court.

Procedural History

Alicia Laurel filed her complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 6, where it was docketed as a civil case for recovery of possession and ownership and quieting of title. After pre-trial, the trial court issued a pre-trial order setting the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence on three dates: the seventh of September 2005, the twelfth of October 2005, and the twenty-third of November 2005. On the twelfth of October 2005, the trial court denied the plaintiff's oral motion to postpone, denied the pending motions for reconsideration of both parties, and dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute, also dismissing the counterclaim. The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied in January 2006.

Laurel appealed to the Court of Appeals, which denied the appeal in October 2011 and affirmed the dismissal in full, with costs against her. Her motion for reconsideration was denied in June 2012. She then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

On the twenty-third of July 2004, Alicia Laurel sued Ferdinand Vardeleon for recovery of possession and ownership and for quieting of title over the island in Caticlan. Vardeleon denied the material allegations and claimed that he had bought the island from Avelina Casimero in April 1973, and that Laurel was guilty of laches.

In the pre-trial order of July 2005, Laurel was given three settings for the presentation of her evidence. Earlier, in August 2005, Vardeleon moved to correct the pre-trial order so that it would reflect Laurel's supposed admission at pre-trial that she knew of his possession since 1975. The trial court denied that motion, and Vardeleon's motion for reconsideration was left unresolved. Laurel, for her part, moved to reset the September 2005 hearing. The trial court granted the reset on condition that she pay the transportation expenses and appearance fee of Vardeleon's counsel. Laurel's motion for reconsideration of that condition was likewise left unresolved.

On the twelfth of October 2005, Laurel appeared with a substitute counsel and her first witness. She moved in open court to postpone, citing the pending motions and the fact that the substitute lawyer had not yet conferred with the witness, since her true counsel, who had interviewed the witness, was absent. The trial court denied the postponement, denied both motions for reconsideration outright, and dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Laurel was then eighty-one years of age.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to prosecute despite the plaintiff's active participation in the proceedings and the pendency of unresolved motions involving the pre-trial order.
• Whether or not the dismissal was proper given that the plaintiff still had one remaining scheduled hearing, agreed upon at pre-trial, within which to present her evidence.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. - If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the court.

This is the very ground on which the trial court dismissed the complaint and on which the Court of Appeals affirmed, so the whole case turns on whether the plaintiff's conduct amounted to failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the dismissal was error. The fundamental test for non prosequitur, that is, failure to prosecute, is whether under the circumstances the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude, and there must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute. The Court found no such unwillingness. Laurel, though eighty-one years old, attended the October 2005 hearing with counsel and her first witness, and she and the substitute counsel honestly believed that trial could not proceed while the two motions for reconsideration remained unresolved. The trial court itself was remiss in failing to act on those pending motions and in denying them summarily in open court.

On the second issue, the Court held that since the parties had agreed at pre-trial to three settings for the plaintiff's evidence, she should have been given three opportunities, not merely two. The Court stressed that the delay contemplated by the rule must be for an unreasonable length of time, and here the continuance sought was only until the next setting, just over one month away, which the respondent expected and which caused him no prejudice. The Court quoted its own settled doctrine:

While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or a scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss.

The Court also reminded that dismissals should be made with care, since a dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits and may forever bar a litigant from judicial relief, so that technicality shall not prevail over substantial justice.

Doctrine

Failure to prosecute under Section 3 of Rule 17 requires unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff, tested by whether the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. Absent a pattern or scheme to delay, or a wanton failure to observe the rules, courts should decide the case on the merits rather than dismiss it. Where the parties agreed at pre-trial to a fixed number of settings for the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to the full number of settings so long as she acts within the schedule, and a postponement confined to that schedule is not delay for an unreasonable length of time. The grant or denial of postponements rests on the sound discretion of the judge, but that discretion must be exercised reasonably and wisely, and the desire for speedy disposition must not result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals were reversed and set aside, the civil case was reinstated, and the trial court was ordered to set the case for the reception of Alicia Laurel's evidence.

Remember This

Memorize the test: failure to prosecute means want of due diligence and unwillingness to proceed, not mere inability to present evidence on one setting. Examiners use this case on the discretionary dismissal of actions under Rule 17, on the grant of postponements, and on the rule that technicality must not prevail over substantial justice.