PETRONILO NAPONE, JR. AND EDGAR NAPONE, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Napone versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is a criminal case in which two brothers, Petronilo Napone, Junior and Edgar Napone, were charged with murder for the killing of Salvador Espelita and were ultimately convicted of homicide. The brothers admitted that they took part in the events that led to Salvador's death, but they insisted that they acted in self-defense and in defense of their father. The case matters because it gathers in one place the rules on justifying circumstances, the burden of evidence that shifts to an accused who admits the killing, the strict requirements for proving conspiracy, and the distinction between a principal and an accomplice.

Procedural History

The brothers, together with their father, Petronilo Napone, Senior, were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. They pleaded not guilty. The case against the father was dismissed after his death. In its decision of 14 November 2006, the trial court found the two brothers guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and rejected their claim of self-defense and defense of a relative. The brothers appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its decision of 9 December 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with modification. It found that the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation attended the killing, held that conspiracy was not proven, and reduced Edgar's liability to that of an accomplice. The brothers moved for reconsideration, which was denied in a resolution of 21 July 2010. They then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review.

Facts

On the evening of 22 September 1992, in Barangay Mabunga, Baungon, Bukidnon, Salvador Espelita and his son Robert arrived at the house of Jocelyn Janioso calling for help. Salvador's forehead was bleeding, and Calib Napone, a son of the father and brother of the petitioners, was bloodied and trying to free himself from Salvador's hold. Salvador said that Calib had waylaid him and struck him with an iron bar. Janioso sent for a vehicle to bring both men to the hospital.

After a while, the Napones arrived in a vehicle. To avoid further conflict, Janioso pulled Salvador inside her house. The father followed and immediately hacked Salvador from behind with a large bolo, hitting him at the back of the head. Salvador retaliated by hacking the father. Edgar then threw a stone the size of a fist at Salvador, and Junior shot Salvador three times with a small firearm, hitting him on the chest and causing him to fall. Salvador was pronounced dead at the hospital.

The autopsy showed four hack wounds on the left side of the head and a gunshot wound on the chest. The medico-legal officer concluded that the cause of death was the perforation of the left ventricle due to the gunshot wound, which was the fatal injury. The defense claimed that the Napones acted in self-defense and in defense of a relative, saying that Salvador attacked the father and then Junior, and that Junior fired only to repel the attack.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioners acted in self-defense or in defense of a relative, such that their killing of Salvador was justified.
• Whether or not conspiracy attended the commission of the felony.
• Whether or not Edgar is liable only as an accomplice.

Applicable Provisions

Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, on self-defense and defense of relatives, provides:

Are exempt from criminal liability the following: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur: First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.

These are the justifying circumstances the petitioners invoked, and the Court measured their evidence against each element.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, on conspiracy, provides:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

The Court applied this definition in holding that conspiracy must be proven by positive and conclusive evidence, not by conjecture.

Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code, on the persons criminally liable, provides:

The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies: 1. Principals. 2. Accomplices. 3. Accessories.

This provision underlies the Court's separate treatment of Junior as a principal and Edgar as an accomplice.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioners failed to prove self-defense or defense of a relative. When an accused admits killing the victim, the burden of evidence shifts to him, and he must prove his innocence by clear and convincing evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's. In both justifying circumstances, unlawful aggression is essential. The Court found that the Napones, not the Espelitas, were the unlawful aggressors. The father armed himself with a bolo and was ready to use it against the Espelitas because he believed they had harmed Calib. The fact that Calib was seen lying on the ground was not the unlawful aggression required by law, because any attack on Calib had already ceased when the Napones arrived. The positive and categorical testimonies of the eyewitnesses, corroborated by the autopsy, prevailed over the claim of self-defense, which the Court described as an inherently weak defense that is easy to fabricate.

On the second issue, the Court held that conspiracy was not established. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is required, and conspiracy cannot rest on conjecture. The fact that the accused were members of the same family, arrived at the scene at about the same time, and attacked the victim successively did not suffice. In the absence of conspiracy, each accused is responsible only for the consequences of his own acts.

On the third issue, the Court held that Edgar is liable only as an accomplice, because his act of throwing a stone was not indispensable to the commission of the felony.

Doctrine

An accused who invokes self-defense or defense of a relative admits the killing, and the burden of evidence shifts to him to prove the justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Unlawful aggression is indispensable to both defenses, and it must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not a mere threatening attitude. Conspiracy must be proven by proof beyond reasonable doubt and by positive and conclusive evidence, never by conjecture; family relationship, simultaneity of arrival, and successive attacks do not by themselves establish it. Where conspiracy is absent, each accused answers only for his own acts, and one whose participation is not indispensable is liable only as an accomplice.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with modification, convicting Junior of homicide as a principal and Edgar as an accomplice, with the corresponding penalties and civil liabilities.

Remember This

Remember the single line: self-defense admits the killing, so the burden shifts to the accused, and unlawful aggression must be actual and present, not already spent. Examiners use this case to test the elements of self-defense and defense of a relative, the quantum of proof for conspiracy, and the principal-accomplice distinction.