PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RENATO LAGAT Y GAWAN A.K.A. RENAT GAWAN AND JAMES PALALAY Y VILLAROSA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

People versus Lagat

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Renato Lagat and James Palalay for qualified carnapping — the taking of a tricycle belonging to Jose Biag, without his consent and with intent to gain, attended by the killing of Biag in the course of the taking. The case matters because it is a clean teaching vehicle on three things a reviewee must command: the elements of carnapping under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, the use of circumstantial evidence to reach moral certainty of guilt, and the presumption that arises from unexplained possession of recently stolen property. It also shows the Court refusing to use admissions extracted without counsel, and yet convicting on the remaining, independent circumstances.

Procedural History

Lagat and Palalay were charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Santiago City, with carnapping as defined under Section 2 and penalized under Section 14 of Republic Act Number 6539, qualified by the killing of the driver and owner. Lagat pleaded not guilty on arraignment; Palalay entered no plea, so the trial court entered a plea of not guilty for him. Both accused proposed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide, but the prosecution rejected the proposal, and trial on the merits proceeded.

After the prosecution rested, the accused filed a demurrer to evidence without leave of court. Because they filed it without leave, they waived their right to present evidence, and the case was submitted for judgment on the prosecution's evidence. The trial court rendered judgment on March 19, 2007, finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified carnapping and sentencing each to reclusion perpetua, with orders to pay actual damages, death indemnity, and moral damages. The trial court agreed that the accused's custodial admissions were inadmissible for want of counsel, but held that circumstantial evidence sufficed. The motion for reconsideration was denied.

The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction with modification, increasing the actual damages awarded. The accused then elevated the case to the Supreme Court on a single assignment of error — that the trial court gravely erred in finding them guilty despite the prosecution's failure to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts

Jose Biag was a farmer, a barangay tanod, and a tricycle driver. In the early morning of April 12, 2005, he left home to operate his tricycle for public use. He never returned. The following day, April 13, 2005, police in Alicia, Isabela received a report that cavans of palay stolen from a store in Angadanan were seen at a palay buying station in Alicia, loaded on a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified men. A police team went to verify and found the tricycle, the palay, and the two accused, Lagat and Palalay. When the officers approached, the two men ran in different directions but were caught.

At the police station, the officers asked the two for papers covering the tricycle and the palay; they kept silent. On inspection, the police found bloodstains inside and outside the sidecar, and a wallet containing the tricycle's certificate of registration and official receipt in the name of Jose Biag. The two accused then admitted that the owner named in the papers was the man they killed and dumped along the Angadanan and San Guillermo road when they carnapped his tricycle. The police informed them of their rights, and with the accused leading the way, the officers recovered Biag's body in a ravine near the road. The autopsy showed multiple stab and hack wounds as the cause of death. The police admitted that the accused were never assisted by counsel at any time during the custodial investigation.

At trial, the prosecution presented Biag's wife, the barangay chief tanod, and the police officers. The accused, having filed a demurrer without leave, presented no evidence of their own.

Issues

• Whether or not the prosecution established the elements of carnapping under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to support a conviction to the exclusion of every other hypothesis consistent with innocence.
• Whether or not the killing of the owner in the course of the carnapping qualified the crime and warranted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Republic Act Number 6539 defines carnapping and motor vehicle:

"Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.

This definition supplies the elements the Court tests against the evidence.

Section 14 of the same Act, as amended, fixes the penalty and qualifies the crime when the owner, driver, or occupant is killed:

Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.

Because Biag, the owner and driver, was killed in the course of the carnapping, this provision raises the penalty to reclusion perpetua to death.

Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court supplies the presumption from unexplained possession:

[A] person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.

This presumption anchors the Court's conclusion that the accused unlawfully took the tricycle.

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court governs sufficiency of circumstantial evidence:

(a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.

This is the standard the Court applies to the web of circumstances against the accused.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that all the elements of carnapping were present and proven: an actual taking of the vehicle; the vehicle belonged to another; the taking was without the owner's consent; and the offender intended to gain. The tricycle, shown by registration papers to belong to Biag, was found in the accused's possession; they fled when the police approached; and they gave no reason for having it. Their unexplained possession raised the presumption under Section 3, Rule 131 that they were the takers. Intent to gain, the Court explained, is an internal act presumed from the unlawful taking, and gain is not limited to pecuniary benefit — the mere use of the thing taken without the owner's consent constitutes gain.

On the second issue, the Court held that the circumstantial evidence, viewed as a whole and excluding the inadmissible admissions, established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It relied on six circumstances: possession of the tricycle the same day it and its owner went missing; presence at the palay buying station with the stolen tricycle loaded with palay; flight upon seeing the police; failure to explain possession; Biag's wallet and registration papers inside the tricycle; and hack wounds on Biag's body matched by blood traces in the tricycle. These circumstances, interwoven, left no reasonable doubt and pointed to a conspiracy to kill Biag in order to steal his tricycle, inferred from the accused's conduct before, during, and after the crime.

On the third issue, the Court held that because Biag was killed in the course of the carnapping, the crime was qualified and the penalty under Section 14 was reclusion perpetua to death. With no aggravating circumstance, the trial court properly imposed reclusion perpetua. The Court affirmed the civil indemnity and moral damages, but replaced the actual damages of 14,900 pesos with temperate damages of 25,000 pesos, since proven actual damages were below 25,000 pesos.

Doctrine

The elements of carnapping are actual taking of the vehicle, ownership by another, taking without consent or by violence, intimidation, or force upon things, and intent to gain. Intent to gain is presumed from the unlawful taking, and gain includes any benefit derived from the use of the thing taken. Unexplained possession of recently stolen property gives rise to the presumption that the possessor is the taker and doer of the whole act, provided the property was stolen, the taking was recent, the property was found in the accused's possession, and the accused cannot satisfactorily explain it. Circumstantial evidence suffices for conviction when there is more than one circumstance, the underlying facts are proven, and their combination produces moral certainty to the exclusion of all others. When the owner, driver, or occupant is killed in the course of the carnapping, the crime is qualified and the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Lagat and Palalay for qualified carnapping and the penalty of reclusion perpetua, modifying only the damages by awarding temperate damages of 25,000 pesos in lieu of the lower actual damages.

Remember This

Memorize this line: unexplained possession of recently stolen property presumes the possessor to be the taker and the doer of the whole act. Examiners use this case to test the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence and the qualification of carnapping by the killing of the owner or driver.