PETRA DE LA CRUZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. LUCIO M. TIANCO, AS JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF PASAY CITY, RESTITUTO N. ASCAÑO, AS CITY ENGINEER OF PASAY AND THE SHERIFF OF …

On April 14, 1958, Petra de la Cruz was prosecuted in the Municipal
Court of Pasay City, for violation of Section 30, Article X of Republic
Act No. D17, upon complaint of appellee City Engineer (Crim. Case No.
7866); and sentenced to pay a fine of f 10.00 and the costs, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to remove her house
from Highway 54, with instruction that upon her failure to do so, the
City Engineer of Pasay could remove said house, at such time his sound
judgment and discretion dictate. The accused did not appeal; the
judgment became final and executory and she paid the fine.Thereafter,
upon petition of the City Fiscal, the municipal Court issued the
following Order—

“WHEREFORE, the motion of the Office of the City
Attorney for the demolition of the house of the accused Petra de la
Cruz from that portion of the government’s right-of-way on Highway 54
is hereby granted. However, this order of demolition should not be
carried into effect if on or before October i), 11)60, the accused is
able to obtain the permission of the Highway Commissioner, by means of
a lease or otherwise, to have her house remain on the premises in
question.”

On October 5, 1960, appellant de la Cruz informed the court that as
of August 14, 1959, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Highways had
already requested the City Engineer of Pasay, thru a personal letter,
deferment of the demolition of the houses on the Highway 54 right of
way, including that of Petra dc la Cruz. The above manifestation was
opposed by the City Fiscal, claiming that the personal letter of the
Commissioner had been counter-manded by the following official
communication sent by Public Highway Commissioner Nicolas L. Cuenca:

“Respectfully returned to the Engineer, Pasay City,
requesting that the ejection of all squatters within the road
right-of-way be given due course.”

On November 9, 1960, defendant-appellee Judge ordered the demolition
of the house in question. Claiming that the appellee Judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in imposing on appellant de la Cruz, as part of her
criminal liability in Criminal Case No. 7866, the affirmative act of
removing her house on the portion of Highway 54, a petition for
certiorari with Writ of Injunction was presented before the CFI of
Rizal, Pasay City Branch. During the hearing of the petition for
preliminary injunction, none of the appellees appeared and the trial
court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads—

“AS PRAYED FOR, the defendants, Restituto N. Ascaño,
as City Engineer of Pasay CIty and the Sheriff of Pasay City or their
agents ar ehereby restrained form demolishing plaintiff’s house
situated at No. 751 Highway 54 (now Epifanio de los Santos Avenue)
Pasay City; and likewise, the defendant Judge, Lucio M. Tianco of the
Municipal Court of Pasay City, is hereby ordered to desist from
proceeding further with Criminal Case No. 7366, until further orders of
this Court.”

As required by Ac Court, defendants presented a joint answer and after the usual admission and denials, stated, among others—

“That moreover, the city government is authorized to
remove the aforesaid illegal construction on the highway considering
that the same is a nuisance and may be removed any time even without
judicial sanrtion, that therefore, the issue raised by plaintiff is
purely academic;

As affirmative defenses, defendants alleged:

“1. That the complaint does not state a cause of
action in that plaintiff decs not have any legal right which has been
violated by the defendants;

2. That the decision rendered in
Criminal Case No. 7866. finding appellant guilty and ordering her to
remove her houee on the, public highway has already be;ome final and
executory and can no longer be subject to question, directly or
indirectly;

3. Appellant is guilty of laches and therefore the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is no longer availing;

4.
That the decision of the municipal court (ordering the removal of the
house) is based on the express, inherent, and implied powers vested on
it by law.”

At the hearing, counsel of the parties manifested that only
questions of law were involved and that they were submitting a
Stipulation of Facts and memoranda to support their respective
contentions. Under date of October 21, 1960, the CFI of Rizal rendered
judgment, the pertinent portions of which read—

“The only issue posed in this case la as to whether
the Municipal Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in condemning the
plaintiff to remove her home in question on a portion of Epifanio de
log Santos Avenue. Plaintiff contends that nothing is said in Section
30, Article X of Republic Act No. 917, nor anywhere else in faid act,
about the removal of the obstruction, and that part of the sentence
which ordered the removal of her house from the portion of the highway
on which it is now built is null and void, in line with the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Carol and Ballestcros vs. Paredes, 17
Phil. 94. The prosecution, on the other hand, anchorn its case on the
provisions of Articles 45, 100, and 104 of the itevised Penal Code and
Sec. 1, Rule 197 (it should be 109), and Sec. 6, Rule 24 (it should be
124), of the Rules of Court.

*        *         *         *         *         *         *

This
Court fully subscribes to the doctrine enunciated in the Carol case
above adverted to, because it is founded on sound principles of law and
logic, and it would not hesitate to apply the ruing of the Fupreme
Court in said case to the case at bur, if it is still controlling. It
is, however, doubted if it could yet be applied here in view of the
subsequent rulincrs of our Supreme Court and existing laws governing
the matter. We observe that because Art. 10 of the Revised Penal Code,
said tribunal has applied certain general provisions of said code to
the special laws. Thus, in the case of People vs. Moreno, 60
Phil. 712, although there is no express provision in the Peviscd Motor
Vehicle Law, Act No. 3992 providing for indemnity and subsidiary
imprisonment, our Supreme Court had deemed it fit and proper to apply
the provisions of Article 100 and Article 39 of the  Revised Penal Code.
because of the provision of Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code that
the coe’e shall be suprimentary to fpenal laws, unless the latter shall
specially provide the contrary. In the case of People vs.
Parel, 44 Phil. 437, although the accused there was tried and convicted
under the special law, he was given the benefit of Article 22 * * *.
Article 45 of the Penal Code with reference to the confiscation of the
instruments used in the commission of a crime was applied in the case
of U.S. vs. Bruhez, 28 Phil. 305, where the defendant wa3 charged with violation of a special law. * * *”.

Now,
because of the provisions of Article 10 of the Revised Penal Cede that
the code shall be supplementary to special laws unless the latter shall
specially provide the contrary (and there is none to the contrary in
Republic Act No 917), Art. 45 of said Code, and Sec. 6, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court and the judicial pronouncement made by our Supreme Court
in the case of Siojo vs. Harvey, 43 Phil. 333, that ‘independent of any
statutory provision, every court had inherent power to do all things
reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope
of its jurisdiction,’ it ia the sense of this Court that the lower
court acted properly in ordering the remtoval of the house of the
plaintiff, who has no vested right or title over the portion of the
highway illegally occupied by her. After all, plaintiff is but an
intruder or usurper and the legal technicalities which she invoked
should deserve scant consideration of the court for the same would only
tend to dereat the speedy administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari with injunction is hereby dismissed, without costs.”

The above judgment is now before Us on direct appeal,
plaintiff-appellant assigning five (5) errors allegedly committed by
the lower court, all of which pose the singular issue of whether or not
the municipal court could legally order the removal of the house
illegally constructed on a portion of Highway 54, in addition to the
penalty of fine.

Appellant seems to labor under the impression that after the
declaration of her construction as illegal, pursuant to Republic Act
No. 917, the government will have to institute a civil case to eject
her from the premises. This contention is preposterous, to say the
least. We should not confound an ordinary civil action of ejectment,
from the removal of obstructions illegally constructed by squatters, as
a result of a criminal offense. In the first, the law specially
provides the procedure to be followed in case of demolition; in the
second, there is none stated, although this Court has had occasion to
rule that houses erected without governmental authority on public
streets, river bed, and water ways are nuisance per se (Sitchon, et al.
vs. Aquino, 98 Phil., 458; 42 Off. Gaz., No. 3, p. 1399; Quinto, et a!, vs.
Lacson, et al., 108 Phil. 460) and could be removed by the government,
under the procedure outlined in the law governing the case. The
appellee can not be accused of having violated clue process, for the
accused had been given her day in court, paid her fine, and her house
was not forfeited or confiscated by the government as alleged, but
removed merely from the government property where it hail no right to
stay. The appellant’s building was a veritable nuisance. Squatters
should not be permitted to obstruct the wheels of progress, such as the
construction of good roads, by invoking trifle technicalities, which
will only delay, as it did delay for a considerable period of time, the
disposal of this case.

With respect to the other minor issues raised, the trial court had
answered them in the decision, portions of which had boon heretofore
reproduced, and which We consider to be well taken.

Conformably with the foregoing, the decision appealed from should
be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant, in both
instances.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.