JOSELITO R. MENDOZA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, RESPONDENTS.

Mendoza versus Commission on Elections

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Joselito Mendoza against the Commission on Elections and Roberto Pagdanganan. Mendoza and Pagdanganan had contested the governorship of Bulacan in the May 2007 elections. Mendoza was proclaimed winner, and Pagdanganan filed an election protest before the Commission on Elections. The case matters because it draws the line between the hearing rights of the parties and the internal, confidential deliberative process of a quasi-judicial body. It asks whether the Commission violates due process when it appreciates ballots after the case has been submitted for decision, without notice to and without the participation of the parties.

Procedural History

Pagdanganan filed his election protest with the Commission on Elections, and it was raffled to the Second Division. After the revision of ballots and the formal offer of evidence, the parties submitted their memoranda and the case was submitted for resolution. Mendoza then moved to suspend further proceedings after the ballot boxes were transferred to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The Second Division denied the motion, and later denied his motion for reconsideration. Mendoza went directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari, invoking grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court issued a status quo order after a preliminary finding of a genuine due process issue, and then resolved the petition on the merits.

Facts

Mendoza and Pagdanganan vied for Governor of Bulacan in the May 14, 2007 elections. Mendoza was proclaimed the winning candidate and assumed office. Pagdanganan seasonably filed an election protest with the Commission on Elections, which was raffled to the Second Division. Revision of ballots followed in several municipalities, conducted at the Commission's office in Intramuros. After revision, the parties presented their other evidence and made their formal offers of evidence. The Commission approved the offers and required the parties to submit memoranda. The parties complied, and the case was submitted for resolution.

On March 2, 2009, the Commission transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including those involved in the provincial election contest, to the Senate Electoral Tribunal in connection with a separate protest. Mendoza moved to suspend further proceedings. The Second Division denied the motion, ruling that the Commission has plenary powers to find alternative methods to facilitate the resolution of the election protest, and that it would continue the proceedings after proper coordination with the Tribunal. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Mendoza then learned of information that the Commission was acting on the provincial election contest within the Tribunal premises without notice to him and without his participation. His counsel wrote the Tribunal Secretary to confirm the report. The Secretary confirmed that the conduct of proceedings within the Tribunal premises was authorized upon formal request, citing a Commission resolution on coordination in the revision of ballots. This confirmation triggered the present petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the Commission on Elections violated due process by conducting proceedings without giving due notice to the petitioner.
• Whether or not the Commission gravely abused its discretion amounting to an excess of jurisdiction in appreciating ballots that were not in its official custody and were outside its own premises, authority, and control.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2, Article Nine, paragraph C of the Constitution lists the powers and functions of the Commission on Elections, and the Court quotes it to locate the Commission within the structure of government:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials shall be final, executory, and not appealable. (3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

This provision shows that the Commission's adjudicative power is quasi-judicial, not the judicial power vested in the courts.

Section 1, Article Eight of the Constitution defines where judicial power lies, and the Court cites it to distinguish the Commission from a court:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.

This reinforces that the Commission is not a tribunal within the judicial branch and does not exercise judicial power in the constitutional sense.

The Court adopts the standards for administrative due process from the Ang Tibay case, which it quotes as the cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

These standards supply the measure of due process for the Commission as a quasi-judicial body, separating the hearing stage from the deliberative stage.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no violation of due process. The appreciation of ballots after the case had been submitted for resolution was part of the Commission's internal decision-making process, not a proceeding at which the parties had a right to be present. The Court distinguished the hearing stage from the deliberative stage. The essence of due process at the hearing stage is simply the opportunity to be heard, and Mendoza was given that opportunity: he participated in the revision, presented evidence, and filed his memoranda. The deliberative stage, by contrast, involves the decision-maker's own consideration of the evidence already in the record, and the parties do not take part in it. The Court noted that the Commission's orders denying the suspension of proceedings had long become unassailable, so the only live question was whether the subsequent appreciation of ballots denied Mendoza notice and participation to which he was entitled.

On the second issue, the Court likewise found no grave abuse of discretion. The Commission's authority over the election contest was not disputed, and its choice of method for appreciating the ballots, in coordination with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, fell within its discretion in the absence of a specific rule. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, an abuse so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Mere abuse is not enough. The Court found no such abuse here.

Doctrine

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional administrative agency whose powers are essentially executive, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative. Its adjudicative function over election contests is quasi-judicial, not judicial, and review of its decisions is by the prerogative writ of certiorari, not by appeal. The due process owed by the Commission is administrative due process under the Ang Tibay standards. At the hearing stage, the right is the opportunity to be heard, and a formal trial-type hearing is not always essential. At the deliberative stage, the decision-maker must consider the totality of the evidence in the record, base the conclusion on substantial evidence, and render a decision stating the facts and the law and the reasons for it. The internal deliberations of the Commission, including the appreciation of ballots after submission for decision, are confidential and do not require notice to or participation of the parties. A violation of due process amounts to grave abuse of discretion, but the abuse must be patent and gross, not merely an error of judgment.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and the status quo order was lifted, leaving the Commission free to proceed with the election protest.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the appreciation of ballots after a case is submitted for decision is an internal, confidential deliberative act, not a hearing, so no notice to the parties is required. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between the hearing stage and the deliberative stage of administrative due process, and the quasi-judicial character of the Commission on Elections.