PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY (Now known AS TOURISM INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENTERPRISE ZONE AUTHORITY), PETITIONER, VS. MARCOSA A. SABANDAL-HERZENSTIEL, PEDRO TAPALES, LUIS TAPALES, A…

Philippine Tourism Authority versus Sabandal-Herzenstiel

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the Philippine Tourism Authority, now the Tourism Infrastructure and Enterprise Zone Authority, against Marcosa Sabandal-Herzenstiel and the Tapaleses. The Authority sues as the owner and prior possessor of a parcel of land in Moalboal, Cebu, which the respondents entered and fenced in 1997. The Authority filed a complaint for forcible entry. The case matters because it is a clean teaching vehicle on the single most examined element of forcible entry: prior possession, and on how little proof of force the law actually requires.

Procedural History

The Authority filed its forcible entry complaint before the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Moalboal-Alcantara-Badian-Alegria, Cebu. The trial court ruled for the Authority, ordering the respondents to vacate, to remove their improvements, and to pay monthly rentals from the date of judicial demand until they vacate, plus costs.

The respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court. That court dismissed the appeal because they failed to file a memorandum on appeal as required under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, and it denied their motion for reconsideration.

Only Sabandal-Herzenstiel went up to the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, by petition for review under Rule 42. The Court of Appeals set aside both lower rulings and declared her the lawful possessor. The Authority moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The Authority then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

Since February 12, 1981, when it bought the land from Tri-Island Corporate Holdings, the Authority owned the subject property and other parcels in Barangay Basdiot, Moalboal, Cebu. It possessed the land actually, physically, continuously, and without interruption, declared it for taxation, placed caretakers, and leased portions to third persons.

Sometime in 1997, the Tapaleses and Sabandal-Herzenstiel entered a 2,940 square meter portion of the property, cut down coconut trees, introduced improvements, and fenced the area. The Authority demanded that they vacate, the last demand being a letter dated January 5, 1998, which they ignored. On March 18, 1998, the Authority filed its forcible entry complaint.

In their answer, the Tapaleses admitted that the property had been sold by its administrator, Josefina Abrenica, to Tri-Island, but claimed that sale was tainted with force and intimidation and therefore void. They insisted they had remained in physical possession and introduced improvements. Sabandal-Herzenstiel never claimed to be owner, and even acknowledged the Authority's ownership when she offered to buy the land back.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondents may be lawfully ejected from the subject property.
• Whether or not the Authority established prior possession sufficient to sustain a forcible entry action.
• Whether or not the Authority had to describe in detail the manner of the respondents' entry in order to prove force.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court defines forcible entry:

A person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

This is the provision that fixes the elements the Authority had to prove: prior possession and deprivation by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.

Ruling

The Court granted the petition. On the first issue, it held that the respondents may be lawfully ejected. In a forcible entry action, the plaintiff must prove prior possession and that the defendant deprived him of it by any of the means in Section 1, Rule 70. The Court found that the respondents failed to establish prior and continued possession after the 1981 sale. On the contrary, they admitted in their answer that the Authority exercised dominion by instituting caretakers and leasing portions to third persons. The Court stressed that possession in the eyes of the law does not require a man to have his feet on every square meter of the ground.

On the second issue, the Court upheld the trial court's finding of prior possession, supported by the deed of sale, the tax declarations, and the leases. Sabandal-Herzenstiel never claimed ownership or possession.

On the third issue, the Court held that a detailed description of the entry was unnecessary. Proving unlawful entry and the exclusion of the lawful possessor necessarily implies force. Quoting Estel versus Heirs of Recaredo Diego:

Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force and this is all that is necessary. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. No other proof is necessary.

And quoting David versus Cordova:

The words by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession therefrom.

Doctrine

First, the plaintiff in forcible entry must prove prior possession and deprivation by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth under Section 1, Rule 70. Second, possession in law does not require physical presence on every square meter; acts of dominion such as leasing and placing caretakers suffice. Third, unlawful entry and exclusion of the prior possessor necessarily imply force; no state of war and no detailed narration of the entry is required.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the Court of Appeals decision and resolution were reversed and set aside, and the trial court's decision was reinstated.

Remember This

Memorize this line: unlawfully entering the property and excluding the prior possessor necessarily implies force, and no other proof is necessary. Examiners use this case to test the elements of forcible entry and the sufficiency of proof of force.