DEMOSTHENES MEDIANTE AND PABLO PASENIO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. MONTANO ORTIZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN, RESPONDENT.

Mediante versus Ortiz

The Case

This is a petition for prohibition brought directly before the Supreme Court by Demosthenes Mediante, the municipal judge of Magsaysay in Misamis Oriental, and Pablo Pasenio, the chief of police, against Judge Montano Ortiz of the Court of First Instance of Agusan. The petitioners ask the Court to stop the respondent judge from proceeding against them in a special civil case and to set aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued in that case. The case matters because it fixes two enduring rules of procedure: the situs of the offense as alleged in the information defines the jurisdiction of the municipal court, and any challenge to that jurisdiction must first be raised before the municipal court itself, not collaterally in another court of first instance.

Procedural History

A criminal complaint for illegal possession of firearm was filed against Mamerto Campo and Anastacio Baclayo in the Municipal Court of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, presided over by petitioner Mediante, and a warrant of arrest was issued. Campo then moved for postponement of the hearing and, without first raising the question of jurisdiction before the municipal court, filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and damages with preliminary injunction directly in the Court of First Instance of Agusan, together with twenty nine other persons. The petitioners there moved to dismiss. In a resolution dated January 22, 1959, the respondent judge denied the motions to dismiss, ruled that his court had jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction, and issued the writ upon a bond. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by this original petition for prohibition.

Facts

The criminal complaint alleged that the offense of illegal possession of firearm was committed in the barrio of Cadena de Amor, municipality of Magsaysay, province of Misamis Oriental. It was filed by Gaudioso Gacus, the acting chief of police, and the Municipal Court of Magsaysay, through Judge Mediante, forthwith issued a warrant of arrest.

Campo, one of the two accused, moved for postponement of the hearing. Without first raising the question of jurisdiction before the municipal court, he joined twenty nine other persons in filing a petition for prohibition, injunction and damages with preliminary injunction directly in the Court of First Instance of Agusan. The petition sought, among other things, to restrain the municipal judge and the chief of police from continuing with the criminal case, and to restrain the respondents from entering certain parcels of land and harvesting their products.

The respondent judge denied the motions to dismiss and issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondents from threatening, coercing or harassing the petitioners and from harvesting and carrying away the corn and other products in the lands in question, upon the filing of a bond of three thousand pesos. The petitioners then brought this petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the respondent judge should be set aside so that the criminal prosecution may continue.
• Whether or not the respondent judge may be prohibited from further proceeding in the special civil case against the petitioners.
• Whether or not the question of the municipal court's jurisdiction over the criminal case should first be passed upon and decided by the municipal court itself.
• Whether or not the petition seeking to prohibit the Municipal Court of Magsaysay from proceeding in the criminal case should have been filed in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental rather than in the Court of First Instance of Agusan.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory provision. It rests on the settled rule that the recital of the situs of the offense in the information defines the jurisdiction of the municipal court, and on the rule that supervisory power over municipal courts belongs to the Court of First Instance of the province in which they sit.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no need to set aside the writ of preliminary injunction. The writ does not enjoin the criminal prosecution. A simple examination of the dispositive portion of the lower court's resolution shows that it granted only the prayers numbered four and five in the petition, and not the prayer to abate temporarily the criminal action.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petition to prohibit the respondent judge from further proceeding in the special civil case should be granted. The complaint for illegal possession of firearm recited that the offense was committed in the barrio of Cadena de Amor of the municipality of Magsaysay. This is the recital that defines the jurisdiction of the municipal court, of which petitioner Mediante is the judge. The respondent court, in taking cognizance of the special civil case insofar as Campo was concerned, stated that the land in controversy pertains to the province of Agusan. But the petition in the special civil case contains no allegation that the barrio of Cadena de Amor is not within the jurisdiction of the municipality of Magsaysay. The allegation is rather that the warrant of arrest was served on Campo at his residence, and that he then remonstrated that the municipal judge who issued the warrant had no jurisdiction in the place where he was harvesting palay and residing, since it was within the province of Agusan.

On the third issue, the Court held that whichever court has jurisdiction in that place is of no importance. The vital point is the allegation of the situs of the offense in the information, and the question of jurisdiction in the light of that allegation must be passed upon and decided in the first instance by the Municipal Court itself in the criminal case before it.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the petition below, insofar as it sought to prohibit the Municipal Court of Magsaysay from proceeding in the criminal case, should have been filed in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, which has appellate and supervisory jurisdiction over all municipal courts in that province, and not in the Court of First Instance of Agusan. The actuation of the respondent judge against the petitioners was officious and unwarranted, and constituted an undue arrogation of supervisory power which did not belong to it at all.

Doctrine

The recital in the information of the place where the offense was committed defines the jurisdiction of the municipal court, and any question of jurisdiction in the light of that allegation must be passed upon and decided in the first instance by the municipal court itself in the criminal case before it. A party may not collaterally attack that jurisdiction by filing a separate action in another court of first instance. Supervisory power over municipal courts belongs to the Court of First Instance of the province in which they sit, and a court of first instance of another province that assumes that power commits an undue arrogation of authority. A writ of preliminary injunction that restrains private acts of coercion and harvesting does not enjoin a criminal prosecution where the order granting it does not include the prayer to abate the criminal action.

Disposition

The Court granted the writ of prohibition, and respondent Judge Ortiz was prohibited and enjoined from further proceeding against the petitioners in the special civil case, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the situs of the offense as alleged in the information defines the municipal court's jurisdiction, and that question must first be decided by the municipal court itself. Examiners use this case to test jurisdiction over criminal cases and the supervisory power of the Court of First Instance over municipal courts within its province.