PEDRO R. DIZON AND OLIMPIO MANALANG, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUDGE AMBROSIO T. DOLLETE AND ARTEMIO SALDANA, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to set aside or
modify two orders (dated March 9 and May 3, 1962) of the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, Hon. Ambrosio T. Dollete, presiding, and to
declare the suspension of Artemio C. Saldana, Mayor of Samal, by
petitioner Dizon, legal, and for other relief. Upon petitioner’s filing
a surety bond in the amount of five hundred pesos a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by this Court on July 3, 1962 to restrain
respondent judge from enforcing his order dated March 9, 1962.

The facts giving rise to the present petition are as follows: Fermin
Adraneda and Guillermo Balintos, a regular policeman and special agent,
respectively, of the municipality of Samal, Bataan, were charged before
the Court of First Instance of Bataan with the crime of frustrated
homicide, committed against one Andres Delatonga. Information about
said criminal charge having been received, Governor Dizon sent a letter
to the Municipal Mayor of Samal on March 3, 1961, requiring him to
suspend policemen Adraneda and Balintos in accordance with the
provisions of Section 4, Republic Act No. 557 (which, in the governor’s
opinion, is mandatory in character) or face administrative or
disciplinary action should he refuse to comply with the governor’s
directive. On March 27, 1961, the governor demanded that the municipal
mayor explain, within five days, why no administrative disciplinary
action should be taken against him for failing to comply with his
letter of March 3, 1961. The mayor failed to comply with thn request to
explain. Upon the lapse of the time given, the provincial governor, on
April 13, 1961, again sent a letter to the municipal mayor warning him
that unless he receives the requested explanation on or before the
morning of Monday, April 17, 1961, formal administrative charges
against the mayor will be filed before the provincial board, and the
mayor suspended “pursuant to Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative
Code, for gross violation of the provisions of Section 4, Republic Act
No. 557 and for utter disregard of my lawful orders contained in the
aforesaid letters.”

On April 14, 1961, Mayor Saldana sent a reply stating the reasons
why he refused to comply with the directive of the provincial governor.
But the governor found the reasons given insufficient and inadequate,
so he again enjoined the mayor on May 5, 1951 to immediately suspend
patrolman Adraneda from office, pending final determination of the
criminal case against him.

Because of the mayor’s consistent refusal to comply with the
instructions of the provincial governor, the latter filed
administrative charges before the provincial board against Mayor
Saldana, for neglect of duty and violation of law, and for
investigation and decision pursuant to Section 2188 of the Revised
Administrative Code. At the same time, he issued Executive Order No. 1,
dated February 15, 1962, suspending Mayor Artemio Saldana from office
for a period of thirty days and appointing Vice-Mayor Marciano Medina
as acting municipal mayor of Samal. The day after his assumption of
office Mayor Medina issued Executive Order No. 1 suspending patrolman
Adraneda from service pending final disposition of his case.

Thereupon, suspended Mayor Saldana filed an action for prohibition,
with a writ of preliminary injunction, with the Bataan Court of First
Instance, as a result of which said court issued an order on March 9,
1962 enjoining Governor Dizon and Provincial Commander Olimpio Manalang
from proceeding with the suspension of petitioner therein, or to
reinstate him to his position if already suspended. Respondent
governor’s motion for reconsideration having been denied on May 3,1962,
he presented with this Court the present petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction. The matter at issue before Us is: May a
provincial governor, pursuant to Section 2188 of the Revised
Administrative Code, suspend a municipal mayor for the latter’s refusal
to suspend a policeman who has been charged in court with a criminal
offense. Said section provides:

“Sec. 2188. Supervisory authority of provincial
governor or municipal officers.—The provincial governor shall receive
and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers
for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any
crime involving moral turpitude for minor delinquency, he may reprimand
the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable, he
shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial
board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused, either
personally or registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the
officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the
board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official
integrity of the officer in question. Where suspension is thus effected
the written charges against the officer be filed with the board within
five days.”

The courts below in ruling for suspended Mayor Saldana, opined that
Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the governor
to suspend a municipal official only if the charges brought against the
latter involve or affect his official integrity, and that the mayor’s
refusal to suspend patrolman Adraneda did not amount’ to an act of
official dishonesty, the suspension of an official under his control
and supervision not being mandatory’ but merely discretionary on his
part.

On the other hand, petitioners’ contention is that the, suspension
of a municipal policeman charged in court with a criminal offense ia
mandatory pursuant to Section 4, Republic Act No. 557, which reads:

“Sec.4. When a member of the provincial guards, city
police or municipal police is accused in court of and felony or
violation of law by the provincial fiscal or city fiscal, as the case
may be, the provincial governor, the city mayor or the municipal mayor
shall immediately suspend the accused from office pending the final
determination of the case by the court and, in case of acquittal, the
accused shall be entitled to payment of the entire salary he failed to
receive during his suspension.”

and, therefore, respondent municipal
mayor’s refusal to suspend the accused policeman amounted to neglect of
duty and violation of the law.

We find merit in the stand taken by petitioners. The wording of the
above provision leaves no room for doubt that it is the duty of the
municipal mayor to immediately suspend a member of the police force who
has been accused in court of any felony or violation of law by the
provincial or city fiscal, pending final decision of the case against
him. The law makes no exception. The mandatory character of the
provision is made more manifest by the fact that the law in the same
breath considers the interest off the accused, who may later on be
found innocent, by entitling him to payment of the entire salary he
failed to receive during his suspension. Moreover, We have already held
that Section 4 of Republic Act No. 557 refers to cases in which the
local executive is bound to suspend members of the police force charged
with crime in court, although: such official is not precluded from
exercising the discretion vested in him by Section 3 of said Act.
(Ferrer vs. De. Leon, 109 Phil., 202, August 29, I960.) Such suspension
is intended to divest an accused policeman of his power to victimize
the people he was bound to protect, and to strip him, at least for the
time being, of the authority to intimidate the witnesses against him.
(Ibid.)

Respondent municipal mayor’s adamant refusal to suspend policeman
Adraneda, despite repeated demands by the provincial governor for him
to comply with Republic Act No. 567, coupled with the warning of
disciplinary action should he refuse to obey the orders, amounted to a
clear neglect of duty in violation of the law—acts which undoubtedly
involve or affect his official integrity. Integrity includes not only
soundness of moral principle and character but also connotes strictness
or fidelity in the discharged of the trust reposed.

“INTEGRITY. As occasionally used in statutes
prescribing the qualifications of public officers, trustees, etc., this
term means soundness of moral principle and character, as shown by one
person dealing with others in the making and performance of contract,
and fidelity and honesty in the discharge of trusts; it is synonymous
with probity,’ ‘honesty’ and ‘uprightness.'” (Black’s Law Dictionary,
p. 94).

Upon taking his oath of office, the municipal mayor bound himself to
obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines. The mayor’s
unyielding stand in ignoring the orders of the governor, if not
displaying an utter disregard of the lawful orders of a superior
officer, betrays, at the very least, an attitude of indifference or
neglect in the execution of the law.

Respondent mayor further claims that the provincial governor acted
contrary to the provisions of Section 2188 of the Revised
Administrative Code, because the letter-complaint filed by Andres
Delatonga with the provincial board was not made under oath. In answer
thereto, it is a fact that the governor did not file the charges by
reason of said letter-complaint dated June 6, 1961. As early as March
3, 1961, the governor, on his own initiative, already required the
mayor to suspend the accused policeman pursuant to Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 557. And again, on March 27 and April 13, 1961, the
governor demanded compliance with his directive of March 3, each time
warning the mayor with disciplinary action should he continue
disregarding his orders. In filing the charges, the governor acted by
virtue of his supervisory authority over municipal officers under
Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code (See Annex “J” of
Petition), the provisions of which do not preclude him from taking
action himself where he finds that a municipal officer is guilty of
maladministration or neglect in the performance of his duties; and in
the exercise of his authority as chief executive of the province
pursuant to Section 2082 of said Code, thus:

“Sec. 2082. Provincial governor as chief executive of province.—The
provincial governor shall be elected by the qualified voters of the
province, and he shall be the chief executive officer of the provincial
government. As such it shall be his duty to exercise, in conformity
with law, a general supervision over the government of the province and
of the municipalities or other political subdivision contained in it
and to see that the laws are faithfully executed by all officers
therein.

“He shall make known to the people of various
municipalities and municipal districts of the province, by
proclamations or communications delivered to the respective mayors, all
general laws or governmental order which especially concern them.”
(Italics supplied)

Wherefore, the orders of the lower court dated March. 9 and May 3,
1962 should be as they hereby are set aside, Executive Order No. 1
dated February 12,1962 suspending Mayor Saldana, issued by the
provincial governor of Bataan declared legal, and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby made permanent.
So ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.