🎧 Case Brief Lecture

HECTOR HERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. SUSAN SAN PEDRO AGONCILLO, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 194122. October 11, 2012 October 11, 2012

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Hernandez versus Agoncillo

The Case

This is the case of Hernandez versus Agoncillo, a petition for review on certiorari brought by Hector Hernandez against Susan San Pedro Agoncillo. The action began as a complaint for damages arising from a traffic incident on the Buendia Avenue Flyover, in which the respondent's car was damaged by a delivery van owned by the petitioner and driven by his employee. The case matters to a reviewee because it is a procedural case dressed in tort: the Supreme Court uses it to fix the rule on belated answers in summary procedure, to distinguish the earlier ruling in Sablas versus Sablas, and to remind counsel and litigants alike that procedural rules are not to be ignored at will.

Procedural History

The respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City against the petitioner and the driver. The summons was served on the petitioner but not on the driver, so the case proceeded only against the petitioner. The petitioner filed an ex parte motion for extension of time to file his answer, which the trial court denied because it was filed beyond the reglementary period and was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. The petitioner nonetheless filed his answer, then a motion for reconsideration. The trial court later ruled that because the amount claimed exceeded 200,000 pesos, the case was governed by the regular rules of procedure, and it denied the motion to render judgment. The respondent then moved to declare the petitioner in default. The trial court declared him in default and allowed the respondent to present evidence ex parte, and later denied the motion to set aside the order of default. After the ex parte presentation of evidence, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay actual damages, attorney's fees, and costs, while dismissing the case against the driver without prejudice.

The petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court, which denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court, holding that the answer was correctly denied due course because the motion for extension was filed out of time and the answer was filed beyond even the extended period requested. The petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which denied it for lack of merit, and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Facts

On October 5, 2006, at around 12:15 in the afternoon, the petitioner's delivery van, driven by his employee, was on the Buendia Avenue Flyover in bumper-to-bumper traffic. The van backed against the respondent's Honda City and its pedestal hooked the front bumper of her car. After a brief discussion, the driver returned to his van and stepped on the gas, moving abruptly forward, which disengaged the bumper and damaged the car's radiator. The car had to be towed, and the respondent paid 1,700 pesos as towing fee.

The respondent made various demands for payment through the secretary of the petitioner's business, Cargo Solution Innovation, but her demands went unheeded. The petitioner never spoke to her despite her requests; instead, a certain Mr. De Ocampo appeared before her and made inquiries about the accident, and no settlement ever followed. The repair of her car cost 130,602.53 pesos, and she was unable to use her vehicle for five weeks, forcing her to take a taxi to her work at Medical Center Manila.

When the complaint was filed, the petitioner's motion for extension of time to file his answer was filed out of time, and his answer was filed beyond even the period he had requested. He also failed to appear at the hearing on the motion to declare him in default. These failures led the trial court to deny due course to his answer and to declare him in default.

Issues

  • Whether or not the Court of Appeals decision is in accord with the ruling in Sablas versus Sablas, such that the trial court should have admitted the petitioner's answer because it was filed before he was declared in default.
  • Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying due course to the petitioner's answer and in declaring him in default.

Applicable Provisions

Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as applied by the trial court, provides:

The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

This is the provision under which the trial court held the petitioner, as owner and employer, liable for the damage caused by his employee's negligent driving.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition is without merit. It is true, the Court said, that in Sablas versus Sablas it held that where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period but before the defendant is declared in default, and there is no showing of intent to delay and no prejudice to the plaintiff, the answer should be admitted. But the Court emphasized that it is not mandatory for the trial court to admit a belatedly filed answer where the defendant is not yet declared in default. It is within the discretion of the trial court to permit the filing of an answer even beyond the reglementary period, provided there is justification for the belated action and no showing that the defendant intended to delay the case.

The Court found that Sablas differs on two points. First, in Sablas the motion for extension was seasonably filed, while here the petitioner's motion was filed beyond the fifteen-day period allowed by the Rules of Court. Second, in Sablas the trial court admitted the answer, so the denial of the subsequent motion for default was correct, while here the trial court denied due course to the answer precisely because the motion for extension was not seasonably filed and the answer was filed beyond the period requested. Thus, the principle in Sablas does not apply.

On the second issue, the Court found the petitioner's negligence inexcusable. He filed his motion for extension late, failed to file his answer within the period he himself requested without any justifiable excuse, failed to appear at the hearing on the motion to declare him in default, and failed to appear at the hearing of his own motion to set aside the order of default. The Court also noted that the petitioner and his counsel failed to comply with the Court's resolution requiring a reply, filing their motion for reconsideration only after the petition had been dismissed, almost five months after receiving the resolution. The Court stressed that a lawyer has the responsibility of monitoring the periods for filing pleadings, and that a client is bound by the conduct, negligence, and mistakes of his counsel. It also reminded litigants that they should not simply sit back and await the outcome of their case, but should assist their counsel and monitor its status.

Finally, the Court held that even if the petitioner was declared in default, he was not deprived of his right to appeal. He did appeal to the Regional Trial Court, which ruled on the merits and found sufficient evidence to sustain the ruling in the respondent's favor.

Doctrine

The rules a Bar candidate must retain are these. First, the admission of an answer filed beyond the reglementary period but before the declaration of default is not mandatory; it lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, provided there is justification for the belated filing and no showing of intent to delay. Second, the ruling in Sablas versus Sablas applies only where the motion for extension was seasonably filed and the answer was admitted; it does not apply where the motion for extension was itself filed out of time and the answer was filed beyond even the requested period. Third, procedural rules are not to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party; the liberal interpretation of rules applies only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes. Fourth, a client is bound by the negligence and mistakes of his counsel, and the failure of a lawyer to seasonably file a pleading constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. Fifth, a judgment by default does not deprive the defendant of the right to appeal, and an appellate court may rule on the merits.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the Court of Appeals decision and resolution were affirmed; the respondent prevailed and the petitioner was held liable for the damages awarded by the trial court.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the admission of a belated answer before default is discretionary, not mandatory, and Sablas does not save a defendant whose motion for extension was itself filed out of time. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between Sablas versus Sablas and the present case, and to test the rule that a client is bound by the negligence of his counsel.