REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. CESARIO OCTOBRE, SHERWIN TAMANG, JAMES OLILA, TERIO BAMBICO AND ERNESTO ROSIMO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

The Republic of the Philippines instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Baguio an action for recovery of possession of a portion of
land with an area of one and one-half hectares, allegedly acquired by
it by purchase from one Ramon Valles in 1925, for the use of the
Mountain National Agricultural School with reserved lands in La
Trinidad, Mountain Province, and illegally occupied by defendants
Cesario Octobre, Sherwin Tamang, James Olila, Terio Bambico, and
Ernesto Rosimo, plaintiff also demanding damages for such unlawful
occupancy.

In their answer to this complaint., defendants
set up the defense of actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the
respective portions of the land occupied by them, on their own and
through their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
Furthermore, they alleged that the land in question no longer forms
part of the reservation, the same having been released by Eresidential
Proclamation No. 209 dated October 20, 1955, for disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Law.

After hearing on this point, and upon the finding that the areas
disputed by the parties were actually included in the portion of the
government reservation released by proclamation of President Magsaysay,
for disposition in aocordance with law, the court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the Mountain National Agricultural School
has no more claim over this land. Hence, this appeal by the government
on the ground that, (1) as the area was already reserved for a specific
public purpose, i.e., for use of the students of the Mountain National
Agricultural School, the same could not have been vaiidly released from
such reservation by a presidential proclamation; and (2) even if
Proclamation No. 209 of the President has force and effect, the court
should have continued the hearing of the case to determine who were the
actual occupants of the land, and entitled to acquire the same from the
government, in view of the claim of plaintiff that it purchased the lot
in question from one Ramon Valles.

In support of its first contention, appellant cites Section 64(e) of the Revised Administrative Code which reads:

“SEC. 64. Particular powers and duties of President of the Philippines.—In
addition to his general supervisory authority, the President of the
Philippines shall have such specific powers and duties as are expressly
conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in particular, the powers
and duties set forth in this chapter.

“Among such special powers and duties shall be:

*     *      *     *     *     *    *

(e) To reserve from sale or other disposition and for specific public
uses or service, any land belonging to the private domain of the
Government of the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise
directed by law; and thereafter such land shall be used for the specific purposes directed By such executive order until otherwise provided by law.

  ‘*    *     *     *    *     (Italics supplied.)

It is not disputed that any disposable land belonging to the government
may, by presidential action alone, be reserved for a specific public
purpose or service. Appellant’s theory, however, seems to be that, once
such reservation is made, the President can no longer, by his act
alone, lift or release the said land from the reservation, a
legislative act being necessary for the purpose. And, in the instant
case, it is admitted that the alleged release of the portion of the
Mountain National Agricultural School-reservation was effected merely
by proclamation of the President.

It may be pointed out, in
this connection, that the cited provision of the Revised Administrative
Code (Sec. 64-e) did not specifically provided that a congressional act
is necessary before a reserved land may be released and opened for
disposition. It merely states that such reserved land shall be used for
the purposes directed in the reservation, until “otherwise provided by
law”. The matter to be considered then is whether there is any law that
directs or authorizes the President to release a disposable public land
from a reservation previously made.

Precisely the Public Land Act (Com. Act 141) contains such an authority. Section 9 of said act provides:

“SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition,
the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall
be classified, according to the use or purposes Co which such lands are
destined, as follows:

“(a) Agricultural.
“(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes.
“(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes.
“(d) Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi public uses.

“The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for
in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.” (Italics supplied.)

It may here be reiterated that pursuant to Section 64-(e) of the
Revised Administrative Code, alienable lands of the public domain may
be ordered reserved, by the President, for a specific public use or
service. Then, under the provisions of the Public Land Law abovequoted,
the President has authority to re-classify such lands from one class to
another, e.g., from agricultural to reserved area and vice-versa. And,
this reclassification may be effected any time and in a similar manner,
that is, by presidential action. It cannot be rightly claimed,
therefore, that the release from reservation of a certain portion of
the area originally intended for the use of the Mountain National
Agricultural School by a subsequent proclamation of the President, is
not in accordance with law.

In view of the foregoing
conclusion, appellant’s alternative contention must be sustained. The
complaint should not have been dismissed merely on the ground that the
disputed area was proved to be part of the area released from the
reservation. Instead, the hearing should have been continued to
determine the persons entitled to acquire the land thus released, the
right, if any, of one Ramon Valles from whom plaintiff alleges to have
purchased the lot in question, and the validity of the respective
claims of the defendants, facts all directly put in issue by the
pleadings of the parties.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further

proceedings. No costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.