CONSOLACION D. ROMERO AND ROSARIO S.D. DOMINGO, PETITIONERS, VS. ENGRACIA D. SINGSON, RESPONDENT.

Romero versus Singson

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Consolacion Domingo Romero and Rosario Domingo against their sister Engracia Domingo Singson. The action began as an unlawful detainer suit filed by Engracia to evict her siblings from the family home in San Juan City, a property she claims to own by virtue of a Torrens title issued in her name. The case matters because it draws the precise boundary between what an ejectment court may decide about ownership and what it may not, and because it shows how a Torrens title, though presumed valid, cannot shelter a transfer that is on its face impossible.

Procedural History

Engracia filed the unlawful detainer complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan City, Branch 58. The MeTC rendered judgment in her favor, ordering the defendants to vacate, to pay two thousand pesos monthly from the date of demand, and to pay attorney's fees. The siblings appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, which in its April 29, 2009 Decision affirmed the MeTC in full, holding that the validity of a Torrens title cannot be raised collaterally in an ejectment suit. On motion for reconsideration, however, the Regional Trial Court reversed itself in its December 11, 2009 Order, holding that the defendants' possession as co-owners had never ceased and dismissing the complaint; it denied reconsideration in a later Order. Engracia then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, which granted it in its February 29, 2012 Decision, reversed the Regional Trial Court, and reinstated the MeTC decision. The siblings came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari, which the Court gave due course.

Facts

Macario and Felicidad Domingo owned a two hundred twenty-three square meter lot at 127 F. Sevilla Street, San Juan City, covered by a Torrens title issued in 1953. Their children Consolacion, Rosario, Rafael, and Ramon lived there with them since birth; Engracia moved to Mandaluyong City after marrying. Macario died on February 22, 1981, and Felicidad died on September 14, 1997.

On June 7, 2006, the old title was cancelled and a new one was issued in Engracia's name, on the strength of a notarized Absolute Deed of Sale purportedly executed on June 6, 2006 by Macario and Felicidad as sellers and Engracia as buyer, notwithstanding that both sellers had long been dead. Engracia then demanded that her siblings vacate.

The siblings filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court for annulment of the deed and the title, reconveyance, and damages, alleging forgery. Engracia, in turn, filed the unlawful detainer suit before the MeTC, claiming ownership, tolerance of her siblings' stay, and a need for the premises for her daughters.

Issues

• Whether or not the ejectment complaint should be dismissed for failure to allege earnest efforts toward a compromise among members of the same family.
• Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the ejectment case despite the issue of ownership being raised as a defense.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Engracia, as the holder of a more recently issued Torrens title, is entitled to possession.
• Whether or not the siblings' defense of ownership amounts to a collateral attack on Engracia's title.

Applicable Provisions

Section 16 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

This provision authorizes the ejectment court to touch ownership, but only provisionally and only to settle possession.

Article 151 of the Family Code provides:

Article 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

This is the condition precedent invoked by the siblings against their sister's complaint.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled in Engracia's favor. The lack of earnest efforts at compromise is not a jurisdictional defect; if the opposing party does not raise it in a motion to dismiss, the defect is deemed waived.

On the second issue, the Court held that the MeTC properly took cognizance of the case. The complaint was phrased as one for unlawful detainer, and under Section 16 of Rule 70 the court could resolve ownership provisionally to determine possession.

On the third and fourth issues, the Court ruled for the siblings. The Court held that the Court of Appeals committed serious and patent error in concluding that, based solely on her title, Engracia must be considered the singular owner and entitled to possession. The Court reasoned that when the deed of sale was purportedly executed and notarized on June 6, 2006, the signatures of Macario and Felicidad were plainly forged, since Macario died in 1981 and Felicidad in 1997. The deed is therefore null and void, and being void it is equivalent to nothing. The Court stressed that the provisional determination of ownership should have been resolved in the petitioners' favor, since their occupancy rested on their right as co-owners and compulsory heirs, and it was not shown that they had alienated that right to their sister.

Doctrine

An ejectment court may pass upon the issue of ownership only to determine possession, and that adjudication is merely provisional, never barring a separate action on title. The holder of a Torrens title enjoys the presumption of validity and the right to possess, but that presumption cannot prevail where the transfer itself is shown to be impossible, as when the deed of sale was purportedly signed by vendors already dead. A void deed conveys nothing, and a title built upon it cannot support a right of possession against co-heirs who never alienated their share. Finally, the requirement of earnest efforts toward a compromise under Article 151 of the Family Code is a condition precedent whose non-compliance is waived if not raised in a motion to dismiss.

Disposition

The Court granted the petition, set aside the Court of Appeals decision, and reinstated the Regional Trial Court's order dismissing the ejectment complaint, with the award of attorney's fees to the defendants.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a Torrens title presumes ownership, but a deed of sale signed by the dead is void and equivalent to nothing. Examiners use this case to test the provisional resolution of ownership under Section 16 of Rule 70 and the waiver of the compromise requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code.