EFRAIM C. GENUINO, ERWIN F. GENUINO AND SHERYL G. SEE, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND RICARDO V. PARAS III, IN HIS CAPACITY…

Genuino versus De Lima

The Case

This is a consolidated special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, brought by Efraim Genuino, Erwin Genuino, and Sheryl Genuino-See, together with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Jose Miguel Arroyo in companion petitions, against then Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and other public respondents. The petitioners assail the constitutionality of Department of Justice Circular Number 41, series of 2010, the Consolidated Rules and Regulations Governing Issuance and Implementation of Hold Departure Orders, Watchlist Orders and Allow Departure Orders, on the ground that it infringes the constitutional right to travel. They also seek to annul the specific hold departure and watchlist orders issued against them under that circular. The case matters because it fixes the limits of an executive department's power to restrict a person's liberty of abode and travel by mere administrative issuance, and because it settles the requisites for the valid issuance of hold departure orders, watchlist orders, and allow departure orders.

Procedural History

The petitions were filed directly with the Supreme Court as original actions for certiorari and prohibition, with prayers for temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction. The petition of the Genuinos was docketed separately and later consolidated with the petitions of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Jose Miguel Arroyo. The Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the circular and the assailed orders, and later ordered Secretary De Lima to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for failure to comply. The Court heard the parties in oral arguments and required the submission of memoranda. The Court then resolved the constitutional issues notwithstanding supervening events that allegedly rendered the petitions moot.

Facts

On March 19, 1998, then Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello the Third issued Department of Justice Circular Number 17, governing hold departure orders, precisely to restrain the indiscriminate issuance of such orders that impinge on the people's right to travel. On April 23, 2007, then Secretary Raul Gonzalez issued Department of Justice Circular Number 18, governing watchlist orders and allow departure orders. On May 25, 2010, then Acting Secretary Alberto Agra issued the assailed Department of Justice Circular Number 41, consolidating the two earlier circulars and expressly repealing them.

After her term as President and her election as a representative of Pampanga, several criminal complaints were filed against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo before the Department of Justice. Acting on these complaints, Secretary De Lima issued watchlist orders against her, and later denied her application for an allow departure order, which she had sought in order to obtain medical treatment abroad for her hypoparathyroidism and metabolic bone mineral disorder. Meanwhile, the Genuinos were subjected to a hold departure order after criminal complaints for malversation, plunder, and violations of the anti-graft law were filed against them in connection with the alleged diversion of Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation funds. Their request to lift the hold departure order was denied.

The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court, contending that the circular and the orders issued under it violate the constitutional right to travel. The Court issued a temporary restraining order, but immigration officials at the airport still refused to process the petitioners' travel documents, prompting the Court to order Secretary De Lima to show cause why she should not be held in contempt.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court may exercise its power of judicial review despite the supervening events that allegedly rendered the petitions moot and academic.
• Whether or not the Department of Justice has the authority to issue Department of Justice Circular Number 41.
• Whether or not there is ground to hold the former Secretary of Justice guilty of contempt of court.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

This provision is the source of the Court's power of judicial review, which the respondents claimed had been lost because the petitions had become moot.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that it may exercise its power of judicial review. The respondents argued that the petitions had been rendered moot by the expiration of one watchlist order, the filing of an information for electoral sabotage against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and the lifting of the watchlist order against Jose Miguel Arroyo. The Court disagreed. It laid down the requisites of judicial review: there must be an actual case or controversy; the challenger must have standing; the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and the constitutionality must be the very lis mota, the very heart of the controversy. The Court found that only the first requisite was in question, and it resolved that the supervening events did not preclude a ruling, because of the grave violation of the Constitution alleged, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved, and the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that the Department of Justice has no authority to issue Department of Justice Circular Number 41. The circular, in authorizing hold departure orders and watchlist orders, effectively restricted the constitutional right to travel. The Court held that the right to travel may be restricted only by authority of law, and not by a mere administrative circular. The circular therefore could not validly serve as the basis for the hold departure and watchlist orders issued against the petitioners.

On the third issue, the Court ruled on whether the former Secretary of Justice should be held in contempt for failing to comply with the temporary restraining order. The Court resolved this issue in accordance with its finding on the respondents' compliance with the order.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate must retain these rules. First, the right to travel may be restricted only by authority of law, not by a mere administrative issuance such as a department circular. Second, a department circular that restricts a constitutional right without statutory authority is invalid. Third, the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts from resolving a case; courts will decide otherwise moot cases when there is a grave violation of the Constitution, when the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest are involved, and when the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public. Fourth, the requisites of judicial review are an actual case or controversy, standing, the constitutional question raised at the earliest opportunity, and the constitutionality being the very lis mota of the case.

Disposition

The Court granted the petitions, declared Department of Justice Circular Number 41 invalid for infringing the constitutional right to travel, and nullified the hold departure and watchlist orders issued against the petitioners pursuant to it.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the right to travel may be restricted only by authority of law, never by a mere administrative circular. Examiners use this case to test the limits of executive rule-making over constitutional rights and the exceptions to the moot and academic principle.