PETER PAUL (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Lorenzo Castro was employed as sheller in 1947 by Peter Paul
(Philippines) Corporation after undergoing the requisite physical
examination. His work consisted in removing the meat from the coconut
shells by means of a knife. He was paid on the. basis of the number of
kilos of coconut meat he was able to shell in seven or eight hours work
thereby making an average weekly wage of P25.00 to P30.00.

The periodic x-ray examination made of the employee during the
succeeding years of his employment showed that he was in good health
until February 21, 1954 when he was found to have tuberculous infection
in his left lung for which reason he had to stop working on sick leave.
He was placed under treatment by the company physician. On April 27,
1954, the employee was x-rayed and again he was found to be suffering
from tuberculosis as follows: ” PTB, minimal, left, fibroid; Pulmonary
scar, right.” This time he was treated by a private physician spending
therefore P450.00 for medicines and other medical services.

Sometime in March, 1954, he was separated from the service because
of his ailment and was given P100.90 as separation pay. Whereupon, on
March 11, 1955, he filed a claim for compensation with the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission against his employer claiming to be entitled to
the compensation that the law allows because of the ailment he
contracted in the course of his employment.

The claim was referred to hearing officer Atanacio H. Mardo for
investigation. After the reception of the evidence, this officer found
that claimant’s sickness was not caused by the nature of his
employment, nor was it aggravated by it, and so he dismissed the claim
as without merit. Claimant filed a petition for review, and having
found no reason to justify any modification of his decision, the
hearing officer forwarded the case to the Commission en banc
pursuant to Section 49 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. in relation
to Section 5. Rule 23. of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.
And on January 25. 1%2, Associate Commissioner Jose Sanchez rendered
decision finding thnt the ailment of the cliumnnt was compensate and
adjudicating to him the compensation authorized by law. Employer’s
counsel filed a motion for reconsideration raising as one of the
grounds that the claim cannot be entertained for having been filed
beyond the two-month period fixed by Section 24 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, but the Workmen’s Compensation Commission denied the
motion for lack of merit. Hence the instant petition for review.

One of the issues raised refers to the finding of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission that the ailment of the claimant is compensable
because it was contracted in the course of his employment which, it is
contended, is contrary to the evidence on record. Petitioner contends
that the decision of the hearing officer deserves more credence because
of the opportunity he had to evaluate the mass of evidence adduced
before him which should not be brushed aside by a mere review by the
respondent Commission.

On the question of whether the illness contracted by the claimant
can be considered as a consequence of the nature of his employment as
this phrase is used in the law, respondent Commission made the
following comment:

“The order of the Hearing Officer dismissing the
claim is based on the theory that the work of a shelter is not
strenuous. At first blush, it may appear that the work of a shelter is
not necessarily a hard one. Considering, however, that t hellers are
paid on piece-work or ‘Pakiao’ basis, said work would appear to be
taxing to the worker’s strength and vitality. The following description
of the thelling operation made by a referee of the former Workmen’s
Compensation Commission who conducted an ocular inspection of the
Franklin. Baker Company, is considered sufficiently accurate:

‘***
A shelter starts his work by pulling an iron plate (3ft square and 164
inch thick) supporting some 800 coconuts and which are released into
his bin. As the work progresses, additional coconuts are dropped into
his bin. With a knife about 9 inches long in his right hand, he striker
breaking its shell. The shell which is thus cracked into several pieces
is removed and separated from the meat by means of a knife and then
thrown into a conveyor which runs below the working compartment. At the
end of the shift, a shelter closes his bin and clears his compartment

‘We had occasion lo observe during our ocular inspection, with close and long scrutiny, shelters in actual work.

‘Shelling
coconuts impresses us us one of hard work. Considering that shelters
(in order to qualify as such) have to shell at least l1,500 nuts during
the 8-hours work, which means, shelling 187 nuts in an hour or 3 nuts
in a minute, with such rapidity of a motion and continuous exertion, we
find that on the whole, the work is one requiring strenuous effort.
Especially so, when observing them perspiring profusely (they had only
their undershirts and punts on) we inquired into the reason for the
hurried movements and found that shelters work on a “Pakiao” basis, and
in their desire to earn more, must, therefore, work as fast as their
strength and stamina can tolerate.’ (Antonio Dungo vs. Franklin Baker Co., February 26. 1956).

“Shelters of respondent company also work on pakyao basis, and required to shell at least 1,000 coconuts in 8 hours.

“Moreover,
claimant was assigned to night duty every 15 days, as stated above. The
debilitating effect of a night work on one’s health cannot be gainsaid.
The Supreme Court in the case of Manila Railroad Company vs. CIR, et
al., G.R. No. 3862, August 28, 1951. held:

‘Night
work has almost invariably been looked upon with disfavor by students
of this problem because of the excessive strain involved, especially
for women and young persons, the large amount of lost time consequent
upon exhaustion of the worker.’

And after making the foregoing comment, respondent Commission
concluded; “Under the circumstances, above narrated, we find that
claimant’s illness of PTB, which flared up or has activated as a result
of the nature and condition of his work, is compensable under the law.
The fact that his illness of PTB receded to the fibrotic stage when he
stopped working and underwent medication lends support to the
conclusion that the nature of his work had something to do, or was
instrumental, in the flaring up of his tuberculosis.”

This conclusion, being supported by substantial evidence, cannot now
be looked into. We are satisfied that considering the nature of the
work of the claimant which is to open the shells of coconut and
separate the meat therefrom by means of a knife and the way his wage is
fixed which is depending on the number of kites of coconut meat he
could shell within his regular hours of employment, for which he has to
exert more effort than a laborer who is not paid on “pakiao” basis if
he wants to increase his daily income, the conclusion that the work of
claimant was taxing and as such it heavily worked against his strength
and vitality is fair and reasonable. Such inroad into his physical
strength and vitality must have contributed to the deterioration of his
resistance thereby sapping his strength to the point of contracting
tuberculosis. No amount of argument can justify a contrary conclusion.
We find, therefore, correct respondent Commission’s conclusion that
claimant’s ailment is compensable.

The other issue raised refers to the alleged late filing by the
claimant of his claim for compensation. It is alleged that since
claimant was separated from the service because of his ailment on March
24, 1954 he should have filed his claim within 60 days from said date
as required by law, which he did not do, because as the record shows he
only filed his claim on March 11, 1955, or almost one year after his
disability or separation from the service. Hence, it is claimed, the
claim is now barred and cannot be entertained.

We lind this contention correct in the light of our ruling
interpreting the vague provision of the law now in dispute, a portion
of which we quote:

“It is petitioner’s theory that the two-year period
mentioned in the law should be reckoned with from the date the injury
is caused or the illness is fwitmctod resulting in death in order that
the employee may be entitled to compensation, or that the wording of
the law should be interpreted literally in order that the illness or
death may be compensable. To this we cannot agree for that would render
the law nugatory and ineffective. A reasonable interpretation would be
that the two-year period be counted from the date the disease or
illness becomes compensable, or from the date the employee’s sickness
renders him physically disabled to do the work, which interpretation is
in keeping with the general rule in compensation cases that the
injuries or diseases that are compensable are only those which produce
disability and thereby affect the earning power of the employee. In
other words, as long as the employee is able to work and receives his
pay even if he is suffering from illness, he is not entitled to
compensation.

“In the instant case, it appears, Garin
contracted pulmonary tuberculosis much prior to September 28, 1950,
when his treatment by petitioner’s physician began, although the same
did not prevent him from working until December 5, 1951, when he
applied for retirement becaure of the aggravation of his illness. He
therefore became incapacitated for work only beginning December 5,
1951, and only from that time on his ailment became compensable within
the meaning of the law, and so the counting of the two-year period
should start from that time. The period of two years cannot be counted
from September 28, 1950 when Garin was placed under treatment by
petitioner’s physician, as petitioner would like us to apply, because
even if Garin were then treated he was not yet completely incapacitated
for labor until December 6, 1951, when he applied for retirement.
Petitioner’s contention that the claim for compensation should have
been dismissed is therefore without merit.” (Central Azucarera Don
Pedro vs. De Leon, et al., 105 Phil., 141)

It thus appears that the two-month period within which a claim for
injury or sickness is required to be filed should be counted from the
date the disease or illness becomes compensate, or from the date the
employee becomes physically disabled to work. This happened on March
24, 1954, when the employee was separated from the service, but the
employee filed his claim nearly a year thereafter. Verily, his claim
was filed beyond the legal limit prescribed by law.

But this claim is not entirely lost. It appears that the employer
paid the employee the sum of P91.21 by way of compensation, aside from
a separation pay of P100.90. This payment places this case within the
exception of the law which makes the filing of the claim within the
legal limit unnecessary. The claim, therefore, can still be entertained.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.