LOLITA M. SANTIAGO, PETITIONER, VS. SILVESTRE H. BELLO IV, RESPONDENT.

Santiago versus Bello

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Lolita Santiago against Silvestre Bello IV. Santiago asks the Supreme Court to reverse the Court of Appeals, which had dismissed her petition for certiorari against a resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. That resolution denied her motion for reconsideration and left standing a finding of probable cause to prosecute her for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law. The case matters for two reasons. First, it is a clean statement on when procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons. Second, and more importantly for the bar, it is a leading authority on the rule that when the dispositive portion of a resolution conflicts with the body, the dispositive portion prevails.

Procedural History

Bello filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa and for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. After preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Eduardo Ramon Reyes found probable cause only for two counts of violating the Bouncing Checks Law, and dismissed the estafa complaint. Santiago moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Assistant City Prosecutor Alfredo Agcaoili. Santiago then elevated the matter to the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor by petition for review. Undersecretary Ernesto Pineda dismissed the petition outright. On reconsideration, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño issued a resolution denying the motion with finality. Santiago then went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and prohibition. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on three procedural grounds, and later denied reconsideration. Santiago came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

On January 30, 2002, Santiago issued two Metrobank checks in favor of Bello. The first, dated January 30, 2002, was for 100,000 pesos. The second, postdated March 30, 2002, was for 280,000 pesos. When Bello presented the first check in March 2002, it was dishonored because the account was already closed. The second check was likewise dishonored for the same reason upon maturity.

After a notice of dishonor and a demand for payment, Bello filed a complaint-affidavit in January 2004 for estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. Santiago answered that the checks merely evidenced a preexisting loan, that they were not issued for value, and that the parties had agreed the checks would not be funded but would be retrieved or replaced with cash.

The Assistant City Prosecutor found probable cause only for the bouncing checks charges and dismissed estafa, reasoning that the checks were issued for a preexisting obligation and that Bello had shown no inducement. That dismissal was affirmed on reconsideration and on review. The Chief State Prosecutor, however, issued a resolution whose body mistakenly recited that probable cause had been found for both estafa and the bouncing checks, but whose dispositive portion simply denied the motion for reconsideration with finality.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari for noncompliance with procedural requirements.
• Whether or not Chief State Prosecutor Zuño committed grave abuse of discretion in his resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, on the contents and filing of a petition, provides:

The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for. In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed, and when notice of the denial thereof was received. It shall be filed in seven clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

This provision supplies the procedural standards the Court of Appeals applied, and which the Supreme Court measures against Santiago's petition.

Section 11 of Rule 13, on priorities in modes of service and filing, provides:

Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.

This is the basis for treating Santiago's petition as not filed for want of a written explanation of service.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred on one ground but was correct on the others. On the first ground, the Rules allow attachment of either a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy, and Santiago had attached her duplicate original. But her failure to indicate the material dates and to include a written explanation of service were fatal. The Court nevertheless relaxed the rules for the most persuasive of reasons, citing counsel's mild stroke, his advanced age, and his death shortly after filing, and resolved the case on the merits.

On the second issue, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion. The body of the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution erroneously mentioned estafa, but the dispositive portion merely denied the motion for reconsideration. The Court applied the rule that the dispositive portion prevails over the body:

The only portion of the decision that becomes the subject of execution is what is ordained or decreed in such dispositive part. Whatever may be found in the body of the decision can only be considered as part of the reasons or conclusions of the court and while they may serve as guide or enlightenment to determine the ratio decidendi, what is controlling is what appears in the dispositive part of the decision.

Thus the Chief State Prosecutor did not reopen the dismissed estafa complaint. His plain denial of the motion was within his jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion, being capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, was not shown.

Doctrine

First, procedural rules are not to be belittled simply because their strict application would prejudice a party's substantive rights; they may be relaxed only for the most persuasive of reasons, where the noncompliance is severely disproportionate to the injustice bound to be suffered. Second, when a conflict exists between the dispositive portion and the body of a decision or resolution, the dispositive portion prevails; the body supplies only the reasons and the ratio decidendi. Third, certiorari is confined to errors of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion means capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an evasion of positive duty.

Disposition

The petition was denied for lack of merit, with no costs; Santiago lost and the challenged resolutions stood.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the fallo controls: what is ordained in the dispositive portion prevails over whatever appears in the body. Examiners use this case to test the fallo-versus-body rule and the relaxation of procedural rules for persuasive, humanitarian reasons.