G.R. No. 19778. September 30, 1964
(With Res. of Feb. 26, 1965)
REGALA, J.:
On July 10, 1956, Cromwell Commercial Co. and the Cromwell Commercial
Employees and Laborers Union (PTUC) signed a collective bargaining agreement
which provided, among other things, for the following:
“3. The Company agrees to consider as permanent employees and workers all
those who have rendered three (3) months continuous, satisfactory service, and
as such shall be entitled to all privileges enjoyed by all permanent and regular
employees; provided, however, that the COMPANY reserves the right to dismiss any
employee for cause;”“6. A ‘Grievance Committee’ composed of three (3) representatives appointed
by the COMPANY and three (3) UNION members elected by the UNION shall be
immediately constituted. This Committee shall meet not more than once a week as
may be called by proper notice of any three (3) members of said committee to
hear and decide any differences on labor-management relations. The committee
shall hear the grievance and the witnesses of the parties concerned, if any, and
shall submit its recommendation to the President of the COMPANY who shall decide
the same, within thirty (30) days from transmittal of said recommendation by the
President’s representative In the Philippines:“7. Considering that the COMPANY has put into effect, effective April 16,
1956, a minimum wage of P140.00 a month to permanent employees in its office and
has given merit increase to a few others, the COMPANY agrees in principle to the
demand of the UNION for a general increase of salaries and wages, if the
financial position of the COMPANY shows that it can afford to give an increase
after the second quarter of 1956 but reserves its decision as to the amount. The
COMPANY further reserves its right as to whether to give or not to give
increases to those who already received merit increases effective April 16,
1956, provided, however, that those whose salaries were slashed in 1956 and were
restored on April 16, 1956. shall not be considered as having received a merit
increase;”“10. That the COMPANY shall restore all salesmen to the status of salary
basis effective May 1, 1056 and shall also restore the helpers allowance of
provincial salesmen effective the same date;”“12. The COMPANY agrees in principle to consider the giving of a share of its
profits to its employees and workers, the amount and the time to depend in the
sale discretion of the management of the COMPANY.”
However, it appears that, contrary to paragraph 7, the company gave no salary
increase to its employees, except to three who were not union members, despite
the fact that it had made a P90,000 profit at the close of the second quarter of
1956.
With respect to paragraph 10 of the agreement, it appears that salesmen of
the company used to be paid on a straight salary basis. Some were receiving
P300, others P320 while still others were getting P350 a month. In addition,
those assigned to the provinces were given a so-called helper’s allowance of
P120 a month, a per diem of P8 and an allowance for postage and other
expenses incurred in remitting their collections. For some reason, however, the
company reduced the salary of salesmen to P200 a month and their helper’s
allowance from P120 to P60 a month, although it paid them a commission of 1 per
cent of their collections.
This is the reason why paragraph 10, which provided for the restoration of
cuts in the salaries and allowances of salesmen, was inserted in the agreement.
But instead of restoring the salaries in full, the company merely paid P300 even
to those who, before salaries were reduced, were already receiving P320 or P350
a month. The so-called helper’s allowance, which as already stated had been
reduced from P120 to P60 a month, was not restored at all.
What is worse, effective March 1, 1957, the company reverted all salesmen to
salary and commission basis, stopped their helper’s allowance altogether and
discontinued the payment of per diem and other allowances to provincial
salesmen, so much so that the latter found themselves again in the same
situation they were in before the signing of the collective bargaining
agreement. Worst of all the company increased the quotas of some salesmen and
threatened them with dismissal if they could not fill their quotas.
These changes in the working conditions in the company and the latter’s
failure to carry out its part of the agreement became a source of complaint
among the employees. But beyond promising that the matter would be looked into
as soon as its President arrived from the United States, the company did
nothing. The grievance machinery set up in the agreement could not function on
account of the company’s refusal to name its representatives in the
committee.
Meanwhile, daily wage employees in the shipping department began agitating
for the application of paragraph 10 to them. In a letter sent to the company on
March 2, 1957, Jose J. Hernandez of the Philippine Trade Union Council asked
that these employees be put on a monthly salary basis. He also called attention
to the failure of the company to send representatives to the grievance
committee.
Three days after, the company dismissed Francisco Gaddi and Crescenciano
Andrada, leaders of the shipping department employees. And so on March 7, the
union dispatched another letter to the company, calling attention to the
contents of its March 2 letter and protesting the dismissal of Gaddi and
Andrada. It gave the company 48 hours within which to act on its grievance and
reinstate the dismissed employees.
On March 6, the company President replied, stating in part that—
“* * * Effective March 1st, I reduced all salesmen’s salaries, I discontinued
the helper’s allowance and, in the case of provincial salesmen, I discontinued
the payment of any per diems.”
In another letter sent the following day, the company explained that the
relief of Gaddi and Andrada was in line with its policy of laying off extra
employees.
From then on the relation between the company and the union steadily
deteriorated.
On March 8, the company took back the keys from the warehouseman and ordered
the salesmen to put their trucks in the garage.
On March 9, the parties met to resolve their differences only to part ways
later-still poles apart.
Finally, on March 11, the union struck and picketed the premises of the
company.
The company in turn gave the strikers until 8 a.m. of March 11, 1957 within
which to return to work otherwise they would be considered dismissed for cause.
It warned them that the strike was illegal for being against the no-strike
clause of the collective bargaining agreement.
In a conference called by the Department of Labor, the strikers offered to
return to work provided the company observed the provisions of the bargaining
contract. But the company insisted that the strikers could be taken back only
under the terms of its March 1 order. As already stated, this order reverted
salesmen to salary and commission basis, abolished their helper’s allowance and
stopped the payment of per diem and other allowances to provincial
salesmen.
In addition, the company set as price for continued conciliation conference
the remittance by the salemen of their collections and the return of delivery
trucks and stocks on hand. The union replied that the strikers had not lost
their employee status and that at any rate they were bonded. It offered though
to deposit with the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor the things
demanded by the company, but the company was unyielding in its demand. Anyway,
nothing came out of the conference. The employees gradually gave up the strike
and the salesmen later settled their accounts and returned the property of the
company.
On September 19, 1957 this case was filed in the Court of Industrial
Relations, charging the company, together with its President and Vice President,
with unfair labor practice. After trial, the court rendered judgment as
follows:
“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Respondent and all its officers and agents
are hereby ordered:
“(1) To cease and desist from:
a) refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union.
b) refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with respect to the
grievance of the Union by appointing its representatives to the grievance
committee as provided for in the said agreement.c) making changes in the working conditions of the salesmen who are members
of the Union with respect to their salaries and the helper’s allowance of
provincial salesmen without complying with the requirements of Sec. 13 of
Republic Act 875.“(2) To take the following affirmative acts which the Court finds will
effectuate the policy of the Act:a) to reinstate Francisco Gaddi with half back pay from March 5, 1957 to
actual date of his reinstatement, minus whatever salaries he might have earned
during the pendency of this case, unless he has found a substantial employment
elsewhere. And with respect to Cresenciano Andrada, his one half back wages
shall be from March 5, 1957 until the date he committed illegal acts in the
picket line. Angel Dario is not entitled to reinstatement.b) to reinstate salesmen Antonio Jacinto, Celestino Gualberto, Constantino
Atienza, Elias Berroya, and Pedro del Rosario with half backwages from the date
they have cleared their accountabilities or responsibilities with the Company,
minus what they have earned during the pendency of the dispute unless they have
found substantial employment elsewhere. The case of Teofilo Nunez is dismissed
as heretofore indicated. With respect to Roberto Dijamco as also mentioned,
there is a pending separate unfair labor practice in the Court (Case No.
1271-ULP).c) To reinstate all the strikers listed in Annex ‘A’ of the complaint,
without backwages, in view of the circumstances, as explained on the subject of
the strike, unless they have found substantial employment elsewhere during the
pendency of this case.“In addition, respondent is hereby ordered to post a copy of this order in
the company’s bulletin board, if any or in default thereof, in any conspicuous
place at company’s premises and report to the Court as soon as possible its
compliance.”
The union moved for a reconsideration of the decision, contending that the
trial judge erred (1) in awarding only half back wages to Francisco Gaddi and
the five salesmen, (2) in awarding no back wages to the rest of the strikers and
(3) in denying reinstatement to Cresenciano Andrada and Angel Dario and to those
who might have found substantially equivalent employment elsewhere. The court en
bane affirmed the decision. Hence, this appeal.
The issues in this appeal
relate to the power of the Court of Industrial Relations to order reinstatement
and the payment of back wages in unfair labor practice cases as a means of
effectuating the policy of the law.
Section 5 (c) of the Industrial Peace Act states:
“* * * If, after investigation, the Court shall be of the opinion that any
person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor
practice, then the Court shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and
cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practice and take such affirmative action, as will
effectuate the policies of this Act, including (but not limited to)
reinstatement of employees with or without back-pay and including rights of the
employees prior to dismissal including seniority. * * *”
At the outset, two types of employees involved in this case must be
distinguished, namely, those who were discriminatorily dismissed for union
activities and those who voluntarily went on strike. To the first class belong
Francisco Gaddi and Cresenciano Andrada, both of whom, as earlier shown, had
been dismissed for union activities, and the five salesmen who were virtually
locked out by the company when they were ordered to put their trucks in the
garage. To the second class belong those who declared a strike on March 11,
1957, following the failure of the company-union conference to settle their
dispute.
Both types of employees are entitled to reinstatement. Indeed, it is said
that striking employees are entitled to reinstatement whether or not the strike
was the consequence of the employer’s unfair labor practice, unless, where the
strike was not due to any unfair labor practice, the employer has hired others
to take the place of the strikers and has promised them continued employment.
(Teller, 2 Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Sec. 371, pp. 396-397)
From this rule, however, must be excepted those who, although
discriminatorily discharged, must nevertheless be denied reinstatement because
of (1) unlawful conduct or (2) because of violence. For while the Court of
Industrial Relations has indeed discretion in determining the remedy in case of
unfair labor practice, its discretion is not unbounded. (Big Five Products
Workers Union-CLP vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G. R. No. L-17600,
July 31, 1963) It cannot exercise its right beyond the point which the object of
“effectuation” of the Act requires. It can not order the reinstatement of those
convicted of violence upon the employer’s property. (Rothenberg on Labor
Relations, 573-574; Philippine Education Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., G. R. No. L-7156, May 31, 1955; Consolidated Labor Ass’n. of
the Phils. vs. Marsman & Co., Inc., et al., G. R. No. L-17038, July 31,
1964)
Such is the case of Cresenciano Andrada and Angel Dario who were found guilty
of acts of violence consisting of hurling stones which smashed glass windows of
the building of the company and the headlights of a car and the utterance of
obscenities such as “putang ina.”
But the union contends that the acts committed by Andrada and Dario were not
so serious as to call for the forfeiture of their rights to reinstatement It is
not for Us to judge the effect of misconduct by employees. That is primarily for
the Court of Industrial Relations to determine. (See KLRB vs. Weissman Co., 170
F(2d) 952). In the absence of proof of abuse of discretion on the part of the
Court of Industrial Relations, this Court will not interfere with the exercise
of that discretion.
The same thing may be said of the denial of reinstatement to those who might
have found substantial employment elsewhere. We agree with the union that under
the ruling of Phelps Dodge Corp. vs. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 85 L, ed. 1271
(See also Cox and Bok, Cases on Labor Law, 250, 5th ed.), the mere fact that
strikers or dismissed employees have found such employment elsewhere is not
necessarily a bar to their reinstatement.[1] But it is just as time to say that the
Phelps Dodge case did not rule that in any event discriminatorily
dismissed employees must be ordered reinstated even though they have in the
meanwhile found substantially equivalent employment somewhere else. While
denying that employees who have obtained equivalent employment are ineligible as
a matter of law to reinstatement, the Supreme Court of the United States at the
same time denied also that the definition of the term “employee” can be
disregarded by the National Labor Relations Board in exercising its powers under
Section 10 (c) of the Wagner Act, which corresponds to Section 5 (c) of our
Industrial Peace Act, to direct the taking of affirmative action by an employer
to remedy unfair labor practices. According to the Court, it is for the Board in
each case to weigh the particular facts and to determine, in the exercise of
wise administrative discretion, whether the Act would best be effectuated by
directing reinstatement despite the fact that the given employee has found
equivalent employment.
Obviously it was after considering the facts in this case that the Court of
Industrial Relations predicated the reinstatement of the employees concerned on
the fact that they had not found substantially equivalent employment elsewhere.
Thus, it made clear in the dispositive portion of its decision that it was
ordering the taking of affirmative acts “which the Court finds will effectuate
the policy of the Act.” The union has not shown that in so doing the Court of
Industrial Relations abused its discretion.
Coming now to the question of backpay, the decision under review directs the
company “to reinstate all the strikers listed in Annex ‘A’ of the complaint,
without back wages, in view of the circumtances, as explained on the subject
of the strike, unless they have found substantial employment elsewhere
during the pendency of this case.” The union assails this order as erroneous.
According to the union, it is unfair to deny backwages to the strikers after
finding that the strike declared by them was legal because it was provoked by
unfair labor practices of the company. Indeed a reading of the 46-page decision
of the Court of Industrial Relations fails to yield the reason that impelled the
court to deny backwages to the strikers.
Nevertheless, We believe that the denial of backpay may be justified,
although on a different ground. For this purpose, We shall advert again to the
distinction earlier made between discriminatorily dismissed employees and those
who struck, albeit in protest against the company’s unfair labor practice.
Discriminatorily dismissed employees receive back pay from the date of the act
of discrimination, that is from the day of their discharge. On this score, the
pay from the date of the act of discriminaton, that is from the day of their
discharge. On this score, the award of backpay to Gaddi, Andrada and the
salesmen may be justified. The salesmen, as already stated, were practically
locked out when they were ordered to put their trucks in the garage; they did
not voluntarily strike. (See Macleod & Co. of the Phils. vs. Progressive
Federation of Labor, 97 Phil., 205) Hence, the award of backwages.
In contrast, the rest of the employees struck as a voluntary act of protest
against what they considered unfair labor practices of the company. The stoppage
of their work was not the direct consequence of the company’s unfair labor
practice. Hence their economic loss should not be shifted to the employer. (See
Dinglasan vs. National Labor Union, 106 Phil., 671). As explained by the
National Labor Relations Board in the case of American Manufacturing
Co., 5 NLRB 443, “When employees voluntarily go on strike, even if in
protest against unfair labor practices, it has been our policy not to award them
back pay during the strike. However, when the strikers abandon the practices and
the employer either refuses to reinstate them or imposes upon their
reinstatement new conditions that constitute unfair labor practices, We are of
the opinion that the considerations impelling our refusal to award back pay are
no longer controlling. Accordingly, We hold that where, as in this case, an
employer refuses to reinstate strikers except upon their acceptance of new
conditions that discriminate against them because of their union membership or
activities, the strikers who refuse to accept the conditions and are
consequently refused reinstatement are entitled to be made whole for any losses
of pay they may have suffered by reason of the respondent’s discriminatory
acts.” (Quoted in Teller, 2 Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining Sec. 371,
pp. 997-998)
While it is true that the strikers in this case offered to return to work on
March 14, 1957, We find that their offer was conditional. Their offer was
predicated on the company’s observance of the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement—the very bone of contention between the parties by reason
of which the union walked out. To be effective so as to entitle the strikers to
backpay, the offer must have been unconditional. The strikers must have offered
to return to work under the same conditions under which they worked just before
their strike so that the company’s refusal would have placed on the latter the
blame for their economic loss. But that is not the case here. Indeed the offer
of the company to accept the strikers under the conditions obtaining before the
strike (without prejudice of course to taking up the grievances of the strikers)
can be considered in its favor in denying backwages to strikers. (Dinglasan vs.
National Labor Union, G. R. No. L-14183, Nov. 28, 1959.)
Nor may it be said that the strikers could not have offered to return to work
because the company dismissed them upon their failure to return to work on March
14, 1957. For the notice given by the company was merely a “tactical” threat
designed to break the strike and not really to discharge the striking employees.
(Majestic Mfg. Co., et al., 64 NLRB 961; Rockwood Stove Works, 63 NLRB 1297;
American Mfg. Co., 7 NLRB 553)
Wherefore, the decision and resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations
appealed from are hereby affirmed, without pronouncements as to
costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Paredes, Dizon, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
[1] The view that discriminatorily
discharged employees who have found substantially equivalent jobs elsewhere are
no longer entitled to reinstatement is based on Section 2(d) of the law which
defines the term “employee” as including “‘any employee and not be limited to
the employee of a particular employer unless the Act explicitly states otherwise
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice and who has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular
employment.” Cf. Far Eastern University vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et
al., G. R. No. L-17620, Aug. 31, 1962.
DISSENTING OPINION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
I can not agree to the ruling laid down in the opinion in so far as it denies
backpay to the reinstated laborers. There is no dispute that the employer was
the first to infringe the collective bargaining agreement by refusing to
implement its provisions, particularly by its March 1 order, and by insisting on
it as a condition for taking back the strikers. I can not see how the objectives
and policies of the Industrial Peace Act can be said to be promoted by placing
the economic loss on the strikers, denying them backpay; the discouraging of
unfair labor practices is certainly one of those policies, and the denial of
backpay to the victims of unfair labor practices is a direct encouragement for
the employer to continue its reprobable misconduct.
While the laborers technically violated the no-strike clause, the facts as
found reveal that the employer goaded the laborers into striking, by repeatedly
violating the collective bargaining agreement and by preventing the organization
of the grievance committee through the Company’s refusal to name its
representatives therein.
Concepcion, J., concurs.
R E S O L U T I O N
REGALA, J.:
The facts of this case are stated in the decision of this Court which was
promulgated on September 30, 1964.
Briefly, our decision rules that as for as reinstatement is concerned, both
employees who are discriminatorily dismissed as well as those who strike because
of the employer’s unfair labor practice are entitled to reinstatement. Excepted
from the rule are those who, on account of violence or other misconduct during
the strike, or who, because of subsequent employment elsewhere, must be deemed
to have forfeited the right to reinstatement, having in view the policies of the
Industrial Peace Act. With respect to backwages, however, we hold that only
discriminatorily dismissed employees are entitled to back pay. Those who
voluntarily strike, even if it be in protest against unfair labor practice, are
not entitled to backwages unless, after giving up the strike and presenting
themselves to the employer, the latter should refuse to reinstate them or should
reinstate them subject to new conditions that are also discriminatory.
On the basis of the foregoing, we affirmed the decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations.
The union has filed a motion for reconsideration. First of all, it contends
that in the absence of good faith or similar circumstances on the part of the
employer, the Court of Industrial Relations has no discretion to award half
backwages only to reinstated employees. Full backpay should have been given
instead and this Court should have ordered this in its decision, so it is
averred.
To begin with, we note that this point is being raised for the first time
only now. Section 7 of Rule 51 states that “no error which does not affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the
assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief, save as the court, at its
option, may notice plain errors not specified, and also clerical errors.” Now,
the fact that full back pay was not given certainly cannot be stigmatized as
“plain error,” much less a clerical one. As noted in the decision of the Court
of Industrial Relations, the salesmen were not exactly justified in refusing to
turn over their collections to the company. Nor is this the first case that one
half instead of full, backwages are awarded.
It is also contended that those who struck in protest against the company’s
unfair labor practice should be given backwages because the company refused to
take them back except under the conditions contained in its March 1 order. On
this point, the decision states:
“In contrast, the rest of the employees struck as a voluntary act of protest
against what they considered unfair labor practice of the company. The stoppage
of their work was not the direct consequence of the company’s unfair labor
practice. Hence, their economic loss should not be shifted to the employer. (See
Dinglasan vs. National Labor Union, 106 Phil.. 671). As explained by the
National Labor Relations Board in the case of American Manufacturing
Co., 5 NLRB 443, ‘When employees voluntarily go on strike even if in protest
against unfair labor practices, it has been our policy not to award them back
pay during the strike. However, when the strikers abandon the strike and apply
for reinstatement despite the unfair labor practice and the employer either
refuses to reinstate them or imposes upon their reinstatement new conditions
that constitute unfair labor practice, We are of the opinion that the
considerations impelling our refusal to award back pay are no longer
controlling. Accordingly, we hold that where, as in this case, an employer
refuses to reinstate strikers except upon their acceptance of new conditions
that discriminate against them because of their union membership or activities,
the strikers who refuse to accept the conditions and are consequently refused
reinstatement are entitled to be made whole for any losses of pay they may have
suffered by reason of the respondent’s discriminatory acts.’ (Quoted in Teller,
2 Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Sec. 371, pp.
997-998)”
Now, it is clear that the statement of the rule that those who strike
voluntarily—even if in protest of unfair labor practice—are entitled to backpay
only—
“when the strikers abandon the strike and apply for reinstatement despite the
unfair labor practice and the employer either refuses to reinstate them or
imposes upon their reinstatement new conditions that constitute unfair labor
practice.”
In insisting therefore on the company’s observance of the collective
bargaining agreement as condition for returning to work, the strikers did not in
fact abandon their strike, because the company’s non-observance of their
agreement was precisely the reason for their strike. This is the reason why we
said that to be entitled to back pay, the strikers must have offered to return
to work under the same conditions just before their strike so as to place on
the1 company the blame for the strikers’ economic loss.
By underscoring certain portions of the decision in the American
Manufacturing case, the dissenting opinion seems to imply that on the
contrary, the voluntary strikers in this case should be given backwages. But if
the strikers in the former case were awarded backwages, it is because their
unconditional offer to return to work, their employer refused to take them back
except under “new conditions that discriminate against them.” These new
conditions were that these employees should sign a new contract as new employees
and undergo medical examination. In contrast, no such conditions were imposed by
the company in this case.
If the American Manufacturing case is being cited, it is for the
general principle it lays namely, that “When employees voluntarily go on strike,
Even if in protest against unfair labor practices, it has been our policy not to
award them back pay during the strike.”
Now, even in the English system, with its strict adherence to precedent,[1] to distinguish one case from another held to
be the rule is not to deny its force as a precedent. As Professor Hart puts
it—
“* * * whatever authoritative status a rule extracted from precedent may
have, it is compatible with the exercise by courts that arc bound by it of the
following two types of creative or legislative activity. On the one hand courts
deciding a later case may reach an opposite decision to that in a precedent by
narrowing the rule extracted from the precedent, and admitting: some exception
to it not before considered, or, if considered, left open. This process of
‘distinguishing’ the earlier case involves finding some legally relevant
difference between it and the present case, and the class of such differences
can never be exhaustively determined. * * *” (The Concept of Law
131).
Anent the claim that the notice given by the company to the employees was not
a mere “tactical” threat calculated to make them go back to work, suffice it to
say that if the strikers had anyway the right to reinstatement, no amount of
notice of dismissal could negate that right. Any notice to that effect,
therefore, could not be anything but a “tactical” threat.
Still on this point, the dissenting opinion states that without a grievance
committee (for the failure to constitute which the company was found at fault by
the Court of Industrial Relations) it is improbable, not to say inconceivable,
that the laborers would “forego the right to strike without any alternative
method to have their grievances redressed.” The opinion goes on that “the
bargaining contract is indivisible, and the employer, who was the first to
breach it by blocking the organization of the grievances committee, has no right
whatsoever to claim enforcement of the no-strike clause.”
The remedy for violation of a provision of an agreement is not another
infraction of that agreement. We still have courts open for the redress of
grievances.
Finally, it is contended that Andrada and Dario should have been ordered
reinstated, because the Court of Industrial Relations itself recognized that
minor misdemeanor is an insufficient ground for denying reinstatement.
To be sure, what this Court said is that the Court of Industrial cannot order
the reinstatement of those who are guilty of violence on the company’s property
and that whether a misconduct is serious or not is for the Court of Industrial
Relations to determine and only in cases of abuse of discretion will this Court
step in. In other words, this Court did not agree with Court of Industrial
Relations observation that occasional infractions of rules brought about by the
rising temper may not justify denial of reinstatement. And this Court also said
that the question of whether or not those already employed elsewhere should be
reinstated is the task of the Court of Industrial Relations and where there is
no abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere. Now the union says it is
hard to show abuse of discretion. We think it rather plain that that is no
excuse for not proving abuse of discretion. To reinstate all employees
irrespective of whether they have found employment elsewhere would be to negate
the injunction that the question is one of discretion to be determined if the
order would effectuate the policies of the law.
In view of all the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is
denied.
Bengzon C.J., Bautista Angelo, Paredes, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
[1] Close emphasis on material facts is
what distinguishes the English Attitude to decided cases from that of
continental jurists who in general regard a judgment as a theoretical answer to
rather abstract question of law. (See Paton, A Text-Book of “Jurisprudence 160
[2d ed.])
DISSENTING OPINION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
My vote is for the reconsideration of the decision for the reasons expressed
in my original dissent. While there was no-strike clause in the collective
bargaining agreement, operation of that clause was manifestly dependent on the
constitution of the grievances committee also provided therein, for it is highly
improbable, not to say inconceivable, that the laborers would forego the right
to strike without any alternative method to have their grievances redressed. The
bargaining contract is indivisible, and the employer, who was the first to
breach it by blocking the organization of the grievances committee, has no right
whatsoever to claim enforcement, of the no-strike clause. The employer can not
disregard what is unfavorable to him and seek the benefit of those stipulations
that are in his favor.
By the same token, I do not believe the rule of the American
Manufacturing case (5/NLRB 443) on employees who voluntarily go on strike
applies in the present case. In the proceedings before us the employees were
practically provoked into a strike because the employer blocked any other
reasonable way to ventilate their complaints against management. In fact, the
decision cited really favors the granting of backpay to laborers in the present
case, who offered to return to work and abandon the strike, but whom the
employer refused to readmit, imposing the condition that its March 1st order be
accepted. Said the NLRB in the case cited (at p. 467):
There is, therefore, no question in my mind that those laborers are entitled
to backpay, at the very least from and after March 14, 1957.
“When employees voluntarily go on strike, even if in protest against unfair
labor practices, it has been our policy not to award them back pay during: the
strike. However, when the strikers abandon the strike and apply for
reinstatement despite the unfair labor practices, and the employer either
refuses to reinstate them or imposes upon their reinstatement new conditions
that constitute unfair labor practices, we are of the opinion that the
considerations impelling: our refusal to award back pay are no longer
controlling. Accordingly, we hold that where, as in this case, an employer
refuses to reinstate striken except upon their acceptance of new conditions that
discriminate against them because of their union membership or activities, the
strikers who refuse to accept the conditions and are consequently refused
reinstatement are entitled to be made whole for any losses of pay they may have
suffered by reason of the respondent’s discriminatory acts. Here the strikers
who were refused reinstatement except on the conditions set forth by the
respondent are entitled to reinstatement with back pay from July 27, 1937, to
the dates on which the respondent offers them reinstatement, less any amounts
earned by them in the1 meantime.” (Italics supplied)
Concepcion, J., concurs.