ERIC U. YU, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE JUDGE AGNES REYES-CARPIO, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG-BRANCH 261; AND CAROLINE T. YU, RESPON…

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to annul and set aside the March 31, 2009 Decision ^[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106878. The CA Decision affirmed the Orders dated August 4, 2008 ^[2] and October 24, 2008 ^[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 261 in Pasig City.

The Facts

The
instant petition stemmed from a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by petitioner Eric U. Yu against private respondent
Caroline T. Yu with the RTC in Pasig City.  The case was initially
raffled to Branch 163.

On May 30, 2006, Judge Leili Cruz Suarez
of the RTC-Branch 163 issued an Order, stating that petitioner’s Partial
Offer of Evidence dated April 18, 2006 would already be submitted for
resolution after certain exhibits of petitioner have been remarked. But
the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of marriage
of the parties. ^[4]

On
September 12, 2006, private respondent moved to submit the incident on
the declaration of nullity of marriage for resolution of the court,
considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property
relations were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the
parties’ marriage. ^[5]

On
September 28, 2006, petitioner opposed private respondent’s Motion,
claiming that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage
cannot be resolved without the presentation of evidence for the
incidents on custody, support, and property relations. ^[6] 
Petitioner, therefore, averred that the incident on nullity of
marriage, on the one hand, and the incidents on custody, support, and
property relations, on the other, should both proceed and be
simultaneously resolved.

On March 21, 2007, RTC-Branch 163 issued an Order in favor of petitioner’s opposition.  Particularly, it stated that:

The
Court agrees with the contention of the Petitioner that it would be
more in accord with the rules if the Parties were first allowed to
present their evidence relative to the issues of property relations,
custody and support to enable the Court to issue a comprehensive
decision thereon. ^[7]

Subsequently,
private respondent was able to successfully cause the inhibition of
Judge Cruz Suarez of the RTC-Branch 163.  Consequently, the case was
re-raffled to another branch of the Pasig RTC, particularly Branch 261,
presided by Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio. ^[8]

Thereafter,
while the case was being heard by the RTC-Branch 261, private
respondent filed an Omnibus Motion on May 21, 2008.  The Omnibus Motion
sought (1) the strict observation by the RTC-Branch 261 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, as codified in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, in the subject proceedings; and (2) that the incident
on the declaration of nullity of marriage be already submitted for
resolution. ^[9]  Conversely,
private respondent prayed that the incident on the declaration of
nullity of marriage be resolved ahead of the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations, and not simultaneously.

Quite
expectedly, petitioner opposed the Omnibus Motion, arguing that the
issues that were the subject of the Omnibus Motion had already been
resolved in the March 21, 2007 Order.  Concurrently, petitioner prayed
that the incidents on nullity, custody, support, and property relations
of the spouses be resolved simultaneously. ^[10]

In its Order dated August 4, 2008, the RTC-Branch 261 granted the Omnibus Motion.  Judge Reyes-Carpio explained that:

At
the outset, the parties are reminded that the main cause of action in
this case is the declaration of nullity of marriage of the parties and
the issues relating to property relations, custody and support are
merely ancillary incidents thereto.

x x x x

Consistent,
therefore, with Section 19 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the Court finds it
more prudent to rule first on the petitioner’s petition and respondent’s
counter-petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of each other’s psychological incapacity to perform their respective
marital obligations.  If the Court eventually finds that the parties’
respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed
meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties’ psychological
incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to comply with Article[s] 50
and 51 of the Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of
marriage can be issued.  Pending such ruling on the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage, the Court finds no legal ground, at
this stage, to proceed with the reception of evidence in regard the
issues on custody and property relations, since these are mere incidents
of the nullity of the parties’ marriage. ^[11]

On
August, 28, 2008, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the
August 4, 2008 Order.  On October 24, 2008, Judge Reyes-Carpio issued an
Order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In denying the
motion, Judge Reyes-Carpio reasoned:

x x x [I]t is
very clear that what petitioner seeks to reconsider in the Court’s Order
dated August 4, 2008 is the procedure regarding the reception of
evidence on the issues of property relations, custody and support.  He
opposes the fact that the main issue on declaration of nullity is
submitted for decision when he has not yet presented evidence on the
issues on property relations, custody and support.

Considering that what he seeks to set aside is the procedural aspect of the instanct case, i.e. the reception of evidence which is a matter of procedure, there is no question that it is A.M. 02-11- ^[10]-SC
which should be followed and not the procedures provided in Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code.  While it is true that the Family Code is a
substantive law and rule of procedure cannot alter a substantive law,
the provisions laid in Articles 50 and 51 relative to the liquidation
and dissolution of properties are by nature procedural, thus there are
no substantive rights which may be prejudiced or any vested rights that
may be impaired.

In fact, the Supreme Court in a number of cases
has even held that there are some provisions of the Family Code which
are procedural in nature, such as Article[s] 185 and 50 of the Family
Code which may be given retroactive effect to pending suits.  Adopting
such rationale in the instant case, if the Court is to adopt the
procedures laid down in A.M. No. 02-11- ^[10]-SC,
no vested or substantive right will be impaired on the part of the
petitioner or the respondent.  Even Section 17 of A.M. No. 02-11- ^[10]-SC allows the reception of evidence to a commissioner in matters involving property relations of the spouses.

x x x x

Lastly,
it is the policy of the courts to give effect to both procedural and
substantive laws, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy
resolution of the dispute between the parties. Moreover, as previously
stated, the Court finds it more prudent to rule first on the
petitioner’s petition and respondent’s counter-petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of each other’s psychological
incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations.  If the
Court eventually finds that the parties’ respective petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of
either or both of the parties’ psychological incapacity, then the
parties shall proceed to comply with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family
Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. ^[12]

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

On
January 8, 2009, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 with the CA, assailing both the RTC Orders dated August 4, 2008 and
October 24, 2008. The petition impleaded Judge Reyes-Carpio as
respondent and alleged that the latter committed grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of the assailed orders.

On March 31,
2009, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the
petition. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

All
told, absent any arbitrary or despotic exercise of judicial power as to
amount to abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in
issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari cannot prosper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.^[13]

The Issues

This
appeal is, hence, before Us, with petitioner maintaining that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the assailed orders
issued by the trial court and dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. 
Particularly, petitioner brings forth the following issues:

1. Whether
   or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
   of jurisdiction in holding that a petition for certiorari is not a
   proper remedy of the Petitioner

2. Whether or not the [CA]
   committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack [or excess] of
   jurisdiction in upholding the Respondent Judge in submitting the main
   issue of nullity of marriage for resolution ahead of the reception of
   evidence on custody, support, and property relations

3. Whether
   or not the reception of evidence on custody, support and property
   relations is necessary for a complete and comprehensive adjudication of
   the parties’ respective claims and [defenses]. ^[14]

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition without merit.

A
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in assailing
that a judge has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
clearly sets forth when a petition for certiorari can be used as a
proper remedy:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. – When
any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis Ours.)

The
term “grave abuse of discretion” has a specific meaning.  An act of a
court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of
discretion when such act is done in a “capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” ^[15] 
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
“evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.” ^[16] 
Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to
“truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or
quasi-judicial body is wholly void.” ^[17] 
From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for
having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could
manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. ^[18]  But this is not the case here.

Nowhere
in the petition was it shown that the acts being alleged to have been
exercised with grave abuse of discretion–(1) the Orders of the RTC
deferring the presentation of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations; and (2) the appellate court’s Decision of upholding the
Orders–were patent and gross that would warrant striking down through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

At the very least,
petitioner should prove and demonstrate that the RTC Orders and the CA
Decision were done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. ^[19]  This, however, has not been shown in the petition.

It
appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged
to have been exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are
interlocutory orders.  An interlocutory order is one which “does not
finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other
things remain to be done by the Court.” ^[20] 
To be clear, certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate to strike down an
interlocutory order only when the following requisites concur:

(1) when the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and

(2)
when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. ^[21]

In
this case, as We have discussed earlier, petitioner failed to prove
that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and
that those were patently erroneous.  Considering that the requisites
that would justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order have not been complied with, the proper recourse for
petitioner should have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of
the trial court on the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing
the interlocutory orders. ^[22]  The appellate court, thus, correctly cited Triplex Enterprises, Inc. v. PNB-Republic Bank and Solid Builders, Inc., penned by Chief Justice Renato Corona, which held:

Certiorari
as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. The
writ may be issued only where it is convincingly proved that the lower
court committed grave abuse of discretion, or an act too patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a duty, or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or that the
trial court exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility. 

While
certiorari may be maintained as an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order in cases where the tribunal has issued an order
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
it does not lie to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling. In this connection, we quote with approval the pronouncement of the appellate court:

In
this jurisdiction, there is an “erroneous impression that interlocutory
[orders] of trial courts on debatable legal points may be assailed by
certiorari. To correct that impression and to avoid clogging the
appellate court with future certiorari petitions it should be
underscored that the office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced
to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally
be used for any other purpose.”

The writ of certiorari
is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower
court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. Moreover, it is designed to
correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors in judgment. The
rationale of this rule is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction,
an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. Otherwise,
every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its jurisdiction and
every erroneous judgment will be a void judgment.

When the court
has jurisdiction over the case and person of the defendant, any mistake
in the application of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed
by a court may be corrected only by appeal. The determination made by
the trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an
exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have perpetrated
in making such a determination is an error in judgment, not of
jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court
on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the
course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject
of a separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be assigned as
errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision
rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case.

Here,
petitioner assails the order of the trial court disallowing the
admission in evidence of the testimony of Roque on the opinion of the
OGCC. By that fact alone, no grave abuse of discretion could be imputed
to the trial court. Furthermore, the said order was not an error of
jurisdiction. Even assuming that it was erroneous, the mistake was an
error in judgment not correctable by the writ of certiorari. ^[23]

Be
that as it may, even dwelling on the merits of the case just as the CA
has already done and clearly explicated, We still find no reason to
grant the petition.

It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did
not disallow the presentation of evidence on the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations.  It is clear in the assailed orders
that the trial court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence
relating to custody, support, and property relations, to wit:

August 4, 2008 Order

Consistent,
therefore, with Section 19 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the Court finds it
more prudent to rule first on the petitioner’s petition and respondent’s
counter-petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of each other’s psychological incapacity to perform their respective
marital obligations.  If the Court eventually finds that the parties’
respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed
meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties’ psychological
incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to comply with Article[s] 50
and 51 of the Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of
marriage can be issued.  Pending such ruling on the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage, the Court finds no legal ground, at
this stage, to proceed with the reception of evidence in regard the
issues on custody and property relations, since these are mere incidents
of the nullity of the parties’ marriage. ^[24]

October 24, 2008 Order

Lastly,
it is the policy of the courts to give effect to both procedural and
substantive laws, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy
resolution of the dispute between the parties. Moreover, as previously
stated, the Court finds it more prudent to rule first on the
petitioner’s petition and respondent’s counter-petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of each other’s psychological
incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations.  If the
Court eventually finds that the parties’ respective petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of
either or both of the parties’ psychological incapacity, then the
parties shall proceed to comply with Article (sic) 50 and 51 of the
Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be
issued. ^[25]

And the trial judge’s decision was not without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 
Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception
of evidence on custody, support, and property relations after the trial
court renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of
judgment granting the petition:

Section 19. Decision.
– (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of
annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

x x x x

Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition,
or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the
appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of
either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody,
support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters
had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

Evidently,
Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody,
support, and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the
existing rules issued by this Court, to a time when a decision granting
the petition is already at hand and before a final decree is
issued.  Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family
court, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution,
custody, support of common children, and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the petition.  And following
the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts. 
Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:

Article 50. x x x

The final
judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.

x x x x

Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court,
shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the
parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided
for such matters. (Emphasis Ours.)

Finally, petitioner
asserts that the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody,
support, and property relations would amount to an ambiguous and
fragmentary judgment on the main issue. ^[26]  This argument does not hold water. The Court En Banc
Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the
reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations.
Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on the subject
incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree
of nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge
Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the assailed orders.  As
correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioner’s assertion that ruling the
main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would
result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative
and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can
fairly weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties. ^[27]

Therefore,
it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious
and whimsical manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and
erroneous, when she issued the assailed orders deferring the reception
of evidence on custody, support, and property relations.  To reiterate,
this decision is left to the trial court’s wisdom and legal soundness. 
Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot likewise be said to have
committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge
Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding an absence of grave abuse of
discretion on her part.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
The CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 106878 finding that Judge Agnes
Reyes-Carpio did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin,^** Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., (Acting Chairperson),^*

^** Additional member per Special Order No. 1000 dated June 8, 2011.

^[1] Rollo,
pp. 32-42. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon and
concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Ramon R.
Garcia.

^[2] Id. at 47-50.

^[3] Id. at 51-53.

^[4] Id. at 33.

^[5] Id.

^[6] Id.

^[7] Id. at 46.

^[8] Id. at 33.

^[9] Id. at 34.

^[10] Id.

^[11] Id. at 49.

^[12] Id. at 52-53. (Emphasis Ours.)

^[13] Id. at 41.

^[14] Id. at 8.

^[15] Beluso v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180711, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 450, 456-457; citing De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 506, 514-15; Fajardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157707, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 156, 163.

^[16] Id.; 2 Jose Y. Feria & Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated 463 (2001).

^[17] J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105827, January 31, 2000, 324 SCRA 24, 34.

^[18] Beluso v. Commission on Elections, supra note 15.

^[19] Id.; Deutsche Bank Manila v. Chua Yok See, G.R. No. 165606, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 672, 692.

^[20] Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010.

^[21] J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17, at 34.

^[22] Yamaoka v. Pescarich Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. No. 146079, July 20, 2001, 361 SCRA 672, 680-681; citing Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128954, October 8, 1998, 297 SCRA 574, 581. See also Deutsche Bank Manila v. Chua Yok See, supra note 19, at 694.

^[23] G.R. No. 151007, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 362, 365-367. (Emphasis Ours.)

^[24] Rollo, p. 49. (Emphasis Ours.)

^[25] Id. at 52-53. (Emphasis Ours.)

^[26] Id. at 15-16.

^[27] Id. at 38; citing Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 111502-04, November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 170.