OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, REPRESENTED BY HON. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS TANODBAYAN, AND HON. GERARD A. MOSQUERA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, …
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Office of the Ombudsman versus Borja
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari brought before the Supreme Court by the Office of the Ombudsman, represented by the Tanodbayang Conchita Carpio Morales and Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Gerard A. Mosquera, against Roger F. Borja, the General Manager of the San Pablo City Water District. The Ombudsman asks the Court to reverse the Court of Appeals, which had cleared Borja of administrative liability for causing the water district to pay backwages that were, by final judgment, his own personal obligation. The case matters because it draws the line between criminal and administrative liability, and because it fixes the meaning of the administrative offense called conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Procedural History
The administrative complaint was docketed with the Office of the Ombudsman in 2003. In a Decision dated November 27, 2007, the Ombudsman found Borja guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposed suspension for one year without pay. Borja moved for reconsideration, which the Ombudsman denied. The Ombudsman also directed the Board of Directors to implement the suspension.
Borja then filed a Petition for Prohibition before the Court of Appeals, which treated it as a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In a Decision dated October 26, 2011, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Ombudsman's ruling, holding that Borja had acted in good faith. The Ombudsman's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated May 9, 2012.
The Ombudsman elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. A separate petition was filed by Lerma Prudente and Damaso Ambray, members of the Board of Directors of the water district, and the Court consolidated the two petitions.
Facts
In August 1991, the Board of Directors of the San Pablo City Water District dismissed its division chiefs, Evelyn Eje and Racquel Tolentino, on the basis of an administrative complaint filed by Borja, its General Manager. Eje and Tolentino appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board of the Civil Service Commission, which affirmed their dismissal. The Court of Appeals later set aside the dismissal and awarded them backwages and other employment benefits. The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that the backwages could not be charged against the water district, because a public officer who wrongfully removes another officer acts outside the scope of his authority and is personally liable. That decision became final on March 27, 1996.
On July 4, 1996, Eje and Tolentino were reinstated and paid their backwages, but the money was taken from the funds of the water district upon Borja's approval. In 1999, members of the San Pablo City Bar Association brought a civil action to compel reimbursement. The Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City ordered Borja to refund to the water district the amount of 1,942,031 pesos and 82 centavos within sixty days, noting that Borja knew this was his personal liability from information given by the Commission on Audit through Director Felicitas Ona.
Borja was also criminally charged for violation of Section 3, paragraph e of Republic Act Number 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The criminal complaints were dismissed in 2008 on the Ombudsman's recommendation, after the Commission on Audit En Banc ruled that the payment was made in good faith. Meanwhile, the administrative case proceeded, and the Ombudsman found Borja guilty. The Court of Appeals cleared him on the strength of the good faith finding, and the Ombudsman came to the Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the administrative complaint against Borja.
- Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal case for violation of Section 3, paragraph e of Republic Act Number 3019 bars the administrative case for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
- Whether or not the Commission on Audit Resolution Number 2004-006 justified the payment of backwages from the funds of the water district and established Borja's good faith.
Applicable Provisions
Section 3, paragraph e of Republic Act Number 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, defines the criminal offense of causing undue injury through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence. Its elements differ from the administrative offense, and the Court uses the contrast to explain why the dismissal of the criminal case does not control the administrative case.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The Court also relies on the constitutional foundation of public accountability, which it quotes in explaining why the integrity of the office is the measure of the administrative offense.
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Finally, the Court cites the definition of substantial evidence in the Rules of Court, the quantum of proof that governs administrative liability.
Section 5. Substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that Borja is administratively liable. By causing the water district to pay backwages that a final and executory judgment had declared to be his personal liability, Borja contravened that judgment. A judgment that attains finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even to correct a perceived error of fact or law. The Court defined the offense: conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service pertains to acts that tarnish the image and integrity of the public office, even if not related to the public officer's function. By making the water district pay a liability that did not belong to it, in the substantial amount of 1,942,031 pesos and 82 centavos, Borja placed the office in a deleterious financial position and put its integrity in question.
On the second issue, the Court held that the dismissal of the criminal case does not bar the administrative case. A criminal case is separate from an administrative case, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each. Criminal guilt requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, while administrative liability rests only on substantial evidence. The elements of the criminal offense differ from those of the administrative offense. The absence of bad faith may negate criminal liability, but it does not automatically absolve the officer of administrative liability, because the only question material to the latter is whether the officer's acts tarnished the image or integrity of the public office.
On the third issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on Commission on Audit Resolution Number 2004-006. That resolution prescribed guidelines on allowances and benefits of water district officials and employees, and did not relate at all to the payment of backwages to Eje and Tolentino. It therefore could not have established good faith.
Doctrine
A judgment that has attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may not be modified in any respect, even to correct a perceived error of fact or law, whether by the court that rendered it or by the highest Court of the land. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service consists of acts that tarnish the image and integrity of the public office, even if not related or connected to the public officer's function. The dismissal of a criminal case does not bar an administrative case arising from the same act, because a criminal case is separate from an administrative case, and because criminal guilt requires proof beyond reasonable doubt while administrative liability rests only on substantial evidence. The absence of bad faith may negate criminal liability under Section 3, paragraph e of Republic Act Number 3019, but it does not automatically absolve the officer of administrative liability, since the only question material to the administrative offense is whether the officer's acts tarnished the image or integrity of the public office. Public office is a public trust, and public officers must at all times be accountable to the people.
Disposition
The petitions were granted. The Court reversed and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the Decision and Orders of the Office of the Ombudsman finding Borja administratively liable and imposing suspension for one year without pay.
Remember This
Memorize this line: the absence of bad faith may negate criminal liability for graft, but it does not automatically absolve the public officer of administrative liability for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between criminal and administrative liability, the differing quanta of proof, and the doctrine of immutability of final judgments.