LITEX GLASS AND ALUMINUM SUPPLY AND/OR RONALD ONG-SITCO, PETITIONERS, VS. DOMINADOR B. SANCHEZ, RESPONDENT.

Litex Glass and Aluminum Supply versus Sanchez

The Case

This is a labor case about a driver and aluminum installer who claimed he was illegally dismissed after a heated confrontation with his employer. Litex Glass and Aluminum Supply and its owner Ronald Ong-Sitco petitioned the Supreme Court to reverse the finding that they illegally dismissed Dominador Sanchez. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the rules on abandonment of work, the award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, the burden of proving the length of service, and the grant of attorney's fees.

Procedural History

Sanchez filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor, finding him illegally dismissed and awarding separation pay, backwages, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and attorney's fees. Litex and Ong-Sitco appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Labor Arbiter in full. Their motion for reconsideration was denied. They then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition and affirmed the labor tribunals. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. The case reached the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

Sanchez claimed that since 1994 he worked as driver and aluminum installer for several companies owned and managed by Ong-Sitco, the last being Litex. He said he had no record of any work-related offense in fifteen years of service. On December 23, 2008, Ong-Sitco and his wife scolded him, hurled insults at him, and ordered him to go on indefinite leave. Sanchez left the premises hoping the animosity would subside.

He returned on December 28, 2008 to talk to Ong-Sitco, but was ignored. He came back on January 2, 2009 and again about a week later, but Ong-Sitco refused to talk to him each time. Sanchez then filed his complaint for illegal dismissal on February 18, 2009.

Only after the complaint was filed did Sanchez receive two memorandum-letters. The first, dated January 7, 2009, was mailed on February 23, 2009 and received on February 26, 2009. It directed him to report for work and explain his absence, and cited alleged infractions. The second, dated January 22, 2009, was mailed on March 10, 2009 and received on March 22, 2009, warning that refusal to comply would constitute abandonment. Sanchez's counsel wrote back saying his client would not report for work because the first letter was a mere afterthought. Litex and Ong-Sitco denied dismissing Sanchez and claimed he abandoned his job, adding that Litex was only registered in April 2002.

Issues

• Whether or not Sanchez abandoned his work, or was instead illegally dismissed.
• Whether or not the award of separation pay may be sustained although it was not prayed for in the complaint and no strained relations were alleged.
• Whether or not mere self-serving allegations of Sanchez are sufficient to prove the alleged dismissal.
• Whether or not Sanchez is entitled to his money claims, including the correct reckoning point for computing separation pay and the award of attorney's fees.

Applicable Provisions

Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act Number 6715, provides:

Article 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

This provision is the basis for the relief granted to an illegally dismissed employee, and the Court cites it in affirming Sanchez's entitlement to reinstatement, backwages, and benefits or their monetary equivalent.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Sanchez did not abandon his work but was illegally dismissed. Whether an employee was dismissed is a question of fact, and the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded respect and finality when supported by substantial evidence. The Labor Arbiter, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in finding Sanchez's account credible. The Court stressed that to constitute abandonment, it is essential that an employee failed to report for work without any valid and justifiable reason and that he had a clear intention to sever the employment relationship by some overt act. Mere failure to report for work after notice to return does not constitute abandonment. Sanchez repeatedly returned to ask about his status and was ignored, and his immediate filing of the complaint negated any intention to abandon his employment. The Court also found no valid ground for dismissal, as only mere allegations, not substantial evidence, supported the claimed infractions.

On the second issue, the Court upheld the award of separation pay. Although separation pay was not prayed for, Sanchez is deemed to have accepted it since he never questioned it, and separation pay may be awarded where the employee decides not to be reinstated. The altercation between Sanchez and Ong-Sitco, and the employers' refusal to retain him, established strained relations. The Court held that the labor tribunals and the Court of Appeals erred, however, in reckoning his service from 1994. It is incumbent upon Sanchez to prove his date of employment, and the Social Security System certification did not show he was employed by petitioners since 1994 or even 1996. Since the only persuasive evidence was the employers' admission that they employed him in April 2002, the date Litex was registered, the reckoning point is 2002.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the claim that Sanchez's allegations were merely self-serving, since the labor tribunals and the Court of Appeals unanimously found his narration credible and it conformed to the evidentiary facts.

On the fourth issue, the Court affirmed the award of attorney's fees, holding that an award of attorney's fees is proper if one was forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect one's rights and interests by reason of an unjustified act or omission on the part of the party from whom the award is sought.

Doctrine

To constitute abandonment of work, two elements must concur: the employee failed to report for work without any valid and justifiable reason, and he had a clear intention to sever the employment relationship by some overt act. Mere failure to report for work after notice to return does not constitute abandonment, and the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal negates any intention of abandoning employment. An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right under Article 279 of the Labor Code, but where an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism has strained relations, separation pay is awarded in lieu of reinstatement. The burden of proving the date of employment for purposes of computing separation pay lies on the employee who makes the allegation. Finally, attorney's fees may be awarded where a party was forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his rights by reason of the other party's unjustified act or omission.

Disposition

The petition was partly granted. The Court affirmed the rulings of the Court of Appeals with the modification that separation pay be computed at one month's pay for every year of service, with years of service reckoned from April 2002 until the finality of the decision.

Remember This

Remember the twin elements of abandonment and the rule that separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is reckoned from the date of employment that the employee actually proves. Examiners use this case to test abandonment, strained relations as a ground for separation pay, and the burden of proof on length of service.