REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. CESAR C. PASICOLAN AND GREGORIO C. PASICOLAN, RESPONDENTS.

Republic of the Philippines versus Pasicolan

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, against Cesar C. Pasicolan and Gregorio C. Pasicolan, who claimed to be the legal and forced heirs of the late Pedro Callueng. The respondents asked the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City to reconstitute Original Certificate of Title Number 8450, which they said had been lost or destroyed, and the trial court granted the petition. The Republic now asks the Supreme Court to reverse that grant. The case matters because it fixes the standard a trial court must meet before it may reconstitute a Torrens title — a proceeding the Court stresses is never ministerial — and because it teaches what documents may, and may not, serve as a competent source of reconstitution under Republic Act Number 26.

Procedural History

The respondents filed their Petition for Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title Number 8450 in the name of Pedro Callueng before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. In a Decision dated October 8, 2004, the trial court granted the petition. It directed the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cagayan to reconstitute the original copy of the title in the name of Pedro Callueng in exactly the same words and figures as the destroyed original copy, based on the certified copy of the decree, subject to the encumbrances mentioned in Decree Number 339880, and provided that no certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the office of the Register of Deeds. It also directed the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy in lieu of the lost or destroyed one.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated September 6, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. It gave weight to the report of the Land Registration Authority and to the factual findings of the trial court, and it held that sufficient basis existed to allow the reconstitution. The Republic then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

The respondents, claiming to be the heirs of Pedro Callueng, sought to reconstitute Original Certificate of Title Number 8450. They predicated their petition on a copy of Decree Number 339880, which they presented as an authenticated copy of the decree of registration pursuant to which the original certificate of title was supposedly issued. They also submitted a technical description, a sepia film plan, certifications from the Registry of Deeds and the Land Registration Authority, a report of the Land Registration Authority, certificates of publication, tax declarations, and official receipts.

The Land Registration Authority reported that Decree Number 339880 was issued for Lot 1921 of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on September 12, 1928, in Cadastral Case Number 4. But the same report admitted that a copy of the decree is no longer available in the Authority. Yet the Authority recommended that an authenticated copy of the decree may be used as a source of reconstitution under Section 2, paragraph d, of Republic Act Number 26. Cesar testified that he had obtained the copy of the decree from the Land Registration Authority — a statement that contradicted the Authority's own admission.

The decree itself bore only the signature of the Deputy Chief of the General Land Registration Office, who signed merely to certify that the document is a true copy; it was not signed by the Chief, who by law issues decrees of registration, and it lacked the signature of the judge who supposedly ordered its issuance. No affidavit of loss was filed with the Register of Deeds, and Cesar's testimony on how the owner's duplicate was lost was vague. The tax declarations submitted covered only the years 1974 to 2000, and were paid only on March 30, 2000, shortly before the petition was filed.

Issues

• Whether or not the absence of opposition from the government bars the Republic from assailing the decision granting the petition for reconstitution.
• Whether or not the Court may review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
• Whether or not the copy of Decree Number 339880 is a competent and authentic source of reconstitution under Section 2, paragraph d, of Republic Act Number 26.
• Whether or not the other documentary evidence — the technical description, sepia film plan, tax declarations, and the certification of the Land Registration Authority — is a sufficient and proper basis for reconstitution under Section 2, paragraph f, of Republic Act Number 26.
• Whether or not the failure to file an affidavit of loss casts doubt on the claim that the title was lost.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Republic Act Number 26 enumerates the sources of reconstitution in the order in which they may be availed of:

SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from (such of) the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available in the following order: (a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title; (b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title; (c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof; (d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued; (e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and (f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

The respondents relied on paragraph d, and failing that, on paragraph f; the Court measures the evidence against both.

Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court governs proof of a private document:

Section 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

Because the source of the decree was doubtful, the Court applied this requirement to dispel or confirm doubts on its genuineness.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the absence of opposition from the government does not bar the Republic from assailing the decision. The State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake, or error of its officials or agents, and the Republic is not barred from assailing a decision granting reconstitution if, on the basis of the law and the evidence, the petition has no merit.

On the second issue, the Court held that this case falls under the ninth exception to the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding — when the appellate court manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. The Court therefore took cognizance of the question.

On the third issue, the Court held that the respondents failed to present a competent source of reconstitution. The Court of Appeals never directly addressed the authenticity of the decree; it merely relied on the findings of the Land Registration Authority. But the Authority had admitted that a copy of the decree is no longer available in its records, and Cesar's testimony that he obtained the copy from the Authority contradicted that admission. The decree was unsigned by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, bore only the certification of the Deputy Chief, and lacked the signature of the issuing judge. Applying Section 20 of Rule 132, the Court found that no one who saw the document executed or written testified, and no evidence of the genuineness of the signature was offered. These flaws cast serious doubts on the decree's genuineness.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the other documentary evidence does not suffice under Section 2, paragraph f. Under the principle of ejusdem generis — general words following a specific enumeration are confined to things of the same kind — the phrase "any other document" must refer to documents similar to those in paragraphs a to e, that is, documents issued or on file with the Registry of Deeds. The survey plan and technical description are mere additional documentary requirements, not competent sources. The certification of the Land Registration Authority was vague: it did not state the nature of the decree or the claimant, and did not indicate the number of the original certificate of title or the date it was issued. The tax declarations are only prima facie evidence of a claim of ownership, which is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding, and those submitted covered only 1974 to 2000 and were paid shortly before the petition was filed.

On the fifth issue, the Court held that the failure to file an affidavit of loss cast doubt on the claim that the title was lost. Under Section 109 of Presidential Decree Number 1529, the owner must file with the proper Registry of Deeds a notice of loss executed under oath. Cesar's testimony was vague, lacking details on how the title was lost and what efforts were undertaken to find it.

Doctrine

A petition for reconstitution of a lost or destroyed original certificate of title is not a ministerial task; the trial court must diligently and circumspectly evaluate the authenticity and relevance of all the evidence, lest it become an unwitting accomplice in the reconstitution of questionable titles. The sources under Section 2 of Republic Act Number 26 must be availed of in the order listed, and a decree of registration offered under paragraph d must be shown to be authentic — where its source is doubtful, the proponent must prove its due execution and authenticity under Section 20 of Rule 132. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the catch-all in paragraph f covers only documents of the same kind as those in paragraphs a to e, namely documents issued or on file with the Registry of Deeds; survey plans, technical descriptions, vague certifications, and tax declarations do not qualify. Finally, the State cannot be estopped by the omission or mistake of its officials, and the absence of government opposition does not validate a defective reconstitution.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, and denied the petition for reconstitution for lack of competent evidence.

Remember This

Memorize this line: reconstitution is not ministerial, and a decree that the Land Registration Authority itself admits is missing from its records cannot be an authenticated source under Section 2, paragraph d. Examiners use this case to test the order of sources under Republic Act Number 26, the ejusdem generis limit on paragraph f, and the rule that the State is never estopped by the silence of its officials.