G.R. No. 19259. September 23, 1966
GENERAL TRAVEL SERVICE, LTD., PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. EDILBERTO Y. DAVID, PERSONALLY AND AS COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF THE MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
of Rizal dismissing the petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by
General Travel Service, Ltd., against Edilberto Y. David, in his
private capacity and as Collector of Customs at the Manila
International Airport.
The petition alleges: that on August 25, 1961 an SAS plane and a KLM
plane from Bangkok arrived at the Manila International Airport
bringing, among other things, eight big packages owned by petitioner, a
limited partnership duly organized and existing under the laws of the
British Crown Colony of Hongkong; that respondent ordered the unloading
of said packages over the objection of local representatives of the two
airlines, who explained that the packages had been mistakenly brought
to the Philippines (from Hongkong via Bangkok) and requested respondent
that they be returned to the airport of origin; that upon learning of
respondent’s intention to open, inspect and inventory the packages,
petitioner, through counsel, wrote a letter to respondent on August 28,
1961, requesting that their immediate reshipment be permitted; and that
since the packages had not been imported but were erroneously brought
to the Philippines, respondent gravely abused his discretion in
ordering their unloading, opening and inspection. Petitioner,
therefore, prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, but
the remedy became moot because in the meantime all the packages had
been opened.
Respondent, in his answer, alleges: that he did not order the
unloading of the eight packages, but the airlines employees voluntarily
unloaded them because they bore the names of consignees with Manila
addresses, as shown by the plane cargo manifest of the SAS plane which
carried seven packages and of the cargo manifest of the KLM plane which
carried the eighth package; that said packages were covered by false
declarations and papers, for while they were declared in the cargo
manifests and air waybills as containing frozen goods intended for
Manila, they were found upon examination to contain highly dutiable
articles in commercial quantities [1]
and of the kind not specified in either the cargo manifests or the air
waybills, for which reason the corresponding seizure proceedings were
instituted for violation of Section 2530 (i), (m)-3, and (m)-4 of the
Tariff and Customs Code and of Circular No. 96, as amended by Circular
No. 123, of the Central Bank, in relation to Section 2530(f) of the
same code; that respondent Collector of Customs may not be prohibited
from taking cognizance of such seizure proceedings, nor may he be
compelled to allow the return of the packages since he has jurisdiction
over all matters arising from the enforcement of tariff and customs
laws within his collection district, his decision being subject to
review only by the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision is in turn
appealable only to the Court of Tax Appeals; that Republic Act No. 1125
has removed from the Courts of First Instance the power to review the
decisions of customs authorities; and that since petitioner has not
been organized and registered under our laws, it has no legal capacity
to sue, and even if it had, it is not the proper party-petitioner
because it does not own the packages, not being either the consignee or
shipper thereof, the air waybills showing that Ana D. Riana, Hector
Reyes, Barbara Mallari and Milagros Isip, all of Manila, Philippines,
were the consignees of two packages each, while the corresponding
shippers were R.B. Henson, Peferlia Roberts, T.H. Leung and David Todd,
all of Melbourne Hotel, Kowloon.
Subsequently, T.H. Leung, David Todd, Peferlia Roberts and R.B.
Henson moved for permission to file an amended petition, substituting
themselves for the original petitioner since they were the real owners
of the eight packages in question, the original petitioner having
merely handled the shipment for them.
In the decision appealed from the lower court denied the motion for
amendment and dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed to this Court
and now avers that the lower court erred in holding: (1) that the eight
packages were imported into the Philippines; (2) that consequently
respondent had the right to seize and hold them until the duties and
taxes due thereon shall have been paid; (3) that respondent had the
authority to determine whether or not the packages bad been imported,
his ruling being appealable only to the Commissioner of Customs and
thence to the Court of Tax Appeals; and (4) that the original
petitioner is an entity separate and apart from the persons named in
the amended petition, and hence the amendment prayed for was improper.
Whether or not appellee acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the seizure
and forfeiture of the packages depends ultimately on whether or not the
packages in question were imported into the Philippines within the
meaning of the Customs Laws.
According to Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code,
“importation begins when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the
jurisdiction of the Philippines with the intention to unload therein x
x x and is deemed terminated upon payment of the duties, taxes, and
other charges due upon the articles, or secured to be paid at a port of
entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted, or x
x x until they have legally left the jurisdiction of the customs.”
It is undisputed that the eight packages arrived at the Manila
International Airport on August 25, 1961. The cargo manifests of the
planes carrying them show that they were destined for the Philippines. [2]
The air waybills covering the packages were of the same import. The
appellee, therefore, was justified in considering said packages as
having been imported into the Philippines.
The functions of the Bureau of Customs include the assessment and
collection of the lawful revenues from imported articles and all other
dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties accruing under the tariff and
customs laws; and the prevention and suppression of smuggling and other
frauds upon the customs. [3]
It is the duty of the Collector of Customs to cause all articles
entering the jurisdiction of his district and destined for importation
through his port to be entered at the customshouse, to have all such
articles appraised and classified, and to assess and collect the
duties, taxes and other charges thereon, and have possession of all
imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges have not
been paid or received to be paid, disposing of the same according to
law. [4] For the enforcement
of the customs and tariff laws, he is authorized to effect searches and
seizures conformably with the provisions of said laws. [5] It shall be his duty to make seizure of any article when the same is subject to forfeiture. [6]
A package or article is subject to forfeiture if it is found by the
examining official to contain any article not specified in the invoice
or entry, provided the Collector is of the opinion that the
misdirection was caused with fraudulent intent; or if it was sought to
be imported on the strength of a false declaration or affidavit, or a
false invoice or other document, executed by the owner, importer,
exporter or consignee concerning the importation. [7]
The facts and circumstances relative to the arrival here of the
eight packages afforded sufficient basis for respondent Collector to
conclude that they had been imported to this country; and since there
was indubitable proof of wrongful declaration it was clearly within his
power to order their seizure and forfeiture. This case has no
similarity with U.S. v. Chua Loy (37 Phil. 510) cited by petitioner. In
that case, there was no evidence of intention to import, all
indications being to the contrary. [8]
Appellant maintains that the evidence of intention to import has
been counteracted by the notice of wrong shipment served by the
airlines representatives upon appellee when the goods were unloaded,
coupled with the request that the packages be returned or shipped back
to the airport of origin. Such notice and request were reiterated in
the formal letter sent to appellee on August 28, 1961. As proof of
erroneous shipment, appellant points to the circumstances: (1) that the
supposed consignees of the packages never claimed them for entry
through the airport customshouse as required by Section 1201 of the
Tariff and Customs Code; and (2) that the packages were found to
contain dry goods and other articles instead of “frozen goods” as their
labels indicated. Circumstance No. 1 was the logical result of the
timely discovery of the misdeclaration; and circumstance No. 2, if
anything, was precisely the justification for the seizure proceedings.
In any event, it was within the appellee’s authority to determine
whether or not the bare notice of wrong shipment served upon him was
sufficient to overcome the convincing objective evidence of importation
on which he acted. We are not prepared to say that in acting as he did
he committed a grave abuse of discretion correctible by the
extraordinary remedy of prohibition, or so far failed to perform a duty
especially enjoined by law as to be subject to mandamus. Otherwise the
exercise of the powers and functions vested by law in the Bureau of
Customs in order to prevent smuggling could be easily frustrated. [9]
If appellant believed that appellee’s conclusion was erroneous, the
remedy was by appeal to the Commissioner of Customs, and then to the
Court of Tax Appeals should the Commissioner uphold appellee’s
decision. The Tax Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review
the action of the Commissioner in seizure and confiscation cases such
as this one. And that power is to the exclusion of the Court of First
Instance, which may not interfere with decisions of the Commissioner
even in the form of proceedings for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, which are in reality attempts to review the Commissioner’s
actuations (Millarez v. Amparo, 98 Phil. 282; Namarco v. Macadaeg, 98
Phil. 185; Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Manahan, L-12096, April 30, 1959; Acting Collector of Customs vs. De la
Rama Steamship Co., Inc., L-20676, February 26, 1965.)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Barrera, Dizon, Bengzon, JP, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.
Regala, J., no part.
[1] Transistors, clocks,
men’s and ladies’ banlon sweaters, socks, fountain pens, watches, bags,
purses, buckles, belts, nylon articles, bracelets, pipes, lighters,
etc.
[2] Section 1105 of the
Tariff and Customs Code provides that for the purpose of making entry,
there shall be presented to the customs boarding official four copies
of a general declaration which shall contain among others: A cargo
manifest together with information as to names of consignees, their
nationalities and their addresses, numbers and marks of packages,
nature of goods, destination, gross weight and value; and that the
cargo manifest shall in no case be changed or altered after entry of
the aircraft, except by means of an amendment by the pilot in command
or authorized agent thereof, under oath, and attached to the original
manifest: Provided, however, that after the invoice and/or entry
covering an importation have been received and recorded in the office
of the appraiser, no amendment shall be allowed, except when it is
obvious that a clerical error or any other discrepancy has been
committed without any fraudulent intent in the preparation of the
manifest, discovery of which could not have been made until after
examination of the importation has been completed.
[3] Section 602, paragraphs (a) and (b), Tariff and Customs Code.
[4] Section 1206, Tariff and Customs Code.
[5] Section 2203, id.
[6] Section 2205, id.
[7] Section 2530, pars. i, m(3) and m(4), id.
[8] The facts of that case
are: “That the steamship Castlefield, an English vessel, arrived at the
port of Manila on the 15th day of August, 1917, from Saigon,
Indo-China; that this was the first trip of said vessel to the port of
Manila; that its accustomed trips were Hongkong to Saigon and return;
that it cleared for the purpose of sailing out of the port of Manila on
the 17th day of August, 1917; that the appellant was chief cook on
board said vessel and had been for three trips; that said trips had
been between Hongkong and Saigon; that he did not know that the vessel
was coming to the port of Manila when it left Saigon a few days prior
to the 15th day of August; that the 60 tins of opium in question were
delivered to him at Saigon to be turned over to some one at Hongkong;
that said tins were kept by him in the kitchen of said vessel until it
arrived in the Philippine waters, when they were delivered to the
defendant (Lee Kam) to be kept in the room of one of the officers of
the vessel until after the same had sailed out of the port of Manila;
that there was no attempt made to bring said opium ashore nor to
discharge it at Manila, notwithstanding the fact that the vessel had
been in the port for two days prior to the time when they were found in
the place above indicated; that the said vessel sailed from the port of
Manila on the 17th day of August 1917. Under these facts, is the
appellant guilty of the illegal importation of opium? He frankly
admitted that the opium was in his possession. Considering the fact
that no effort was made by him to discharge said opium during the two
days while the vessel was at anchor in the port of Manila, we are
inclined to accept his statement that it was his intention to carry the
opium in question to Hongkong and not to deliver it in the Philippine
Islands, especially in view of the fact that when the vessel left
Saigon he did not know that it was coming to Manila.”
[9] SEC. 2210. – It shall
be lawful for any official or person exercising police authority under
the provisions of this Code to go aboard any vessel or aircraft within
the limits of any collection district, and to inspect, search and
examine said vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope
on board, and to search any person on board the said vessel or aircraft
and to this end to hail and stop such vessel or aircraft if under way,
to use all necessary force to compel compliance; and if it shall appear
that any breach or violation of the customs and tariff laws of the
Philippines has been committed, whereby or in consequence of which such
vessels or aircrafts, or the articles, or any part thereof, on board of
or imported by such vessel or aircraft, is liable to forfeiture, to
make seizure of the same or any part thereof.
The power of search hereinabove given shall extend to the removal of
any false bottom, partition, bulkhead or other obstruction, so far as
may be necessary to enable the officer to discover whether any dutiable
or forfeitable articles may be concealed therein.
No proceeding herein shall give rise to any claim for the damage thereby caused to article or vessel or aircraft.
SEC. 2211. – It shall also be lawful for a person exercising
authority as aforesaid to open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or
other container, wherever found when he has reasonable cause to suspect
the presence therein of dutiable or prohibited article or articles
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, and likewise to stop,
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of
holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. (Tariff and Customs
Code)