TRINIDAD ALICER AND ADMINISTRATOR OF INTESTATE ESTATE OF HEIRS OF ARTURO ALICER, PETITIONERS, VS. ALBERTO COMPAS, WINEFREDA AND AMANDO PINEDA, RURAL BANK OF CARIGARA, INC., AND …

This petition for review^[1] assails the 29 May 2007 Decision^[2] and the 17 April 2009 Resolution^[3]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEBU-SP No. 00920. The Court of
Appeals upheld the default order dated 25 July 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City (trial court) in Civil Case No.
97-11-203 for Reconveyance of Title with Damages and the trial court’s
succeeding orders dated 23 February 2005 and 12 May 2005 denying the
motion to lift order of default and motion for reconsideration,
respectively.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

The
instant petition stems from the complaint filed by Alberto Compas
against Winefreda Pineda and Amando Pineda, Trinidad Alicer and Heirs of
Arturo Alicer, Edgar Selda and the Rural Bank of Carigara (Leyte)
docketed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City as
Civil Case No. 97-11-203 for Reconveyance of Title and Damages.

After all the answers have been filed and preliminary matters disposed of, the court a quo
on December 10, 2002 set the pre-trial conference on February 20, 2003
which was rescheduled to March 13-14, 2003 upon motion of defendant
Rural Bank of Carigara (Leyte) per Order dated January 29, 2003.

However,
prior to the March 13-14, 2003 pre-trial conference, counsel for the
plaintiff Alberto Compas moved for the postponement of the hearings to
March 20-21, 2003 on the ground of prior commitment.

Likewise on
the same ground, defendants Trinidad Alicer and Administrator of
Intestate Estate of the deceased Arturo Alicer through counsel moved for
postponement of the suggested March 20 and 21, 2003 hearing dates to
May 8, 2003.

It appears that both motions for postponement did
not reach the trial court on time hence the case was still called for
hearing on March 13, 2003. On the said date only the following parties
were in attendance: Edgar Selda and his counsel Atty. Alexander Ang,
Rural Bank of Carigara (Leyte) and its counsel Atty. Nilo Aldrin
Lucinario and Trinidad Alicer and one of her counsels Atty. Samuel
Lagunzad. Incidentally, the pre-trial conference was rescheduled to June
5, 2003 which was once more reset to July 25, 2003.

When the
case was called for pre-trial on July 25, 2003, all parties were present
except for defendants Trinidad Alicer and the heirs of Arturo Alicer
and their counsel/s. Upon motion of counsel for the plaintiff, said
defendants were declared in default by the court a quo. Afterward,
pre-trial proceeded and after which a pre-trial order was issued by the
trial court of even date. Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.

On
August 13, 2004, defendants Trinidad Alicer and the Heirs of Arturo
Alicer filed a “Motion to Lift Default Order dated July 25, 2003”
alleging inter alia that they did not receive a notice of the
pre-trial scheduled on July 25, 2003, which motion was denied by the
trial court on February 23, 2005 for insufficiency in form and substance
of the motion and for not being accompanied by an affidavit of merit. A
motion for reconsideration thereon was also denied on May 12, 2005,
hence the instant petition for certiorari.^[4]

Petitioners
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging
that they did not receive a resolution from the trial court denying or
granting their motion for postponement^[5]
dated 8 March 2003, requesting that the pre-trial conference be moved
to 8 May 2003. Furthermore, they asserted that they were also not served
a copy of the notice setting the pre-trial conference on 25 July 2003
and that such notice should have been served on Atty. Melencio Emata
(Atty. Emata) and not on co-counsel Atty. Samuel Lagunzad (Atty.
Lagunzad).

The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court. The Court of Appeals stressed
that it should never be presumed that a motion for postponement would
be granted. Petitioners’ counsel should have been put on guard when they
received no action from the trial court regarding their motion.

On
the alleged lack of notice of the pre-trial conference, the Court of
Appeals found that the notice and a copy of the pre-trial order were
actually sent to Atty. Lagunzad, one of the counsels of petitioner
Trinidad Alicer. Contrary to petitioners’ claim that Atty. Emata is the
sole counsel of record for petitioners, the records reveal that
petitioner Trinidad Alicer is actually represented by three counsels,
namely, Atty. Emata, Atty. Lagunzad, and Atty. Von Kaiser Soro, who
separately appeared in court on different dates and filed pleadings on
behalf of petitioner Trinidad Alicer. Citing Section 2, Rule 13 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals held that if a party is
represented by several counsels, service of pleadings, judgments and
other papers may be made on any of them and that notice to one of the
counsels is equivalent to notice to all.

With regard to
petitioner heirs of Arturo Alicer, the Court of Appeals found that the
trial court furnished both Atty. Lagunzad and Atty. Emata with the order
dated 13 March 2003 scheduling the pre-trial on 5 June 2003, the order
dated 5 June 2003 resetting the pre-trial to 25 July 2003 and the
pre-trial order dated 25 July 2003. The Court of Appeals held that
notice sent to Atty. Emata is deemed service of notice to the heirs of
Arturo Alicer. If Atty. Emata failed to receive the notice, it was
because of his negligence in informing the trial court of his change of
address. As explained by the Court of Appeals:

Undeniably,
due service of such orders were sent to Atty. Melecio Emata. It is
legal presumption, born of wisdom and experience, that official duty has
been regularly performed; that the proceedings of a judicial tribunal
are regular and valid, and that judicial acts and duties have been and
will be duly and properly performed. It has also been held that “when a
mail matter is sent by registered mail, there exists a presumption, set
forth under Section 3(v), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that it was
received in the regular course of mail. Accordingly, notice sent to
Atty. Melecio Emata is deemed service of notice to the heirs of Arturo
Alicer.

At this juncture, it is not amiss to highlight Atty.
Melecio Emata’s use of various office addresses which according to
private respondent Alberto Compas, generated bewilderment as to said
counsel’s exact and official address. We take cognizance of private
respondent Alberto Compas’ declaration that in the Answer to the
“Amended [Amended] Complaint” dated September 10, 2001 filed by Atty,
Emata for and on behalf of petitioners, he supplied the following
address: Ground Floor, Door B, Lagasca Apartments, 8259 Constancia
Street, Makati City. Thereafter, said counsel sometime in the middle of
2001 used another address, to wit: Rm. 416 Margarita Bldg., J. Rizal
Ave., Cor. Cardona, Makati City. In the answer to the “Amended
Complaint” dated September 25, 2002 filed by Atty. Emata for and on
behalf of the Administrator of the Instestate Estate of Arturo Alicer
and the Heirs of Arturo Alicer the address given this time is Constancia
Street, Makati City. We note however that in the Order dated January
29, 2003 the address of Atty. Emata as appearing therein is the Cardona,
Makati City address which is likewise the same address provided by
private respondent Compas in his “Motion to Transfer Hearing” dated
February 10, 2003. But in the contentious “Motion for Postponement”
dated March 8, 2003 in response to the “Motion to Transfer Hearing” of
private respondent Compas, Atty. Emata once more utilized the Constancia
Street, Makati City address. Finally, in the “Motion to Lift Default
Order” dated July 25, 2003, Atty. Melecio Emata gave a third address,
that is, FH Center, LDS Chapel Compound, Dela Costa cor. Solaiman
Streets, Salcedo Village, Makati which address is currently being used.

Evidently,
Atty. Emata’s employing simultaneous and different addresses has
muddled the service of pleadings and court notices and orders. It is
elementary that it is a counsel’s duty to make of record in the court
his address and notify the court of any change thereof. The fact that
counsel used a different address in later pleadings does not constitute
the notice required for indicating his change of address. Jurisprudence
teaches that when a party is represented by counsel, notice should be
made upon the counsel of record at his given address to which notices of
all kinds emanating from the court should be sent in the absence of a
proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address.^[6]

The Court of Appeals likewise denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, thus:

In
the instant case, it is an admitted fact that petitioners’ counsel,
Atty. Emata, failed to notify the lower court of his change of address
in violation of Rule 7, Sec. 3 (par. 3) of the 1997 Rules of Court.
Atty. Emata claims that his failure to notify the lower court of his
change of address was because of his elevated blood pressure and
cerebral blood clot that he sustained which made him not intellectually
functional to prepare the notice.

However, the Court finds the
same lacking credibility considering that he was able to file a number
of pleadings and motions for the petitioners using his new address. Why
he did not endeavor to include a notice of change of address when he had
the chance to do so was inexcusable negligence on his part.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that clients are bound by
the actions of their counsel in the conduct of their case. Counsel’s
omission was an inexcusable neglect binding upon petitioners.

It
is not incumbent upon the court to determine the new address of
party-litigants. On the contrary, it is the duty of the parties to
inform the court of such change of address. Moreover, notices of the
court processes are ordinarily taken cared of by clerks who are
naturally guided by addresses of record. To require the court and its
personnel before sending out the notices to be continuously checking the
records and the various addresses from which a counsel may have filed
his pleadings and sending them to such addresses instead of his address
of record is to sow confusion and add an intolerable burden which is not
permitted by the Rules of Court.^[7]

Hence, this petition.

The
sole issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the order of the trial court declaring petitioners in default.

The petition has no merit.

In
this case, the trial court declared petitioners in default for failing
to attend the pre-trial conference. Under Section 5, Rule 18 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, non-appearance of the defendant at the
pre-trial conference allows the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte, thus:

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear. ?
The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the
next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The
dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the
court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

The
Court of Appeals, in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioners, found that the trial court furnished both Atty. Lagunzad
and Atty. Emata with the order dated 13 March 2003 scheduling the
pre-trial on 5 June 2003, the order dated 5 June 2003 resetting the
pre-trial to 25 July 2003, and the pre-trial order dated 25 July 2003.
If indeed Atty. Emata failed to receive any of these orders, the Court
of Appeals stated that such failure could only be attributed to the
negligence of Atty. Emata, petitioners’ counsel. The Court of Appeals
found that Atty. Emata failed to inform the trial court of his change of
address, which Atty. Emata did not refute.

We agree with the
Court of Appeals in sustaining the default order of the trial court.
There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
declaring petitioners in default because they failed to appear during
the pre-trial conference. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals,
specifically that petitioners were served notice of the pre-trial
conference, is conclusive upon this Court which is limited to reviewing
errors of law.^[8] It is not this Court’s function to analyze and weigh the evidence all over again.^[9]

Besides,
petitioners cannot claim that they were denied substantial justice
considering that they can still appeal the judgment of the trial court
on the main case, which they did. Indeed, as held in Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc. v. Tansipek:^[10]

It
is important to note that a party declared in default – respondent
Tansipek in this case – is not barred from appealing from the judgment
on the main case, whether or not he had previously filed a Motion to Set
Aside Order of Default, and regardless of the result of the latter and
the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on the
Decision’s being contrary to law or the evidence already presented, and
not on the alleged invalidity of the default order.^[11]

In this case, it appears that while the issue of the propriety of the
default order was still pending in the Court of Appeals, the trial court
rendered a decision on 27 November 2006 in Civil Case No. 97-11-203 and
petitioners then filed their Notice of Appeal.^[12]

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 29 May 2007 Decision and the 17 April 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEBU-SP No. 00920.

SO ORDERED.

Nachura, Peralta, Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

^[2] Rollo,
pp. 47-55. Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon, with Associate
Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Francisco P. Acosta, concurring. In
dismissing the petition for certiorari, the dispositive portion of the
29 May 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals erroneously states that the
“Resolutions dated June 25, 2004 and July 27, 2005 are AFFIRMED.”
Nowhere in the Decision was there a mention of said Resolutions. Based
on the Decision itself, the dispositive portion should have stated that
the Orders dated 25 July 2003, 23 February 2005 and 12 May 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City in Civil Case No.
97-11-203 are affirmed.

^[3] Id. at 57-63.

^[4] Id. at 48-49.

^[5] Id. at 115-117.

^[6] Id. at 52-54.

^[7] Id. at 61-62.

^[8]
Questions of fact are not reviewable in a petition for review under
Rule 45 which specifically states in Section 1 thereof that the petition
shall raise only questions of law.

^[9] Development Bank of the Philippines v. Traders Royal Bank, G.R. No. 171982, 18 August 2010, 628 SCRA 404.

^[10] G.R. No. 181235, 22 July 2009, 593 SCRA 456.

^[11] Id. at 467.

^[12] See Comment of respondent Rural Bank of Carigara, Inc., pp. 17-20; rollo,
pp. 148-151. In their petition dated 22 June 2009, petitioners also
mentioned the Decision dated 27 November 2006 of the trial court; rollo, p. 38.