THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. AGRIPINO FONTANOSA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, CRISPULO GILVERO, SILVERIO CAÑETE, AQUILINO BACANG, GENOVEVO BARRO, MAURO BACANG, …

People versus Fontanosa

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in a murder case. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Agripino Fontanosa and ten others for the killing of Danilo Doneza, a cowhand, in a nighttime shooting at a ranch house on leased public forest land in Bansalan, Davao. The case matters to a reviewee for three reasons: it shows how the Supreme Court treats extrajudicial confessions that the accused claim were extracted by force, it shows how alibi collapses against positive identification and corroboration, and it teaches the rule that the fact of death is the corpus delicti in murder, so that a confession need only be corroborated by some proof that the crime was committed.

Procedural History

An amended information for murder was filed in the Court of First Instance of Davao. After trial, the lower court acquitted Agripino Fontanosa, noted that Teodosio Umpok was at large, and convicted the remaining accused of murder qualified by treachery, with no modifying circumstances, sentencing each to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Danilo Doneza jointly and severally in the sum of 6,000 pesos, and to pay the costs proportionately. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, but because the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court for review.

Facts

Romulo Ramos was the lessee of 960 hectares of public forest land in the sitio of Daeg, barrio of Bala, municipality of Bansalan, Davao, which he converted into a ranch. He built two ranch houses for his cowhands. In the upper one, Ranch House Number 2, lived Jose Tirol, Roberto Tirol, Julian Daroy, and Danilo Doneza.

At about ten o'clock in the evening of December 13, 1957, while the occupants of Ranch House Number 2 were asleep, a succession of shots came from the eastern side. The cowhands took cover and lay flat on the floor until early morning, when they found Doneza wounded near the left ear. He was treated that morning, then brought to Digos, and finally to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital in Davao City, where he died on December 20, 1957.

The municipal police of Bansalan and the 72nd Philippine Constabulary Company investigated. They found Ranch House Number 2 riddled with bullets and empty rifle shells scattered thirty to fifty meters away. In the farm of Mauro Bacang they found a poncho raincoat containing live ammunition and two Enfield rifles, and in the house of Celso Lape another rifle. The appellants gave written statements admitting participation in the attack, signed and sworn before Special Counsel Roque M. Barnes of the Provincial Fiscal's Office. At trial they admitted their signatures but claimed the confessions were forced through maltreatment, and they put up alibi. The trial court convicted them, and they appealed.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Davao had jurisdiction to try the case, the appellants claiming the crime was committed in Dapok, Cotabato, and not in Daeg, Davao.
• Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions were involuntary, having allegedly been obtained through force, violence, duress, and intimidation.
• Whether or not the defense of alibi should be credited.
• Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti, such that the confessions could not be given weight.

Applicable Provisions

Section 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, on official entries in public records, provides:

Entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

The Court used this to hold that the official records of the Bureau of Forestry, showing the leased land and Ranch House Number 2 to be within Davao, established the trial court's jurisdiction.

Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, on corroboration of confessions, provides:

A confession made outside of court cannot be used as evidence against the person making it unless it is corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti.

The Court applied this to require only some proof, apart from the confession, that the crime was committed.

Ruling

On jurisdiction, the Court held for the prosecution. Pasture Land Lease Agreement Number 173 in the name of Romulo Ramos, with its attached sketch, showed that the 960 hectares leased to him lie in Daeg, Bansalan, Davao, and that Ranch House Number 2 stands within that area. Under Section 38, Rule 130, these official entries are prima facie evidence of the facts stated, and to overcome the presumption the evidence must be clear and convincing. The appellants' evidence failed, so the trial court had jurisdiction.

On the confessions, the Court upheld their voluntariness. The medical certificates, except those of Genovevo Barro and Crispulo Gilvero, showed only scars, abrasions, discolorations, and complaints of pain. The examination came eighteen days after confinement, although counsel had seen the accused as early as December 23, 1957 and did not bring them to a physician. The examining physicians testified that the wounds of Barro and Gilvero appeared to have been inflicted only days before examination and were superficial and could have been self-inflicted. Special Counsel Barnes and clerk Jose C. Adao testified that the contents were translated into Visayan, that the accused affirmed their statements, and that they signed voluntarily, with no injuries observed. The Constabulary officers and the provincial jail guard likewise denied maltreatment.

On alibi, the Court rejected it as a weak defense, easy to manufacture, and held it must be proved by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence. The notebook of the preacher Roque Dandan was disbelieved because the pencil entries showed no variation in strokes, the circumstances of its production were puzzling, and it surfaced only on cross-examination. The other alibi witnesses were relatives, associates, or persons who remembered too much, and some alibis stood uncorroborated.

On corpus delicti, the Court held there was sufficient proof. Doctor Asuncion Paraan, who performed the autopsy, found an external wound below the left ear lobe, possibly an entrance wound of a gunshot, with the bullet traveling six inches into the neck, fracturing the cervical vertebrae and severing the spinal cord, the immediate cause of death. Jose Tirol and Julian Daroy testified that Doneza sustained the wound during the shooting. The Court held that in murder the fact of death is the corpus delicti, and that the rule requires only some proof, aside from the confession, that the crime was committed. The confessions were further corroborated by Felix Tolin, who placed three of the accused near the scene carrying rifles hours before the incident, and by the recovery of the rifles.

Doctrine

First, official entries in public records made in the performance of duty are prima facie evidence of the facts stated, and clear and convincing evidence is needed to overthrow them; this settles venue and jurisdiction where land records locate the scene of the crime. Second, a confession is presumed voluntary, and the claim of maltreatment must be supported by credible proof; superficial or delayed medical findings, and the failure of counsel to secure prompt examination, weaken that claim. Third, alibi is a weak defense and must rest on positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence, and it fails against positive identification and corroborated confessions. Fourth, in murder the fact of death is the corpus delicti, and the corroboration required by Section 3, Rule 133 means only some proof, apart from the confession, that the crime was committed.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding the appellants guilty of murder qualified by treachery and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua, with the civil indemnity and costs as imposed below.

Remember This

The line to memorize is that in murder the fact of death is the corpus delicti, and a confession needs only some corroborating proof that the crime was committed. Examiners use this case on the corroboration requirement for extrajudicial confessions and on the weakness of alibi against positive identification.