EUGENIO S. DE GRACIA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT.

Eugenio S. de Gracia was charged with estafa before the Court of First
Instance of Manila where he was found guilty thereof and sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, as minimum, and 1 year and 1 day of prision correccional,
as maximum, to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P400.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, at the rate of P2.50 a
day, provided that said subsidiary imprisonment does not exceed
one-third of the principal penalty herein imposed, and to pay the costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the above judgment by
eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment imposed upon the accused. The
case is now before us on a petition for review.

Sometime in
July, 1950, one Celedonio A. Benipayo, owner of Lucky Press and
Engraving located at 1220 Santander, Sampaloc, Manila, and appellant
entered into a transaction whereby the former was to print and engrave
the composite picture of several of the members of the House of
Representatives and the latter to pay him the price in the amount of
P540.00. An advance payment of P140.00 was given, leaving a balance of
P400.00. When the pictures and the cuts were ready for delivery,
appellant could not pay the balance agreed upon, and so he induced
Benipayo to accept an assignment in his favor of certain accounts due
from the congressmen concerned, to wit: Congressmen Felisberto Verano
for P120.00, Jesus Ilagan for P120.00, Dennis Molintas for P100.00, and
Ismael Veloso for P60.00, or a total of P400.00. In addition appellant
gave Benipayo letters of Congressmen Verano, Ilagan and Molintas
authorizing the accounting officer of the House of Representatives to
charge their accounts against their allowances. In the assignment of
the accounts made in favor of Benipayo, appellant wrote the words
“Please issue treasury warrant payable to Lucky Press and
Photo-Engraving as our assignee, E.S. de Gracia.”

Relying on this assignment, Benipayo delivered the composite pictures
and cuts to appellant. When Benipayo went to the office of the
accounting officer of the House of Representatives to collect, he came
to know from the records that the money covered by the accounts had
already been collected by appellant, whereupon Benipayo filed a charge
for estafa against him while he instituted an action to recover the
balance due before the Municipal Court of Manila. The civil case was
appealed to the court of first instance and later to the Court of
Appeals where the latter affirmed the judgment of the former sentencing
appellant to pay the sum of P400.00 to Benipayo, plus P100.00 as
attorney’s fees, as well as to pay treble costs.

In concluding that appellant is guilty of the crime charged, the Court
of Appeals made the following finding: “This Court in said case CA-G.
R. No. 11716-R, had already passed upon this issue of fact by holding
that the evidence of record indubitably reveals that appellant himself
had collected the credits he assigned to plaintiff (complainant herein)
in payment of the balance of P400.00 which he owed the latter for the
preparation of certain cliches and that he did not turn over his
collection to his creditor. Besides, an examination of the evidence on
record does not reveal any outstanding credit owing to the appellant
from the different congressmen concerned other than those which the
cashier or accounting officer had paid to the former on account of the
pictures purchased by them from him.”

Appellant now disputes this finding not only on the basis that the
decision in the civil case is not deemed admissible against an accused
in a subsequent criminal action even if they involve the same party but
because the evidence on record does not support the finding that
appellant does not have any outstanding credit in his favor from the
congressmen concerned other than those which the accounting officer had
paid to the former on account of the pictures purchased by him from him.

While as a rule the decision in a civil case is not admissible as
evidence against an accused in a criminal case subsequently filed
against him even if both involve the same party because of the theory
that a decision in a civil case is merely based on preponderance of
evidence white in a criminal one on a finding beyond per-adventure of
doubt, the citation of that decision herein is merely confined to the
status of the assigned credits in question and not to the case as a
whole, a material fact which was found to be true not only by the court
of first instance but even by the Court of Appeals as to which
appellant has no reason to complain because of the opportunity for
examination and confrontation he had had in the civil case. At any
rate, there is enough evidence on record to show that appellant really
withdrew the same credits he assigned to the complainant himself, of
Juliana Imutan, clerk of the accounting office of the House of
Representatives, and of Toribio M. San Juan, chief of the property
division of the same House, plus the letters of inquiry extant in the
record. Under a well-settled rule, this finding of the Court of Appeals
cannot now be disturbed there being more preponderance in support
thereof.

Regarding the contention that appellant did not have any criminal
intent to defraud the complainant when he assigned the credits in
question to him, suffice it to say that the Court of Appeals found
otherwise, as may be inferred from the following statement: “The scheme
or cunning with which the appellant was able to obtain the release in
his favor the release of the composite picture and the cuts was clearly
fraudulent. The pretended assignment of credits which appellant had, by
his subsequent act, not intended to materialize, was used and availed
of by him as part of the deceit which was the affected cause that
induced the complainant to part with his property.” Criminal intent
being a function of the mind, we find the surmise reasonable for no
other conclusion can be drawn from the overt act of appellant in
successfully withdrawing the very credits he assigned before the
complainant could have time to collect them. And it is not correct to
say that complainant was negligent in collecting said credits because
he immediately tried to do so, only that he failed because there were
no funds available when the attempt was made. And when he returned he
found to his surprise that the credits had already been collected by
appellant contrary to his commitment.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.