REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. MACONDRAY & CO., INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This
is an appeal taken by the Republic of the Philippines from the order of
the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No, 49159
dismissing its complaint against Macondray & Co., Inc. on the
ground that the cause of action was barred by the Statute of
Limitations.

On September 6, 1961, appellant filed a
complaint with the Municipal Court of Manile to collect from appellee
the administrative fine—amounting to the sum of P500.00—imposed upon
the latter, as agent of the vessel SS “Titania”, by the Bureau of
Immigration, for an alleged violation committed on June 11, 1955 of the
provisions of Section 44 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended. The violation consisted in the failure of the master or agents
of the SS “Titania” to include in the passenger manifest the name of an
alien stowaway and to prevent his landing in the Philippines when the
vessel arrived in Manila on the date aforesaid.

Appellee filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription,
citing the provisions of Section 44(f) of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, as amended, which provides that—

“No action or proceeding for the enforcement of any fine for any
violation of the provisions of this section shall be instituted more
than five years after the violation is committed.”

The Municipal Court dismissed the case. On appeal, the Court of First
Instance of Manila where appellee reiterated its motion to dismiss,
issued the appealed order. Hence the present appeal.

It is
not disputed that the violation of the provisions of Section 44 of the
Immigration Act for which the fine was imposed was committed on June
11, 1955. The record discloses that on April 11, 1960, or exactly two
months before the expiration of the five year prescriptive period, the
office of the Solicitor General made a written demand upon appellee for
the payment, within ten days, of the fine of P550.00 imposed upon it by
the Conmissioner of Immigration, otherwise the proper action would be
filed in court. Appellee, through counsel, replied thereto on April 19
of the same year bringing to the attention of the Solicitor General the
fact that the order imposing the fine aforesaid had been appealed to
the Secretary of Justice the day before and making an express request
that action on the matter be held in abeyance until after said official
shall have finally decided the appeal.

It
is thus crystal clear that if no action was filed in court within the
prescriptive period for the collection of the fine in question, the
inaction was due entirely to appellee’s express request. The latter,
therefore, is in estoppel and should not be permitted to rely upon the
defense of the statute of limitations. (Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Suyoc Consolidated etc., 104 Phil. 819, citing Newport Company vs. U.S. (DCINWIS), 34 F. Supp. 588.)

However,
appellee claims that the doctrine of estoppel should not be applied to
it because its request was never granted by the office of the Solicitor
General. This is not exactly correct. While it is true that there was
no express or written grant of the request, there is no question that
the office of the Solicitor General impliedly granted appellee’s
request, and it was only after the lapse of a reasonable time that it
took the matter to court because of appellee’s failure to give advice
as to the result of its appeal to the Department of Justice.

Appellee contends further that because appellant’s complaint contains
no allegation concerning the suspension of the running of the
prescriptive period, it may not be allowed to present any evidence to
establish that fact. This contention is without merit. Appellee raised
the question of prescription of the action in its motion to dismiss. In
the answer thereto filed by appellant, the latter alleged all the facts
that would justify the presentation of the evidence which appellee
claims may not be allowed and admitted under the allegations of the
complaint. (Record on Appeal, pp. 25-31) Appellant’s reply (Record on
Appeal, p. 31) did not deny the facts aforesaid but only claimed that
“the case cited by the plaintiff in support of its argument is not
applicable to the case at bar.” In view of this, We believe that the
motion to dismiss should have been resolved by the lower court only
after taking into account the aforesaid allegations made in appellant’s
answer to the motion to dismiss or only after receiving evidence in
connection therewith.

Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is
set aside and the case is hereby remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.