PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VICTORIANO VILLAR @ BOY, A CCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Villar

The Case

This is People versus Villar, a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecute Victoriano Villar, known as Boy, for the killing of Jesus Ylarde. Villar was one of four men charged with murder, and he was the last of them to be caught and tried. The case matters for two reasons. First, it shows how conspiracy and treachery are established when several assailants act together, and how unexplained flight is treated as evidence of guilt. Second, and more useful for the Bar, it is a compact lesson on the proof required for damages: civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, temperate damages in place of small actual damages, and the strict standard for loss of earning capacity.

Procedural History

An information dated September 21, 1987 charged Wilson Suitos, Alvaro Suitos, and Villar with the murder of Jesus Ylarde before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 38. The accused were tried separately as they were apprehended. Alvaro was tried first and convicted of murder in 1988; the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction in 1993, modifying the damages. Wilson was tried next and convicted in 1996; the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction in 2000, again with modifications. Villar was apprehended only after almost eighteen years. He pleaded not guilty, stood trial, and in a decision dated August 8, 2008 the Regional Trial Court convicted him of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, with joint and several liability for damages. Villar appealed to the Court of Appeals, which in its decision of January 31, 2012 denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court in full. The case then reached the Supreme Court by appeal, and the Court required supplemental briefs, which both parties chose not to file.

Facts

At around six o'clock in the evening of September 5, 1987, Jesus Ylarde was sitting in front of his store in Umingan, Pangasinan with his daughter Juvy. Alvaro Suitos, Wilson Suitos, and Villar suddenly emerged from the ice cream parlor across the street. Alvaro shot the victim first, hitting him on the forehead and causing him to fall. Although that first shot was fatal, Wilson and Villar still fired shots at the victim. The three then fled, followed by a fourth companion driving a tricycle. Juvy testified to these events, and her sister Vivian corroborated her, recalling that she was studying inside the store when several shots rang out.

Villar set up an alibi, claiming he was in Cubao, Quezon City at the time of the shooting. The trial court rejected the alibi as uncorroborated and self-serving, especially in light of his positive identification by the victim's daughters. The court also noted his flight: although he knew of the charge against him as early as 1987, he did not surrender but went into hiding and was apprehended only after almost eighteen years. On these facts the trial court found the killing qualified by treachery.

On appeal, Villar argued that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy. He pointed to Juvy's testimony that he aimed his gun at her, not at the victim, and that when he fired it was the victim who was hit. The Court of Appeals found no merit in this, concurring that the assailants simultaneously emerged from the store, successively shot the victim, and fled together.

Issues

• Whether or not the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Villar conspired with his co-accused in the killing of Jesus Ylarde.
• Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing.
• Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly awarded damages, particularly the award for loss of earning capacity.

Applicable Provisions

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes murder, the crime of which Villar was convicted:

Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

The killing was qualified as murder because treachery attended it, and the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua.

Section 3 of Republic Act Number 9346, the law prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, governs Villar's eligibility for parole:

Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

This is why the Court expressly declared that Villar is not eligible for parole.

Article 2206 of the Civil Code, as discussed in the decision, is the basis for indemnity for loss of earning capacity:

Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death.

The Court used this provision to explain that the award is not for lost earnings but for lost capacity to earn, and so must be proved as actual damages.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal lacked merit and that the courts below correctly found Villar guilty of murder. It had already affirmed the convictions of Alvaro and Wilson, and it found that Villar, in conspiracy with them, treacherously shot and killed the victim. The Court rejected the argument drawn from Juvy's testimony, since the evidence showed the assailants acting together from start to finish.

On the second issue, the Court sustained the finding of treachery, and it affirmed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It added that Villar is not eligible for parole under Section 3 of Republic Act Number 9346.

On the third issue, the Court corrected the damages. It found the award of moral damages of 50,000 pesos correct, but increased civil indemnity from 50,000 pesos to 75,000 pesos in line with prevailing jurisprudence, and awarded exemplary damages of 30,000 pesos. On actual damages, the Court applied its ruling in People versus Villanueva that when actual damages proven by receipts amount to less than 25,000 pesos, temperate damages of 25,000 pesos are justified. It therefore deleted the 11,575 pesos in actual damages and granted temperate damages of 25,000 pesos in lieu thereof. All damages were made to earn interest at six percent per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid.

The most important correction concerned loss of earning capacity. The Court held that the indemnity for lost earnings had been erroneously computed, because the formula adopted over time limits recovery to net earning capacity, meaning total income less the necessary expenses for the victim's own living, and the computation of 16,000 pesos did not consider those expenses. The Court stressed that compensation for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proven by competent proof and the best obtainable evidence. It recognized only two exceptions, where documentary evidence may be dispensed with: when the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage, and when the deceased is a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage. Here, the widow gave conflicting testimonies, first claiming a net income of 16,000 pesos a year and later describing daily and monthly earnings and a harvest of palay, and the amounts mentioned were arbitrary and not shown to be below the prescribed minimum wage. The Court therefore deleted the award of 320,000 pesos for loss of earning capacity for lack of basis.

Doctrine

Conspiracy is established when the assailants act in concert, shown here by their simultaneous emergence, their successive shooting of the victim, and their common flight from the scene. Treachery qualifies a killing as murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code when the attack is sudden and the victim is given no chance to defend himself. Unexplained flight, especially hiding for many years after knowledge of the charge, is an indication of guilt. A person convicted of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua is not eligible for parole under Section 3 of Republic Act Number 9346. On damages, civil indemnity is increased to 75,000 pesos, moral damages of 50,000 pesos are proper, and exemplary damages of 30,000 pesos may be awarded. When actual damages proven by receipts are less than 25,000 pesos, temperate damages of 25,000 pesos may be granted in lieu thereof. Finally, and this is the rule examiners test, indemnity for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages and must be proved by competent proof, not merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow, and the computation must use net earning capacity, that is, total income less the victim's necessary living expenses, except in the two recognized instances where the victim is self-employed or a daily wage worker earning below the minimum wage.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Villar for murder but modified the judgment: it declared him ineligible for parole, deleted the award for loss of earning capacity and the actual damages, increased civil indemnity to 75,000 pesos, awarded exemplary damages of 30,000 pesos and temperate damages of 25,000 pesos, and imposed interest at six percent per annum on all damages from finality of judgment until fully paid.

Remember This

The one line to memorize is that indemnity for loss of earning capacity is actual damages that must be proved by competent evidence of net income, not by the self-serving testimony of the widow. Examiners use this case to test the rules on temperate damages in lieu of small actual damages and the strict proof required for lost earning capacity.