G.R. No. 196890. January 11, 2018
CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD, REPRESENTED BY CHAIRPERSON BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MA. ANTHONETTE VELASCO-ALLONES, AND DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ARTURO M. LACHI…
TIJAM, J.:
and prohibition under Rule 65, seeking to declare null and void the
Decision dated January 31, 2011 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in
CSC Decision[2] No. 11-0047,
which declared null and void the Memorandum issued by Chairman Bernardo
Abesamis (Chairman Abesamis) of the Career Executive Service Board
(CESB).
The Facts
Private respondent Blesilda Lodevico (Lodevico) was appointed
by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on May 14, 2008 as Director
III, Recruitment and Career Development Service, CESB.[3]
Lodevico possesses a Career Service Executive Eligibility since
November 29, 2001, as evidenced by the Certificate of Eligibility issued
by the CSC.[4]
On June 30, 2010, the Office of the President (OP) issued
Memorandum Circular No. 1 (MC 1), which declared all non-Career
Executive Service positions vacant as of June 30, 2010 and extended the
services of contractual employees whose contracts expire on June 30,
2010.[5]
On July 16,
2010, the OP promulgated the Implementing Guidelines of MC 1, which
states that all non-Career Executive Service Officers (non CESO) in all
agencies of the Executive Branch shall remain in office and continue to
perform their duties until July 31, 2010 or until their resignations
have been accepted and/or their replacements have been appointed or
designated, whichever comes first.[6]
Acting pursuant to MC 1 and its implementing guidelines, Chairman Abesamis of the CESB issued a Memorandum[7]
which informed Lodevico that she shall only remain in office and
continue to perform her duties and responsibilities until July 31, 2010.[8]
Meanwhile, Memorandum Circular No.2 (MC 2), which extended the term
stated under MC 1 to October 31, 2010, was issued on July 29, 2010. The
same circular provides that all non-CESO occupying Career Executive
Service (CBS) positions in all agencies of the Executive Branch shall
remain in office and continue to perform their duties and discharge
their responsibilities until October 31, 2010 or until their
resignations have been accepted and/or until their respective
replacements have been appointed or designated, whichever comes first,
unless they are re-appointed in the meantime. However, any official
whose service has been terminated or whose resignation has been accepted
on/or before July 31, 2010, but whose replacement has not yet been
appointed or designated shall be deemed separated from service as of the
date of termination or acceptance of resignation.[9]
Lodevico filed her appeal on the Memorandum issued by Chairperson Abesamis before the CSC.
On September 21, 2010, CESB received a Notice from CSC, requiring it to file a comment.[10] On October 1, 2010, CESB filed its Comment,[11] assailing the jurisdiction of CSC to hear and decide the appeal.
On January 31, 2011, the CSC rendered the assailed Decision[12]
which granted the appeal of Lodevico and declared null and void the
termination of her services. The CSC ruled that CESB Chairman Abesamis
has no power to terminate the services of Lodevico. As the latter was a
presidential appointee, only the President has the authority to do so.
Hence, the Memorandum issued by Chairman Abesamis is null and void.
Also, the CSC pointed out that the services of a non-CESO occupying CES
position in all agencies of the Executive Branch have been extended
until October 31, 2010 pursuant to MC 2. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of [Lodevico], Director III, [CESB] is GRANTED.
The Memorandum dated July 29, 2010 of CESB [Chairman Abesamis],
informing Lodevico that, pursuant to the provisions of [MC 1] and its
Implementing Guidelines, and after a consensus arrived at by the members
of the CES Governing Board in consultation with the CESB Executive
Director, her service as CESB Director III is terminated effective July
31, 2010 is hereby declared NULL and VOID. Accordingly, Lodevico
is reinstated to her former position as Director III and shall be paid
her back salaries and other benefits corresponding to the period of her
illegal termination.[13]
CESB filed an Omnibus Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration,[14] assailing the jurisdiction of CSC to issue the assailed decision.
In a Resolution[15] dated April 7, 2011, the CSC denied the motion for reconsideration. The fallo thereof states:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the [CESB] is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the [CSC] Decision No. 11-0047 dated January 31, 2011, STANDS.[16]
Hence, this petition.
In their Comment, Lodevico and CSC
mainly argue that the latter acted within the bounds of its authority in
issuing the assailed decision as it has jurisdiction over her appeal.
Also, they contend that the petitioners resorted to a wrong mode of
appeal. Hence, the petition should be dismissed.
Issue
Is the dismissal of Lodevico as Director III, Recruitment and Career Development Services from the CESB, proper?
Ruling of the Court
Procedurally, respondents question the impropriety of filing a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 as the proper mode of appeal is via petition for review under Rule 43.
It is well-settled that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are resorted to only where (a) a tribunal, a board or an
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[17]
In this case, it is clear that the second requirement is absent as petition for review under Section 1[18]
of Rule 43 is available to petitioners. However, there are exceptions
to the aforementioned rule, namely: “(a) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when the broader interests of
justice so require; (c) when the writs issued are null; and (d) when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.”[19]
In the case of Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Leyeco IV Employees Union-ALU,[20] We relaxed the application of the rules of procedure to meet the ends of justice. In Leyte IV, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 instead of filing a petition for review under Rule 43, but We
gave due course to the petition to accommodate the broader interest of
justice.
In allowing the liberal application of procedural rules, We emphasized in the case of Obut v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[21] that placing the administration of justice in a straightjacket, i.e.,
following technical rules on procedure would result into a poor kind of
justice. We added that a too-rigid application of the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court will not be given premium where it
would obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in the
light of the prevailing circumstances of the case under consideration.[22] Moreover, in the case of CMTC International Marketing Corp. v. Bhagis International Trading Corp.,[23]
We denied the application of the technical rules to yield to
substantive justice. In said case, We ruled that the rules of procedure
should give way to strong considerations of substantive justice. Thus, a
rigid application of the rules of procedure will not be entertained if
it will obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in
the light of the prevailing circumstances of the case under
consideration.[24] Likewise, in the case of Uy v. Chua,[25]
We interpreted that “[t]he Rules of Court were conceived and
promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but
not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts
will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion.”[26]
Considering the foregoing and the circumstances obtaining in
this case, We allow the application of liberality of the rules of
procedure to give due course to the petition filed by petitioners as the
broader interest of justice so requires.
Substantively, petitioners assert that CSC has no jurisdiction to resolve the appeal of Lodevico.
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution charged the CSC, as the central
personnel agency of the Government, with the administration of the civil
service.[27] Book V, Title I,
Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12 of the Administrative Code of 1987
provides for the powers and functions of the CSC, which, among others,
include its power to decide and pass upon all civil service matters. On
the other hand, CESB was specifically established to serve as the
governing body of the CES and mandated to promulgate rules, standards
and procedures on the selection, classification, compensation and
career development of members of the CES.[28]
“From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity,
albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission.”[29] As an attached agency, the decisions of the CESB are expressly subject to the CSC’s review on appeal.[30]
As to petitioners’ second contention, they aver that Lodevico’s removal
from service is justified in that her appointment as Director III,
equivalent to Assistant Bureau Director, is not a permanent one. Hence,
her removal from service by the CESB, following the orders of MC Nos. 1
and 2 issued by the President was valid and she was not entitled to
security of tenure.
It must be noted that the President, thru the
issuance of MC 1, effectively discharged all non-CESOs occupying CES
positions in all agencies until July 31, 2010. MC 2 extended the term of
their service until October 31, 2010. However, MC2 mentioned that those
who have been terminated pursuant to the earlier Memorandum but whose
replacement has not yet been appointed shall be deemed separated from
service as of the date of termination.
Going into the issue, it is necessary to determine the nature of Lodevico’s position.
The Civil Service Law classifies the positions in the civil service into career and non-career, to wit:
The career service is characterized by (1) entrance based
on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications;
(2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3)
security of tenure; while a non-career position is characterized
by (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit
and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is
limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that
of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to
the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was
extended.[31] (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
There are also three levels of positions in the career service,
namely: (a) the first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts and
custodial service positions which involve non-professional or
sub-professional work in a non supervisory or supervisory capacity
requiring less than four years of collegiate studies; (b) the second
level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions
which involve professional, technical or scientific work in a
non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of
college work up to Division Chief level; and (c) the third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.[32]
Under the third level, such positions in the Career Executive Service are further classified into Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,
Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department
Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by
the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the
President.[33]
As to employment status and security of tenure, appointment in the career service shall be either permanent or temporary.[34]
Lack of civil service eligibility makes an appointment a temporary one
and without a fixed and definite term and dependent entirely upon the
pleasure of the appointing power.[35] On the other hand, the acquisition of security of tenure is governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the CESB.
Sections 2 and 3, Article I, Circular No. 2 Series of 2003 issued by the CESB provide:
Section 2. Membership in the CES. Upon inclusion of
his/her name in the Roster of CES Eligibles after the conferment of CES
Eligiblity and compliance with the other requirements prescribed by the
Board, a CES Eligible assigned to any CES position and appointed by the
President to a CES Rank becomes a member of the CES.Section 3. Original Appointment to CES Rank. Appointment
to appropriate classes, based on ranks in the CES, shall be made by the
President from a list of CES Eligibles recommended by the Board.Only a CES Eligible assigned to a CES position may be appointed
by the President to a CES Rank. The Entry Rank in the CES shall be CESO
Rank VI regardless of the position to which a CES Eligible is assigned.
In sum, for an employee to attain a permanent status in his
employment, he must first be a CES eligible. Such eligibility can be
acquired by passing the requisite civil service examinations and
obtaining passing grade to the same.[36]
“At present, the CES eligibility examination process has four stages,
namely: (1) Written Examination; (2) Assessment Center; (3) Performance
Validation; and (4) Board Interview.”[37]
After completing and passing the examination process, said employee is
entitled to conferment of a CES eligibility and the inclusion of his
name in the roster of CES eligibles. Such conferment of eligibility is
done by the CESB through a formal Board Resolution after an evaluation
is done of the employee’s performance in the four stages of the CES
eligibility examinations.[38]
Conferment of a CES eligibility does not complete one’s membership in
the CES nor does it confer security of tenure. It is also necessary that
an individual who was conferred CES eligibility be appointed to a CES
rank. Such appointment is made by the President upon the recommendation
of the CESB. Only after such process will the employees appointment in
the service be considered as a permanent one, entitling him to security
of tenure.[39]
In the
CES ranking structure, there are recognized six ranks – the highest rank
is that of a CESO I while the lowest is that of CESO VI.[40]
As clearly set forth in the foregoing provisions, two requisites must
concur in order that an employee in the career executive service may
attain security of tenure, to wit:
a) CES eligibility; and
b) Appointment to the appropriate CES rank.[41]
Here, Lodevico was appointed as Director III as evidenced by a Letter[42]
dated May 14, 2008. The position of Director III, equivalent to
Assistant Bureau Director, is considered as a Career Executive Service
position, belonging to the third-level. Lodevico met the first requisite
as she is a CES eligible, evidenced by a Certificate of Eligibility.[43] However, the second requisite is wanting because there was no evidence which proves that Lodevico was appointed to a CES rank.
Guilty of repetition, being CES eligible alone does not qualify her
appointment as a permanent one, for there is a necessity for her
appointment to an appropriate CES rank to attain security of tenure.
That being said, We consider Lodevico’s appointment as mere temporary.
Such being the case, her services may be terminated with or without
cause as she merely serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
“[T]he temporary appointee accepts the position with the condition that
he shall surrender the office when called upon to do so by the
appointing authority.”[44]
Consequently, her removal from service based on MC Nos. 1 and 2, which
discharged all non-CESO occupying CES positions in all agencies, was
proper.
Thus, petitioners are correct in stating that mere
appointment of Lodevico as Director III and her CES eligibility do not
automatically mean that her appointment becomes a permanent one. It is
necessary that she be appointed in an appropriate CES rank to convert
her temporary appointment into a permanent one.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision dated January 31, 2011 and Resolution dated April 7, 2011
of the Civil Service Commission in CSC Decision No. 11-0047 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta,[*] and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.
[*] Designated additional Member per Raffle dated November 20, 2017 vice Associated Justice Francis H. Jardeleza.
[1] Rollo, pp. 6-41.
[2] Penned by
Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza, concurred in by Chairman
Francisco T. Duque III and Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor, id. at
48-55.
[3] Id. at 68.
[4] Id. at 52.
[5] Id. at 12-13, 52.
[6] Id. at 13.
[7] Id. at 70.
[8] Id. at 52.
[9] Id. at 14-15.
[10] Id. at 71.
[11] Id. at 72-91.
[12] Id. at 48-55.
[13] Id. at 55.
[14] Id. at 92-100.
[15] Id. at 61-64.
[16] Id. at 64.
[17] Sections 1 and 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[18] Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission,
Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social
Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification
Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657,
Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic
Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
(Emphasis ours)
[19] Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. LEYECO IV Employees Union-ALU, 562 Phil. 743, 755 (2007).
[20] 562 Phil. 743 (2007).
[21] 162 Phil. 731 (1976).
[22] Id. at 744.
[23] 700 Phil. 575 (2012).
[24] Id. at 582, citing Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Phils. v. Celebrity Travel and Tours, Inc., 479 Phil. 1041, 1052 (2004).
[25] 616 Phil. 768 (2009).
[26] Id. at 785.
[27] 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article IX-B, Section 1(1).
[28] Article IV, Part III of the Integrated Reorganization Plan as approved by P.D. No. 1 dated September 24, 1972.
[29] Eugenio v. CSC, 3 12 Phil. 1145, 1155 (1995).
[30] Career Executive Service Board, et.al. v. Civil Service Commission, et. al., G.R. No. 197762, March 7, 2017.
[31] Jocom v. Judge Regalado, 278 Phil. 83, 93-94 (1991).
[32] Administrative Code of 1987, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 8.
[33] Administrative Code of 1987, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3).
[34] Administrative Code of 1987, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 27:
Sec. 27. Employment Status. -Appointment in the career service shall be permanent or temporary.
(1) Permanent status. A permanent appointment shall be
issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the positions to
which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and
standards promulgated in pursuance thereof.(2) Temporary appointment. In the absence of appropriate
eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a
vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be issued to a person who meets
all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed
except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided,
That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the
appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible
becomes available.
[35] Province of Camarines Sur v. CA, 316 Phil. 347, 351 (1995).
[36] Home Insurance and Guaranty Corp. v. CSC, 292-A Phil. 247, 254 (1993).
[37] Señeres v. Sabido, et al., 772 Phil. 37, 62 (2015).
[38] General v. Roco, 403 Phil. 455, 459-460 (2001).
[39] Id. at 460.
[40] Section 1, Article I, Circular No. 2 Series of 2003 issued by the CESB.
[41] Id.
[42] Rollo, p. 68.
[43] Id. at 69.
[44] CSC v. Engr. Darangina, 542 Phil. 635, 639 (2007).