HEIRS OF JULIAN MOLINA, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HONORIA VDA. DE BACUD AND COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

This case involves
a dispute over two parcels of land with a
total area of about 60 hectares in barrio Bulagan
in San Mariano, Isabela.  In her complaint be­fore the Court of First
Instance of the province, res­pondent alleged that she was the absolute owner
and possessor of these lands, having inherited them from her mother, Catalina Siccuan; that in her lifetime her mother was in
“continuous, public, quiet and adverse possession” of the lands, in
the concept of an owner; and that in 1944 Julian Molina, employing
“violence, force, strategy and intimidation,” seized possession of
Lot 1 and a part of Lot 2 and cut the trees found therein.  As relief, she asked the court to declare her
the owner of the lands and to order
Molina to deliver to her the lands and their products and pay her damages.

Molina denied the charges and claimed that the lands in question
were public lands which he had acquired un­der a sales application duly approved by the Director of Lands.  He contended further that appellee
had lost what­ever possessory rights she might have
acquired by prescription.  The Director
of Lands also intervened to assert public ownership of the lands and contest
the jurisdic­tion of the court.  Before
trial of the case began, Mo­lina died and so he was substituted by his heirs,
the petitioners in this case.

The trial court found that the lands in question really formed
part of the public domain.  In 1916, res­pondent’s
mother, Catalina Siccuan, took possession of the
lands, declared them for taxation in 1919 and there­after paid the yearly
taxes.  Still later, she had the lands
surveyed.  It is important to note that
the survey plan was approved by the Director of Lands on April 17, 1922.

It was also found that Molina bought a five-hectare lot from a Kalinga
tribesman and that, on the basis of this acquisition, he extended his
possession over the neighboring lands in question.  In 1936, he filed a sales application (S.A.
No. 21218) covering these lands which the Director of Lands approved the
following year (Entry No. 4064).

In 1938, respondent protested before the lands office the sale to Molina and, as no action had
been taken, she filed another protest in 1948. 
An investigation was thereupon conducted but as respondent made known
her desire to seek relief in the courts, the administrative investig­ation was
suspended.  This case was filed in the
lower court on July 28, 1950.

The court upheld respondent’s right to the lands, even as it
declared them public, on the basis of respondent’s priority of possession.  It ordered the Director of Lands to cancel
Molina’s sales application and directed peti­tioners to vacate the lands and
deliver them to respond­ent.  Petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals, but again they lost.^[1]
In affirming the lower court’s judgement, the
appellate court said:

“Since the land in question has been in the actual and
physical possession of the plaintiff and her predecessor in interest from 1916
un­til 1936 when said possession was interrupted by the defendants, on one
hand, and the defendants’ predecessor in interest have (sic) ac­quired the right
of possession thereto through sales application filed in 1936, approved by the
Director of Lands on June 19, 1937, on the other hand, we are of the opinion, and so hold,
that the land in question, although a part of the public domain, the Director
of Lands, with knowledge that that portion of public land is occupied
by a private person claiming it as her own, placing it under cultivation, and
paying to the Government taxes on the land, could not grant a sales application
in favor of Julian Molina, without giving the actual occupant the opportunity
to acquire it for herself.

“x x x It is
true that in a purely adminis­trative case the Director of Lands is the offi­cer
authorized to determine the rights of the parties, and the courts cannot review
any decision or order of the Director of Lands involv­ing factual questions
unless there is
excess of jurisdiction.  When the
decision of the Director of Lands, however, is on a question of law, the courts are not
precluded from taking cognizance of a petition to review.  And that is also true when property rights,
not mere rights of possession, are claimed over the land in question in which
case the court should be the one to resolve the controversy.  (Simon vs. Tago, 72
Phil. 289) The land subject of the sales application, having been occupied and
claimed in ownership by a person other than the applicant, whose possession antedeates that of the latter, the approval by the Director
of Lands of the sales application, affecting as it does the property rights of
the plaintiff and not his (sic) mere rights of possession, the court has
jurisdiction to settle the controv­ersy and order the cancellation of the sales
application.”

Petitioners brought the case to this Court for review, raising a
number of issues which will be discussed in the course of this decision.  They contend, first of all, that after
finding that the lands in question are public lands, the trial court should
have dismissed this case because under section 4 of the Public Land Act (Com.
Act No. 141)^[2]
the authority to dispose of public lands is vested exclusively in the Director
of Lands.

The argument is without merit. 
The authority given to the Lands Department over the disposition of
public lands does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the public character of the land
notwithstanding.^[3]
This is such an action and the fact that in her complaint respondent claimed
the lands in ownership did not change the nature of her action.  The allegation of ownership should be
regarded as a mere surplusage.^[4]

The jurisdiction of the lower court cannot be as­sailed even if
this case were viewed from the standpoint of appellants’ position.  For even if it be granted that the Director
of Lands could validly dispose of the lands in favor of appellants, still
jurisdiction over this case must be recognized in the court because once a sales application is approved and
entry is permitted, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and the
Director of Lands loses control and possession thereof except if the
application is finally disapproved and entry is annulled or revoked.^[5]

But of course the Director of Lands could not approve the sales
application of appellants’ predecessor in in­terest.  By being in open, continuous, exclusive and
no­torious possession and occupation of the lands for more than 30 years, in the concept of an owner,
respondent certainly has acquired a right which entitles her to a grant.^[6]
Only the lack of an application for the confirmation of respondent’s title
prevents us from holding that the lands are now deemed private lands, beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.^[7]

Nor can the
Director of Lands plead ignorance of res­pondent’s possession and occupation of
the lands.  As already adverted to above,
he had previously approved the survey plan of the lands which Catalina Siccuan submitted, on April 17, 1922. 
Even the lands inspector sent to verify Molina’s application must have
noticed the improve­ments on the land.

It is argued,
however, that respondent has lost what­ever rights she might have acquired by
abandonment.  After paying taxes in 1929,
it is claimed, neither
respondent nor her predecessor paid taxes for subsequent years and it was only
in 1952 that taxes were paid again. 
Aside from the fact that abandonment cannot be inferred from the mere
failure to pay taxes, this argument is fallacious because it is based on a premise that is against the ex­press finding of
both the trial court and the appellate court, namely, that after the lands were
declared far tax­ation in 1919 by respondent’s mother, the yearly taxes
thereafter were paid.  What is more, it
was found by both courts that from 1916 to 1936 the lands were in the pos­session
of Catalina Siccuan and later of respondent.  This is
a finding that is conclusive
on us.^[8]

Now, if the lands were thus in the possession of respondent and
her predecessor from 1916 to 1936, peti­tioners’ claim to an older possession
dating back to Spanish times must be rejected as something inconsistent.  In the language of the Code, “possession
as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different person­alities.”^[9]
It will not do for petitioners to try to create doubt on the validity of the
factual conclusions in this case by adverting to a supposed discrepancy between the trial
court’s finding and that of the Court of Appeals as to the date when Molina entered
the lands.  A reading of the decisions of
both courts will readily show that Molina excluded respondent from the lands in 1936,
when, after buying a small parcel of land from Kalinga
tribesmen, he extended his possession over the lands in question and included
them in a sales
applic­ation he filed in the Bureau of Lands.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed with costs against
petitioners.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Castro, J., took no part.

^[1]
The Director of Lands did not appeal.

^[2]
The provision reads:

“Subject
to said control, the Directof of Lands shall have
direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any
other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the
public domain, and his deci­sions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.”

^[3] Bohayang v.
Maceren, 96 Phil. 390 (1954); Pitargue
v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5 (1952).

^[4] Diaz v. Macalinao, 102
Phil. 999 (1958).

^[5] Cf.
Diaz v. Macalinao, supra.

^[6]
Com. Act No. 141, sec. 48(b), as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942.

^[7] It
is now settled that where all requirements for a grant by the State are
complied with through actual phys­ical possession, openly, continuously and
publicly, the possessor is deemed to have already acquired not only a right to a grant but a grant itself, for it is
not neces­sary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant
may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor
being sufficient.  (Mesina
v. Pineda Vda. de Sonza,
58 O.G. 6403 /1906/; Susi v. Raxon, 48 Phil. 424 /1925/)

^[8] See,
e.g., Goduco v. Court of
Appeals, 63 O.G. 309
(1964); resolution denying reconsideration, 63 O.G. 313 (1965)

^[9] Civil Code art. 538.