G.R. No. 18930. February 28, 1967
PHILIPPINE SUGAR INSTITUTE, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND INSUREFCO & PAPER PULP PROJECT WORKERS’ UNION, RESPONDENTS.
CASTRO, J.:
Petition for certiorari by the Philippine Sugar Institute
(PHILSUGIN) against the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) and the Insular
Refining Co. & Paper Pulp Project Workers’ Union (Union), to set aside the
order of the CIR of July 31, 1961, and its resolution en banc of
September 7, 1961, issued in CIR case 283-V (8).
On June 11, 1949 the respondent Union and the Insular Refining
Corporation (INSUREFCO), predecessor of the PHILSUGIN,[1]
entered into a partial agreement, whereby the latter granted to its workers
who are members of the Union 15 days vacation leave and 15 days sick leave with
pay for every year of service, proportionate to the length of service
rendered; 25% additional compensation for evertime
work and work performed on Sundays and legal holidays, this to apply also to
monthly-salaried employees; and 25% additional compensation for work from 6:00
p.m. to 12:00 midnight, and 50% additional compensation for work from 12:00
midnight to 6:00 a.m., to all workers, including monthly-salaried
employees. This partial agreement was
approved by the CIR in its order of June
20, 1949.
But because the aforesaid agreement was not made applicable to
the 26 members of the police force of the PHILSUGIN, who are also members of
the Union, the latter on May 21, 1951 filed a petition with the CIR (Case 283-V)
for extra compensation. While this
petition was pending resolution, 17 of the 26 members accepted an offer of the
PHILSUGIN granting them 25% and 50% additional compensation for work performed
from 6:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight and from 12:00 midnight to 6:00 a.m.,
respectively, and 25% additional compensation for work performed on Sundays
and legal holidays, effective February 1, 1951. This agreement was approved by the CIR on December 11, 1951.
Sabas Camacho, Leopoldo
Lanuza, Marcos Rarang,
Alfredo Abaño, Martiniano Abuton and Margarito Villamor refused to be bound by the last agreement, and
accordingly pressed their petition for extra compensation. The PHILSUGIN filed its answer on October 2
1953, alleging that the partial agreement of June 11, 1949 is not applicable to
the members of its police force, and that these policemen were already enjoying
free uniforms consisting of khaki clothing equivalent to 2 suits for every 6
months, one pair of shoes for every 6 months, one regulation helmet for every 6
months, aside from 10% additional compensation for members performing work
from 3:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. and two extra days leave of absence per month
(non-cumulative), in addition to the regular sick and vacation leaves
prescribed by the Civil Service Law.
On August 2, 1954,
the CIR rendered judgment as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the respondent Insular Sugar Refining Corporation
is hereby ordered to pay:
“Policemen Sabas Camacho, Leopoldo Lanuza, Alfredo Abaño, Martiniano C. Abuton, Marcos Rarang and Margarito Villamor (a) 25%
additional compensation for night work from 6:00 p.m. to 12:00 p.m. and 50%
from 12:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.; and (b) 25% additional compensation for work performed
on Sundays and legal holidays, all of which additional compensation to begin
from March 22, 1949 up to the time they are in the service of the company,
together with all the privileges and facilities hitherto enjoyed by them at
the time the partial award of June 20, 1951[2]
was made effective.”
Prior to the rendition of this judgment,
however, or on the previous March 31,
1954, the said six policemen, together with other personnel of the
petitioner, were laid off, after being paid one-month separation pay, their
regular salaries to the last day of their service (March 31, 1954), and all
their accumulated leave pay.
On October 11, 1954
the INSUREFCO resumed operations. These
policemen were refused reinstatement, and so four of them, namely, Marcos Rarang, Alfredo Abaño, Martiniano C. Abuton and Margarito Viliamor,[3]
filed with the CIR a petition for reinstatement and for contempt, dated
November 8, 1954 (Case 283-V (6),[4]
claiming that the abolition of their positions constitutes contempt of court as
well as obstructs the execution of the judgment of August 2, 1954; that their
lay-off was only a temporary measure adopted by the company during the time
that it was idle; and that although it had already resumed operations and taken
back all of the employees who were working on June 14, 1952, the four of them
were nevertheless not readmitted. They
therefore prayed for reinstatement, with back wages from October 11, 1954 until the date of their
reinstatement. In answer, the company
maintained that the lay-off was in pursuance of a directive of the Office of
Economic Coordination ordering a retrenchment of personnel; that it was under
no legal obligation to reinstate the policemen in question, especially in view
of the losses incurred by the company; and that it did not commit any act of
contempt of court in laying off the policemen and in refusing to reinstate
them.
The CIR, declaring that the four policemen were the “victims of
discrimination”, rendered judgment on December 9, 1957 as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders the respondent and/or the
Philippine Sugar Institute, the respondent’s substitute, to reinstate Policemen
Marcos Rarang, Alfredo Abaño,
Martiniano C. Abuton and Margarito Villamor to their
previous positions in the police force, with back wages from October 11, 1954,
until actually reinstated, without loss of seniority and other privileges they
have hitherto enjoyed as of March 31, 1954.”
This judgment was affirmed by this Court in Philippine Sugar
Institute vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-13475,
September 29, 1960; a
motion for reconsideration thereof filed by the PHILSUGIN was denied in a
resolution dated October 25, 1960. The four policemen were consequently
reinstated on November 29, 1960
and paid their back wages.
The above antecedents constitute the background of the case at bar
(CIR case 283-V, [8]).
On December 19, 1960 the respondent Union filed with the CIR a
“Petition for execution of judgment re privileges, facilities” (CIR
Case 283-V [8]), against the PHILSUGIN, alleging, among other things, that
inasmuch as the four policemen were paid their back wages from October 11,
1954 to November 7, 1960 and therefore were technically in the service of the
company during the said period, they are likewise entitled to the privileges
and facilities they have hitherto enjoyed, pursuant to the judgments of August
2, 1954 and December 9, 1957, and as part of the said judgments; that
likewise, now they are back in the service of the company, they should
currently enjoy the said privileges and facilities; that the company has not
yet executed the judgment of December 9, 1957 with reference to the enjoyment
of said privileges, ordained in the judgment of August 2, 1954; that since
their reinstatement, they have not been given their two extra days leave for
every month of service, although they have been working with the company for
more than a month. They therefore prayed
that the company be ordered to grant them the privileges and facilities
mentioned in the judgment of August 2, 1954, or their money value corresponding
to the period from October 11, 1954 to November 7, 1960, and to grant them two
extra days leave for every month of service from November 7, 1960 onward, or
the equivalent money value; they further prayed that the examination division
of the CIR be ordered to compute the money value of the said privileges and
facilities for the purpose of execution or compliance with the judgments of
August 2, 1954 and December 9, 1957.
On December 29, 1960
the company moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of its failure to state
a valid cause of action; the respondent Union filed its
opposition.
On July 31, 1961
the CIR issued an order, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Insular Sugar Refinery and/or Philippine Sugar
Institute, or their successors-in-interests, are hereby ordered (a) to grant to
policemen Marcos Rarang, Alfredo Abaño,
Martiniano C. Abuton and Margarito Villamor the following
privileges and facilities:
“One (1) pair of shoes every 6
months, or two
pairs a year P13.50
each – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – P27.00
“Two (2) khaki suitings
every 6 months of
11 yards, or 4 suitings a year or 22
yards P1.50 a
yard – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – 33.00
“One (1) helmet every 6 months, or
2 hel?
mets
a year, with poncho – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – – – 10.00
“Two (2) days off for every month
of serv?
ice at P5.55 a day,
for 1 year – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – 135.00
or the money value thereof for the period
from October 11, 1954 to November 7, 1960; (b) to continue granting them the
two (2) days every month with pay from November 7, 1960; and (c) to restitute
to and/or credit in favor of each of the said four policemen the vacation and
sick leave privileges with pay, aggregating 180 days or six months, which they
failed to enjoy during the period they were illegally laid off from October
11, 1954 to November 7, 1960 and to continue granting the said privileges
thereafter.”
The respondent Union thereafter filed a
petition, praying that the company be ordered to deposit with the respondent
CIR, the sum of P9,000 in satisfaction of the above judgment. The company filed its opposition thereto.
On September 7, 1961
the respondent court, in a resolution en banc, denied the
company’s motion for reconsideration of August
8, 1961.
Against this last order and the order of July 31, 1961, the petitioner has come to this
Court through the present recourse.
The petitioner’s first contention has to do with procedure. It is argued that the respondent court erred
in arbitrarily disregarding section 14 of the Rules of Court of Industrial
Relations, and section 3 of Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, quoted
hereunder:
“14. After the petition or motion is filed, the Clerk of Court
shall set it for hearing at 9:00 A.M. on the available date immediately
following the third day after the filing thereof, and where an earlier setting
is necessary due to the urgency of the case, the same may be made upon previous
knowledge of the judge trying the case.”
(Rules of Court of Industrial Relations.)
“SEC. 3. Hearing and order. – After hearing the court
may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment of pleading, or may defer the
hearing and determination of the motion until the trial if the ground alleged
therein does not appear to be indubitable.” (Rule 16, New Rules of
Court.)
The petitioner claims that the respondent Union flagrantly
violated the provisions of section 14 of the Rules of Court of Industrial
Relations, supra, by filing its opposition to the motion to dismiss only
on February 6, 1961, or almost two months after receipt of the motion to
dismiss, when an answer or opposition should have been filed within three days
after such receipt.
This argument is without merit.
The said section 14 does not prescribe a period of time within which an
adverse party should file its opposition to a motion to dismiss, which means
that such opposition may be filed within a reasonable time from receipt of the
motion.
And under section 20 of the Rules of Court of Industrial
Relations, the CIR “shall act according to justice and equity and the
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may
inform its mind in such manner as it may determine just and equitable.” In
the case at bar, it is undoubted that the opposition to the motion to dismiss
has aided the respondent court in arriving at a conclusion on the merits of
the motion to dismiss.
It is further argued by the petitioner that section 14 was
disregarded by the respondent court when its clerk of court failed to set the
motion to dismiss for hearing “on the available date immediately following
the third day after the filing thereof.” This argument becomes relevant to
the question of whether a hearing on the motion was necessary, and to the
further contention of the petitioner that the respondent court committed grave
abuse of discretion by arbitrarily disregarding section 3, Rule 16, New Rules
of Court, supra, when it issued the order of July 31, 1961 without first
resolving the aforesaid motion to dismiss.
Under Section 3, Rule 16, new Rules of Court (section 3, Rule 8
of the old Rules of Court), two courses of action are open to a court when a
motion to dismiss is filed, namely, (a) after hearing to “deny or grant
the motion or allow amendment of pleading”; (b) to “defer the hearing
and determination of the motion until the trial if the ground alleged therein
does not appear to be indubitable.”[5]
Was a hearing on the motion to dismiss the petition for execution
of the judgments of August 2, 1954
and of December 9, 1957
necessary? The answer is in the
negative.
The motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the petition
fails to state a valid cause of action.
In the determination of the sufficiency and validity of a cause of action,
our uniform ruling has been and is that one need not go beyond and outside of
the petition for data or facts (Convets, Inc. vs.
Nat’l. Development Co., G.R. No. L-10323, Feb. 28, 1958, citing World Wide Insurance & Surety
Co., Inc. vs. Manuel, et al., 51 O.G. 6241).
Consequently, the hearing which section 3, Rule 16, supra,
contemplates was unnecessary in this case.
“Petitioner’s view that when a motion to dismiss a complaint
or a petition is filed, only the facts alleged in the complaint or petition may
be taken into account is not entirely correct.
To the contrary, the rule is that at said hearing said motion may be proved
or disproved in accordance with the rules of evidence, and it has been held
that, for that purpose, the parties should be allowed to present evidence, except
when the motion is based on the failure of the complaint or of the petition to
state a cause of action (Asejo vs. Leonoso, 44 O.G. No. 10, 3832 [83 Phil. 943, 945]).” (Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, et al., G.R.
No. L-17759, Dec. 17, 1962;
see also Cañete vs. Madrigal & Co., et al., G.R.
No. L-17836, Aug. 30, 1962.)
(Emphasis ours)
That the petition for execution of the judgments of the CIR
states a “valid cause of action”, is indubitable. It reproduces the judgments of August 2, 1954 and December 9, 1957 sought to be
executed; it quotes verbatim the dispositive
portions of the said judgments. That the
CIR has not yet executed portions of the said judgments, is alleged; the prayer
is that the petitioner be ordered to grant to the policemen in question
“the privileges and facilities” included in the said judgments.
Upon the foregoing premises, the order of July 31, 1961 of the respondent court cannot be construed
except as a denial of the motion to dismiss.
We now approach the main issue.
The petitioner contends that the respondent court erred in awarding to
the four policemen all the “facilities and privileges” enumerated in
the order of July 31, 1961. More specifically the petitioner argues that
since these policemen were not in actual service from October 11, 1954 to November 7, 1960, they were therefore not entitled to any
facilities or privileges corresponding to that period. As to the shoes, khaki suitings,
helmets and ponchos, the petitioner argues that these items are given to the
policemen for their official use during their official
tour of duty and while rendering actual police work in the premises of
the company; that these items were not intended for private use or
purposes; and that therefore the four policemen in question, not having been on
actual duty during the said period, were not entitled to these items nor
to their money value.
The respondent union, upon the other hand, maintains that the
“privileges and facilities” form part of the specific awards
granted to them by the CIR judgment of August 2, 1954; that the policemen were
reinstated in their previous positions and, although they did not render actual
service, were paid their back wages from October 11, 1954 to November 7, 1960,
so that they must be deemed to have been technically in the service; that they
are therefore entitled to receive the “privileges and facilities” in
question; that their reinstatement with back salaries entitles them to the
enjoyment of these privileges and facilities also as a measure of indemnity
for the losses and damages they suffered by reason of their being laid off and
as a penalty on the company for the discriminatory acts committed by it against
them.
Well-settled is the rule that the portion of a decision that
becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof (Neri
Edwards, et al. vs. Arce, et al., 52 O.G. 2537; Gov’t. of the Phil. vs. Jose Ramon y Vasquez, et al., 73
Phil. 669; Contreras, et al. vs. Felix, et al., 78 Phil. 570; Jabon, et al. vs. Alo, et al., 91
Phil. 750; Robles et al. vs. Timario, et al., G.R.
No. L-13911, April 28, 1960;
Segarra vs. Maranilla, G.R.
No. L-14428, July 26, 1960).
In the case at bar, it is unquestioned that the petition of December 19, 1960 is one for
execution of the judgments of August 2,
1954 and December 9, 1957. The judgment of August 2, 1954 awarded to the policemen, among other
things, all the privileges and facilities enjoyed by them
at the time the partial award of June
20, 1949 was made. The
judgment of December 9, 1957,
upon the other hand, awarded to them, among other things, privileges
hitherto enjoyed by them as of March
31, 1954. The term
“facilities”, which was deleted from the latter judgment, obviously has
reference to the items consisting of khaki suitings,
shoes, helmets and ponchos. And the
deletion by the CIR of the said “facilities” in its judgment of December 9, 1957, was not without
reason. The aforementioned items were
given free to the police force of the petitioner for the policemen to use
officially and only during their official tour of duty and while rendering
police work within the premises of the company.
These items were not intended to be used outside of the territorial
bounds of the company’s grounds, nor for private or personal purposes. Not being in the actual performance of police
work during the period from October
11, 1954 to November 7,
1960, the four policemen were not entitled to the said “facilities”,
even if they were “technically” in the service of the petitioner.
We, therefore, hold that the respondent court was not justified
in including the aforementioned “facilities” in its order of July 31, 1961.
Respecting the “other privileges they have hitherto enjoyed
as of March 31 1954”, the petitioner, relying upon Sun Ripe Coconut
Products, Inc. vs. National Labor Union, 97 Phil. 691, 696, and Taguilig, et al. vs. Theo H. Davis & Co., Far East
Ltd., G.R. No. L-9144, May 30, 1959, argues that these grants are likewise
unjustified, because the prime and sole purpose of vacation and sick leaves is
to afford employees much needed rest to recoup lost energies, in order that
they can efficiently and satisfactorily perform their assigned tasks with
renewed vitality; that the said leaves are given to employees in actual service
not merely to give them additional salary and bounty; and that each of these
privileges must be demanded at the opportune time and if the claimant
“allows the years to go by in silence, he waives it.” The petitioner further argues that since the
policemen in question have already been paid their back salaries from October 11, 1954 to November 7, 1960, inclusive, the
further grant to them of vacation and sick leaves and other privileges for that
period, is without legal basis.
These self-same arguments have been previously advanced by the
same petitioner before the respondent court, and rejected. And upon review in G.R. No. L-13475, supra,
this Court approvingly quoted the declarations of the said court that
“since the four policemen were reinstated to their former positions and
were paid their corresponding back wages it is only just and proper that they
should be entitled to the leave benefits which they would have enjoyed had they
not been discriminated against. The
argument of respondent that the four policemen more than enjoyed vacation and
sick leave with pay during the entire six-year period while being laid off
because they received their back wages without rendering any kind of service is
against reason and logic. They
failed to work from October 11, 1954
to November 7, 1960,
through no fault of their own, but due to the discriminatory act of the
Company.”
Indeed, the stance assumed by the company contravenes the law
which decrees that vacation and sick leaves are cumulative and that any part
thereof which is not taken within the calendar year in which earned may be
carried over to the succeeding years.
The four policemen are rightly entitled to these cumulative leaves, for
their separation was not of their own choosing, nor due to their own undoing,
as they did not voluntarily resign, nor were they separated from the service
through their own fault (see secs. 284 and 285-A, in
relation to sec. 286, Rev. Adm. Code, as amended by R.A. 611).
The cases cited by the petitioner are not applicable. In the Sun Ripe Coconut Products, Inc. case,
the vacation leave therein sought was not a matter of right but “a mere
concession or act of grace of the employer”.
And in the Taguilig case, the laborer therein
concerned was lawfully dismissed for “frequent absences, leaving the
premises untidy, and allowing relatives to stay therein”, this Court
adding that “his employment was without a definite period and could therefore,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 1950, be terminated by the company at any time
with or without cause so long as he was given a month’s notice in advance or
paid the equivalent of his salary for that month.”
ACCORDINGLY, with the deletion of the portions of the
order of the CIR of July 31, 1961,
which award shoes, khaki suitings, helmets and
ponchos, or their money value, for the period from October 11, 1954 to November 7, 1960, the said order is affirmed in all other
respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.
[1]
By virtue of R.A. 632, as amended by. R.A. 1328, the PHILSUGIN came into
existence, and the assets of the defunct Insular Sugar Refining Corporation
were purchased by it.
[2]
This date should read June 20, 1949.
[3] Sabas Camacho was retired effective December 1954; Leopoldo Lanuza was dismissed
dishonorably for inciting an illegal strike.
[4]
Amended on December 9, 1954.
[5]
“Indubitable” is defined in 42 C.J.S., 1370, as “something which
cannot be doubted; also certain and unquestionable; without doubt.”