G.R. No. 187273. February 15, 2017
ROMEO F. ARA AND WILLIAM A. GARCIA, PETITIONERS, V. DRA. FELY S. PIZARRO AND HENRY ROSSI, RESPONDENTS.
LEONEN, J.:
be made within
the period allowed, and supported by the evidence required under the
Family Code.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, asking that the Court of Appeals Decision[1] dated August 1, 2008
and Resolution[2]
dated March 16, 2009, in CA-G.R. CV No. 00729 entitled “Romeo
F. Ara, Ramon A. Garcia, William A. Garcia, and Henry A. Rossi v. Dra.
Fely S. Pizarro,” which modified the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial
Court in Special Civil Action No. 337-03 entitled “Romeo F.
Ara, Ramon A. Garcia, William A. Garcia and Henry A. Rossi vs. Dra. Fely
S. Pizarro” for Judicial Partition, be set aside.
Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia (petitioners),
and Dra. Fely
S. Pizarro and Henry A. Rossi (respondents) all claimed to be children
of the late Josefa A. Ara (Josefa), who died on November 18,
2002.[4]
Petitioners assert that Fely S. Pizarro (Pizarro)
was born to
Josefa and her then husband, Vicente Salgado (Salgado), who died during
World War II.[5]
At some point toward the end of the war, Josefa met and lived with an
American soldier by the name of Darwin Gray (Gray).[6]
Romeo F. Ara (Ara) was born from this relationship. Josefa later met a
certain Alfredo Garcia (Alfredo), and, from this relationship, gave
birth to sons Ramon Garcia (Ramon) and William A. Garcia
(Garcia).[7]
Josefa and Alfredo married on January 24, 1952.[8] After Alfredo passed away, Josefa
met an Italian missionary named Frank Rossi, who allegedly fathered
Henry Rossi (Rossi).[9]
Respondent Pizarro claims that, to her knowledge,
she is the only child of Josefa.[10]
Further, petitioner Garcia is recorded as a son of a certain Carmen
Bucarin and Pedro Garcia, as evidenced by a Certificate of Live Birth
dated July 19, 1950;[11] and petitioner Ara is recorded as a son of
spouses Jose Ara and Maria Flores, evidenced by his Certificate of Live
Birth.[12]
Petitioners, together with
Ramon and herein respondent Rossi (collectively, plaintiffs a
quo), verbally sought partition of the properties left by the
deceased Josefa, which were in the possession of respondent
Pizarro.[13] The
properties are enumerated as follows:
- Lot and other improvements located at
Poblacion, Valencia City,
Bukidnon with an area of One Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Eight (1,268)
sq. m. in the name of Josefa Salgado covered by Katibayan ng Original na
Titulo No. T-30333; - Tamaraw FX; and
- RCBC Bank Passbook in the amount of One Hundred
Eight Thousand Pesos (Php 108,000.00) bank deposit.[14]
Respondent Pizarro refused to partition these properties.
Thus, plaintiffs a quo referred the dispute to the
Barangay Lupon for conciliation and amicable settlement.[15]
The parties were unable to reach an amicable
settlement.[16]
Thus, the Office of the Barangay Captain issued a Certification to File
Action dated April 3, 2003.[17]
Plaintiffs a quo filed a
Complaint dated April 9, 2003[18]
for judicial partition of properties left by the deceased Josefa,
before the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Branch 9 (Trial
Court). In her Answer, respondent Pizarro averred that, to her
knowledge, she was the only legitimate and only child of Josefa.[19] She denied that any
of the plaintiffs a quo were her siblings, for lack
of knowledge or information to form a belief on that matter.[20] Further, the late
Josefa left other properties mostly in the possession of plaintiffs
a quo,
which were omitted in the properties to be partitioned by the trial
court in Special Civil Action No. 337-03, enumerated in her counterclaim
(Additional Properties).[21]
Respondent Pizarro filed her Pre-Trial Brief dated
July 28,
2003, which contained a proposed stipulation that the Additional
Properties also form part of the estate of Josefa.[22] Amenable to this proposal,
plaintiffs a quo
moved that the Additional Properties be included in the partition, in a
Motion to Include in the Partition the Proposed Stipulation dated
August 31, 2003.[23]
At the pre-trial, Ara, Garcia, and Ramon claimed a
property of
respondent Rossi as part of the estate of Josefa. This property was not
alleged nor claimed in the original complaint. This compelled
respondent Rossi to engage the services of separate counsel, as the
claim of his property constituted a conflict of interest among the
plaintiffs a quo.[24]
In a Pre-trial Order issued by the Trial Court on
October 1, 2003, the following facts were admitted:
- All the above mentioned
fathers of the children in this case,
Mr. Vicente Salgado, Mr. Darwin Grey [sic] and Henry Rosi (sic), are all
deceased. Josefa Ara Salgado is also deceased having died on November
18, 2002. - The properties mentioned in Paragraph 9
of the counter-claim
mentioned in the Answer filed by the defendant thru counsel are also
admitted by both counsels to be part of the properties subject of this
partition case. - The Katibayan Ng Orihinal na Titulo
attached thereto as ANNEXES “C”-“C-1”, are all admitted as the subject
properties. - Some properties involved maybe covered
by the land reform
program of the government and the parties have agreed that only the
remainder thereof or the proceeds of compensation shall be partitioned
among them. All these properties shall be properly determined during the
inventory to be finally submitted to the Court for approval. - All the foregoing properties were acquired after
the death of
Vicente Salgado and presumably all the exclusive properties of Josefa
Ara Salgado.[25]
After trial, on February 20, 2006, the Trial Court, issued a
Decision. The decretal portion states:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders a DECISION as
follows:1. Awarding the Baguio property to Henry Rossi, to be
deducted from his share;2. Awarding the Valencia property covered by OCT No. T-
30333;
Tamaraw FX and the RCBC Bank Deposit Passbook to defendant Fely S.
Pizarro, to be deducted from her share; and3. With respect to the other properties that may not be
covered
by the foregoing, the same are declared under the co-ownership of all
the plaintiffs and defendant and in equal shares.SO ORDERED.[26]
Respondent Pizarro appealed the Trial Court Decision,
claiming it
erred in finding petitioners Ara and Garcia to be children of Josefa,
and including them in the partition of properties.[27]
Petitioners Ara and Garcia, as well as respondent Rossi, also filed
their own respective appeals to the Trial Court Decision. Respondent
Rossi questioned the inclusion of his property in the inventory of
properties of the late Josefa.[28]
Petitioners questioned the awarding of particular properties to, and
deductions from the respective shares of, respondents Pizarro and
Rossi.[29]
The Court of Appeals,[30] on August 1, 2008,
promulgated its Decision[31] and held that only respondents Pizarro and
Rossi, as well as plaintiff a quo Ramon, were the
children of the late Josefa, entitled to shares in Josefa’s estate:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeals are
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 20
February 2006, of the court a quo,
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The legitimate children of Josefa
Ara, namely, Fely Pizarro and Ramon A. Garcia, are each entitled to one
(1) share, while Henry Rossi, the illegitimate child of Josefa Ara, is
entitled to one-half (1/2) of the share of a legitimate child, of the
total properties of the late Josefa Ara sought to be partitioned
[.]. . . .
SO ORDERED.[32]
In omitting petitioners from the enumeration of Josefa’s
descendants, the Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the Trial
Court. The Court of Appeals found that the Trial Court erred in allowing
petitioners to prove their status as illegitimate sons of Josefa after
her death:
In holding that appellants William A. Garcia and Romeo F.
Ara are the illegitimate sons of Josefa Ara, the court a
quo ratiocinated:Without anymore discussing the validity of their
respective
birth and baptismal certificates, there is sufficient evidence to hold
that all the plaintiffs are indeed the children of the said deceased
Josefa Ara for having possessed and enjoyed the status of recognized
illegitimate children pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 175 of
the Family Code which provides:“Illegitimate children may establish their filiation
in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children”in relation to the second paragraph No. (1) of Article
172 of the same code (sic), which provides:“In the absence of the foregoing evidence, legitimate
filiation shall be proven by:(1) the open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child.”All the plaintiffs and defendant were taken care of and
supported by their mother Josefa Ara, including their education, since
their respective birth and were all united and lived as one family even
up to the death and burial of their said mother, Josefa Ara. Their
mother had acknowledged all of them as her children throughout all her
life directly, continuously, spontaneously and without
concealment.[33]
(Emphasis omitted.)
Petitioners, together with Garcia, and respondent Rossi
filed
separate Motions for Reconsideration, which were both denied by the
Court of Appeals on March 16, 2009.[34]
Petitioners bring this
Petition for Review on Certiorari.[35]
Respondents Pizarro and
Rossi filed their respective Comments on the Petition.[36] Petitioners filed a
Reply to respondents’ Comments, as well as a Motion to Submit Parties to
DNA Testing,[37]
which this Court denied. Memoranda were submitted by all the
parties.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erroneously applied Article
285 of the Civil Code, which requires that an action for the
recognition of natural children be brought during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, subject to certain exceptions.[38]
Petitioners assert that during Josefa’s lifetime, Josefa acknowledged
all of them as her children directly, continuously, spontaneously, and
without concealment.[39]
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not apply the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, which states that filiation
may be established even without the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or an admission of filiation in a public or handwritten
document.[40]
Further, petitioners aver that the Court of
Appeals erred in
its asymmetric application of the rule on establishing filiation. Thus,
the Court of Appeals erred in finding that respondent Pizarro was a
daughter of Josefa Ara and Vicente Salgado, asserting there was no basis
for the same. Petitioners claim that, in her Formal Offer of Exhibits
dated May 26, 2005, respondent Pizarro offered as evidence only a
Certificate of Marriage of Salgado and Josefa to support her filiation
to Josefa.[41]
On respondent Rossi, petitioners claim that there
is no direct
evidence to prove his filiation to Josefa, except for his Baptismal
Certificate, which was testified to only by respondent Rossi.[42]
The primordial issue for this Court to resolve is whether petitioners
may prove their filiation to Josefa through their open and continuous
possession of the status of illegitimate children, found in the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code.
This
Petition is denied.
I
On establishing the filiation of illegitimate
children, the Family Code provides:
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.The action must be brought within the same period
specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime
of the alleged parent.
Articles 172 and 173 of the Family Code provide:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or
legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or
by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a,
267a)Article 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought
by the
child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs
should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these
cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute the action.The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties. (268a)
Thus, a person who seeks to establish illegitimate filiation
after
the death of a putative parent must do so via a record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of
legitimate filiation. In Uyguangco v. Court of
Appeals:[43]
The following provision is therefore also available to the
private respondent in proving his illegitimate filiation:Article. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:. . . .
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or
by the Rules of Court and special laws.While the private respondent has admitted that he has none
of the
documents mentioned in the first paragraph (which are practically the
same documents mentioned in Article 278 of the Civil Code except for the
“private handwritten instrument signed by the parent himself), he
insists that he has nevertheless been “in open and continuous possession
of the status of an illegitimate child,” which is now also admissible
as evidence of filiation.Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967
until
1973, receiving support from him during that time; that he has been
using the surname Uyguangco without objection from his father and the
petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a special power of
attorney executed in his favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one by
Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he has shared in the profits of the copra
business of the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business; that he
was a director, together with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons
Development Corporation, a family corporation; and that in the addendum
to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the petitioners he
was given a share in his deceased father’s estate.It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also
allowed
to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.The problem of the private respondent, however, is that,
since
he seeks to prove his filiation under the second paragraph of Article
172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged
father’s death in 1975. The second paragraph of this Article 175 reads
as follows:The action must be brought within the same period
specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be
allowed
at this time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged
filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or
special laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already
dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son’s
illegitimate filiation.[44]
Petitioners did not present evidence that would prove their
illegitimate filiation to their putative parent, Josefa, after her death
as provided under Articles 172 and 175 of the Family
Code.
To recall, petitioners submitted the following
to establish their filiation:
Baptismal
Certificate listing Josefa as his mother, showing that the baptism was
conducted on June 1, 1958, and that Garcia was born on June 23,
1951;[45]
Marriage, listing Josefa as his mother;[46]
wedding, with Josefa and other relatives;[47]
showing that Alfredo and Josefa were married on January 24, 1952;[48]
Live Birth from Paniqui, Tarlac, issued on October 23, 2003,[49]
under Registry No. 2003-1447, which is a late registration of his
birth, showing he was born on June 23, 1951 to Alfredo and
Josefa;[50]
parties in the instant case.[51]
the Formal Offer of Exhibits of Pizarro, Rossi
stated:
Romeo Flores
Ara are half brothers of Dr. Henry Rossi their mother being Josefa Ara,
who did not register them as her children for fear of losing her
pension from the U.S. Veterans Office;[52]
son of the
late Josefa and Gray, and that his record of birth was registered at
camp Murphy, Quezon City;[53] and
cousin of Josefa, testified that Ara was a son of Josefa and
Gray.[54]
None of the foregoing constitutes evidence under the first
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code.
Although not raised by petitioners, it may be argued that
petitioner Garcia’s Certificate of Live Birth obtained in 2003 through a
late registration of his birth is a record of birth appearing in the
civil register under Article 172 of the Family Code.
True, birth certificates offer prima facie evidence
of filiation. To overthrow the presumption of truth contained in a
birth certificate, a high degree of proof is needed.[55]
However, the circumstances surrounding the delayed registration prevent
us from according it the same weight as any other birth certificate.
There is a reason why birth certificates are
accorded such
high evidentiary value. Act No. 3753, or An Act to Establish a Civil
Register, provides:
Section 5. Registration and Certification of
Births. —
The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth
or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn
child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp
tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty
days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in attendance at the
birth or by either parent of the newly born child.In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall
certify
to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and religion of parents
or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; (f) and such
other data may be required in the regulation to be issued.In the case of an exposed child, the person who found the
same
shall report to the local civil registrar the place, date and hour of
finding and other attendant circumstances.In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate
shall be
signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the
mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be
permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father
who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information
by which such father could be identified.Any foetus having human features which dies after twenty
four
hours of existence completely disengaged from the maternal womb shall be
entered in the proper registers as having been born and having died.
Further, Rule 21 of National Statistics Office
Administrative
Order No. 1-93, or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Act No.
3753, provides that a person’s birth be registered with the Office of
the Civil Registrar-General by one of the following individuals:
Rule 21. Persons Responsible to Report the
Event. — (1)
When the birth occurred in a hospital or clinic or in a similar
institution, the administrator thereof shall be responsible in causing
the registration of such birth. However, it shall be the attendant at
birth who shall certify the facts of birth.(2) When the birth did not occur in a hospital or clinic
or in a
similar institution, the physician, nurse, midwife, “hilot”, or anybody
who attended to the delivery of the child shall be responsible both in
certifying the facts of birth and causing the registration of such
birth.(3) In default of the hospital/clinic administrator or
attendant
at birth, either or both parents of the child shall cause the
registration of the birth.(4) When the birth occurs aboard a vehicle, vessel or
airplane
while in transit, registration of said birth shall be a joint
responsibility of the driver, captain or pilot and the parents, as the
case may be.
Further, the birth must be registered within 30 days from
the time of birth.[56]
Thus, generally, the rules require that facts of the report be
certified by an attendant at birth, within 30 days from birth. The
attendant is not only an eyewitness to the event, but also presumably
would have no reason to lie on the matter. The immediacy of the
reporting, combined with the participation of disinterested attendants
at birth, or of both parents, tend to ensure that the report is a
factual reporting of birth. In other words, the circumstances in which
registration is made obviate the possibility that registration is caused
by ulterior motives. The law provides in the case of illegitimate
children that the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly
by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father
refuses. This ensures that individuals are not falsely named as
parents.
National Statistics Office Administrative Order No. 1-93 also
contemplates that reports of birth may be made beyond the 30-day period:
Rule 25. Delayed Registration of Birth.
— (1) The requirements are:
a) if the person is less than eighteen (18)
years old, the following shall be required:i) four (4) copies of the Certificate of Live Birth duly
accomplished and signed by the proper parties;ii) accomplished Affidavit for Delayed
Registration
at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth by the father, mother or
guardian, declaring therein, among other things, the following:> name of child;
>
date and place of birth;
> name of the father
if the child is illegitimate and has been acknowledged by
him;
> if legitimate, the date and place of
marriage of parents; and
> reason for not
registering the birth within thirty (30) days after the date of
birth.In case the party seeking late
registration of
the birth of an illegitimate child is not the mother, the party shall,
in addition to the foregoing facts, declare in a sworn statement the
present whereabouts of the mother.iii) any two of the following documentary evidences which
may
show the name of the child, date and place of birth, and name of mother
(and name of father, if the child has been acknowledged);> baptismal certificate;
> school records (nursery, kindergarten, or preparatory);
> income tax return of parent/s;
> insurance policy;
> medical
records; and
> others, such as barangay
captain’s certification.iv) affidavit of two disinterested persons who might have
witnessed or known the birth of the child. (46:1aa)b) If the person is eighteen (18) years old
or
above, he shall apply for late registration of his birth and the
requirements shall be:i) all the requirements for a child who is less than
eighteen (18) years old; andii) Certificate of Marriage, if married.
(46:1ba)(2) Delayed registration of birth, like
ordinary
registration made at the time of birth, shall be filed at the Office of
the Civil Registrar of the place where the birth occurred.
(46:3)(3) Upon receipt of the application for
delayed
registration of birth, the civil registrar shall examine the Certificate
of Live Birth presented whether it has been completely and correctly
filled up and all requirements complied with. (47a)(4) In the delayed registration of the birth
of an
alien, travel documents showing the origin and nationality of the
parents shall be presented in addition to the requirements mentioned in
Rule 25 (1). (49:2a)
Thus, petitioners submitted in evidence a delayed
registration of
birth of Garcia, pursuant to this rule. Petitioners point out that a
hearing on the delayed registration was held at the Office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac. No one appeared to oppose
the delayed registration, despite a notice of hearing posted at the
Office of the Civil Registrar.[57]
It is analogous to cases where a putative father’s name is
written
on a certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child, without any
showing that the putative father participated in preparing the
certificate. In Fernandez v. Court of
Appeals:[58]
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. “A”; Exh. “B”)
of
the petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are not
also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the
records do not show that private respondent had a hand in the
preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the
ruling of the respondent court is in accord with our pronouncement in
Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050
(1958),viz:“. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the
Civil
Code of the Philippines explicitly prohibited, not only the naming of
the father or the child born outside wedlock, when the birth
certificates, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but,
also,
the statement of any information or circumstances by which he could be
identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to
make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an
illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is
incompetent evidence of fathership of said child.We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op.
cit., when we
held that “a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein
indicated is not competent evidence of paternity.”[59] (Emphasis in the original).
In Berciles v. Government Service Insurance
System:[60]
The evidence considered by the Committee on Claims
Settlement as
basis of its finding that Pascual Voltaire Berciles is an acknowledged
natural child of the late Judge Pascual Berciles is the birth
certificate of said Pascual Voltaire Berciles marked Exh. “6”. We have
examined carefully this birth certificate and We find that the same is
not signed by either the father or the mother; We find no participation
or intervention whatsoever therein by the alleged father, Judge Pascual
Berciles. Under our jurisprudence, if the alleged father did not
intervene in the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the
mother or doctor or registrar is null and void. Such registration would
not be evidence of paternity. (Joaquin P. Roces et al. vs. Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, 102 Phil. 1050). The mere certificate by the
registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary
acknowledgment on his part (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729). A birth
certificate does not constitute recognition in a public instrument.
(Pareja vs. Pareja, et al., 95 Phil. 167). A birth certificate, to
evidence acknowledgment, must, under Section 5 of Act 3753, bear the
signature under oath of the acknowledging parent or parents.
(Vidaurrazaga vs. Court of Appeals and Francisco Ruiz, 91 Phil.
492).….
In the case of Mendoza, et al. vs. Mella, 17 SCRA 788,
the
Supreme Court speaking through Justice Makalintal who later became chief
Justice, said:It should be noted, however, that a Civil Registry Law
was
passed in 1930 (Act No. 3753) containing provisions for the registration
of births, including those of illegitimate parentage; and the record of
birth under such law, if sufficient in contents for the purpose, would
meet the requisites for voluntary recognition even under Article 131.
Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit
1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be
relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily
recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it.
While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that
they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in
Section 5 of Act No. 3753 (Vidaurrazaga vs. Court of Appeals, 91 Phil.
493; In re Adoption of Lydia Duran, 92 Phil. 729). For all that might
have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the
data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any
event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document
wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made,
according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case there
must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes
the child as his or her own (Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1); and in
Exhibit 1 no such statement appears. The claim of voluntary recognition
is without basis.”[61]
Further, in People v. Villar,[62]
this Court sustained the Trial Court’s rejection of a delayed
registration of birth as conclusive evidence of the facts stated
therein:
In the resolution of the sole assignment of error we find
as
well-taken and accordingly adopt as our own the lower court’s
ratiocination, thus:After going over the evidence in support of the alleged
minority of the accused Francisco Villar when he committed the crime on
or about August 24, 1977, the Court finds that Exhibit 1 and the
testimonies of the defense witnesses can not have more probative value
than the written statement of Francisco Villar, Exhibit E. It is to be
noted that Exhibit 1 is a delayed registration of a supposed birth
accomplished and submitted only on January 12, 1979 to the Local Civil
Registrar of Caloocan City by the witness Leonor Villar, long after the
offense was committed and after the prosecution finally rested its case
on November 21, 1978, thus exposing the basis of Exhibit 1 to be resting
on a slender and shaky foundation, and more so, in the absence of
explanation from the defense of the reason for said late registration.
Hence, the Court rejects Exhibit 1….The appellant invokes Art. 410 of the Civil Code which
reads:Art. 410. The books making up the civil register and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts herein contained.Suffice it to say that the above-quoted provision makes
the information given in Exhibit 1 only prima facie
but
not conclusive evidence. This must be so because the Local Civil
Registrar merely receives the information submitted to him; he does not
inquire into its veracity. Moreover, to regard as conclusive the content
of a certificate of live birth can lead to absurd results. Supposing
that Leonor had given John F. Kennedy as the father of Francisco, are we
to accept that as an incontestable fact? In the light of the
circumstances already narrated concerning the preparation and submission
of Exhibit 1, the lower court committed no error in disregarding
it.[63]
A delayed registration of birth, made after the death of the
putative parent, is tenuous proof of filiation.
Thus, we are unable to accord petitioner Garcia’s delayed registration
of birth the same evidentiary weight as regular birth
certificates.
Even without a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment, filiation may still be established after the death of a
putative parent through an admission of filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument, signed by the parent
concerned.[64]
However, petitioners did not present in evidence any admissions of
filiation.
An admission is an act, declaration, or
omission of a party on a relevant fact, which may be used in evidence
against him.[65]
The evidence presented by petitioners such as group pictures with
Josefa and petitioners’ relatives, and testimonies do not show that
Josefa is their mother. They do not contain any acts, declarations, or
omissions attributable directly to Josefa, much less ones pertaining to
her filiation with petitioners. Although petitioner Garcia’s Baptismal
Certificate, Certificate of Marriage, and Certificate of Live Birth
obtained via late registration all state that Josefa is his mother, they
do not show any act, declaration, or omission on the part of Josefa.
Josefa did not participate in making any of them. The same may be said
of the testimonies presented. Although Josefa may have been in the
photographs, the photographs do not show any filiation. By definition,
none of the evidence presented constitutes an admission of filiation
under Article 172 of the Family Code.
II
The Trial Court bypassed the issue of the birth
certificates
and did not consider the first paragraph of Article 172 of the Family
Code. Instead, it ruled only on the open and continuous possession of
status of filiation:
Without anymore discussing the validity of their
respective
birth and baptismal certificates, there is sufficient evidence to hold
that all the plaintiffs are indeed the children of the said deceased
Josefa Ara for having possessed and enjoyed the status of recognized
illegitimate children pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 175 of
the Family Code[.]. . . .
All the plaintiffs and defendant were taken care of and
supported by their mother Josefa Ara, including their education, since
their respective birth and were all united and lived as one family even
up to the death and burial of their said mother, Josefa Ara. Their
mother had acknowledged all of them as her children throughout all her
life directly, continuously, spontaneously and without
concealment.[66]
Thus, the Court of Appeals found that the Trial Court had
erred in
allowing petitioners to prove their illegitimate filiation through the
open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children
after the death of the putative parent:
However, the trial court’s finding cannot be sustained.
Even
granting for the sake of argument that appellants Romeo F. Ara and
William Garcia did enjoy open and continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child, still, they should have proven this during the
lifetime of the putative parent. Article 285 of the Civil
Code provides the period for filing and
(sic) action for recognition as follows:ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural
children
may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except
in the following cases:
father or mother
died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may
file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment
of his majority;
the father or
of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard
and in which either or both parents recognize the
child.In this case, the action must be commenced within four
years from the finding of the document.The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision,
have however been omitted by Articles 172, 173 and
175 of the Family Code, which We quote:…
The law is very clear. If filiation is sought to be proved
under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family
Code,
the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is evident that appellants Romeo F. Ara and William Garcia can no
longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of their open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove
their alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of
Court or special laws. The simple reason is that Josefa Ara is already
dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of her alleged sons’
illegitimate filiation.[67]
The Court of Appeals did not adopt the Trial Court’s
appreciation
of evidence. It ruled that, because petitioners’ putative parent Josefa
had already passed away, petitioners were proscribed from proving their
filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family
Code.
The Court of Appeals properly did not give
credence to the evidence submitted by petitioners regarding their
status.
Josefa passed away in 2002.[68]
After her death, petitioners could no longer be allowed to introduce
evidence of open and continuous illegitimate filiation to Josefa. The
only evidence allowed under the law would be a record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private signed,
handwritten instruction by Josefa.
An alleged parent
is the best
person to affirm or deny a putative descendant’s filiation. Absent a
record of birth appearing in a civil register or a final judgment, an
express admission of filiation in a public document, or a handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned, a deceased person will have
no opportunity to contest a claim of filiation.
In
truth, it is
the mother and in some cases, the father, who witnesses the actual birth
of their children. Descendants normally only come to know of their
parents through nurture and family lore. When they are born, they do not
have the consciousness required to be able to claim personal knowledge
of their parents. It thus makes sense for the parents to be present when
evidence under the second paragraph of Article 172 is
presented.
The limitation that an action to prove filiation as an illegitimate
child be brought within the lifetime of an alleged parent acknowledges
that there may be other persons whose rights should be protected from
spurious claims. This includes other children, legitimate and
illegitimate, whose statuses are supported by strong evidence of a
categorical nature.
Respondent Pizarro has submitted
petitioners’
certificates of live birth to further disprove petitioners’ filiation
with Josefa. A Certificate of Live Birth issued in Paniqui, Tarlac on
July 19, 1950 shows that Garcia’s parents are Pedro Garcia and Carmen
Bugarin[69] while
another
Certificate of Live Birth issued in petitioner Ara’s birthplace, Bauang,
La Union, shows that he is the son of spouses Jose Ara and Maria
Flores.[70]
The Court of Appeals gave
credence to these birth certificates submitted by respondent Pizarro:
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value
given to
the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official
duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is
usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and
disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of
record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as
might have occurred.Therefore, this Court upholds the birth certificates of
William
Garcia and Romeo F. Ara, as issued by the Civil Registry, in line with
Legaspi v. Court of Appeals,
where the High Court ruled that the evidentiary nature of public
documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. Consequently, appellants
Romeo F. Ara and William Garcia are deemed not to be the illegitimate
sons of the late Josefa Ara.[71]
Thus, the Court of Appeals made a determination on the
evidence
and found that the birth certificates submitted by respondent Pizarro
belong to petitioners Garcia and Ara. These birth certificates name
Carmen Bugarin[72]
and Maria Flores,[73]
as the respective mothers of petitioners Garcia and Ara. Considering
that these birth certificates do not name Josefa as a parent of either
petitioner, petitioners are properly determined not to be Josefa’s
children.
Petitioners point out that the Certificate
of Birth
does not contain petitioner Garcia’s correct birth date. They claim that
the birth date of petitioner Garcia as recorded in his baptismal
certificate is June 23, 1951. This birth date is also reflected on his
Certificate of Live Birth issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as in the Notice of Hearing of the delayed
registration of birth certificate of petitioner Garcia. Thus,
petitioners speculate that the birth certificate submitted by respondent
Pizarro is of a different “William Garcia”:
Perhaps, defendant-appellant Fely Pizarro obtained a
Certificate
of Live Birth and Cedula de Baotismo of a wrong person bearing the same
name William Garcia which always happened (sic) in our country
considering that the family name Garcia is very much common because in
the said documents the birthdate of a certain William Garcia was June
23, 1950 not June 23, 1951, the actual birth of William Garcia.[74]
On this point, respondent Pizarro argues:
It may be noted that William Garcia obtained said
Certificate
more than six (6) months after he, with his co-plaintiffs, had filed the
case of judicial partition on 9 April 2003. Obviously, he found the
need to apply for the late registration of his birth when he learned
from respondent’s Answer that from her knowledge she is the only child
of Josefa Ara. Very likely, William Garcia already knew that he already
has a record of birth in the municipality of Paniqui, Tarlac, showing
that her mother was not Josefa Ara.[75]
These are matters of appreciation of evidence, however,
which
cannot be subject of inquiry in a petition for review under Rule 45.
Nonetheless, considering that there were two reports of birth for
William Garcia, and considering further that one of the reports was made
only after initiating a case which would directly
use said
report, we cannot find error in the Court of Appeals’ decision to
disregard the delayed registration.
Finally, petitioners’ claim that there was no
basis for the
Court of Appeals to find that respondents are the children of Josefa is
untenable. Respondents’ filiation with Josefa was not put in question
before the Trial Court. Even petitioners admitted in their Complaint
that respondents were Josefa’s children.[76]
Further, on appeal, no party questioned the Trial Court’s determination
that respondents Pizarro and Rossi were the children of Josefa.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining these
findings without requiring further proof.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on
certiorari is DENIED. The August 1, 2008
Decision and the March 16, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 00729 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta,
Mendoza, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by
Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion. Associate Justices Edgardo A.
Camello and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. concurred. Rollo,
pp. 42-56.
[2] Id.
at 59-60.
[3] RTC
Records, pp. 154-160.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 42-43.
[5] Id.
at 5.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
at 6.
[9] Id.
at 5.
[10]
Id. at 154.
[11]
Id. at 153-154.
[12]
Id. at 154.
[13]
Id. at 43.
[14]
Id.
[15]
Id.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id.
[18]
RTC Records, p. 1.
[19]
RTC Records, p. 21.
[20]
Id.
[21]
Id. at 22.
[22]
Rollo, p. 45.
[23]
Id.
[24]
Id. at 92.
[25]
Id. at 45-46.
[26]
Id. at 46.
[27]
Id.
[28]
Id. at 47.
[29]
Id.
[30]
Id. at 42-56.
[31]
Id.
[32]
Id. at 55-56.
[33]
Id. at 48.
[34]
Id. at 59.
[35]
Id. at 3-40.
[36]
Id. at 90-103 and 105-111.
[37]
Id. at 114-116.
[38]
Id. at 34.
[39]
Id.
[40]
Id.
[41]
Id. at 34-35.
[42]
Id. at 196.
[43]
258-A Phil. 467 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
[44]
Id. at 471-473.
[45]
Rollo, p. 188.
[46]
Id.
[47]
Id.
[48]
Id.
[49]
Id. at 154.
[50]
Id. at 188-189.
[51]
Id. at 190.
[52]
Id. at 192.
[53]
Id.
[54]
Id.
[55] Heirs of Cabais v. Court of
Appeals, 374 Phil. 681, 688 (1999) [Per J. Purisima, Third
Division]
[56]
NSO Adm. O. No. 1-93 (1992), Rule 19.
[57] Rollo, p. 178.
[58]
300 Phil. 131 (1994) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[59]
Id. at 137-138.
[60]
213 Phil. 48 (1984) [Per J. Guerrero, En Banc].
[61]
Id. at 49-72.
[62]
193 Phil. 203 (1981) [Per J. Abad Santos, Second Division].
[63]
Id. at 207-208.
[64]
FAMILY CODE, art. 172.
[65]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 26.
[66]
RTC Records, pp. 158-159.
[67]
Rollo, pp. 48-50.
[68]
Id. at 43.
[69]
Id. at 190.
[70]
Id. at 154.
[71]
Id. at 51.
[72]
Id. at 190.
[73]
Id. at 154.
[74]
Id. at 181.
[75]
Id. at 154.
[76]
RTC Records, p. 1.