APOLONIO TANJANCO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ARACELI SANTOS, RESPONDENTS.

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R)
revoking an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No.
Q-4797) dismissing appellant’s action for support and damages.

The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from
December, 1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco , courted the
plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that “defendant expressed
and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time
reciprocated the tender feelings”; that in consideration of defendant1 s
promises of marriage plaintiff consehted and acceded to defendant’s pleas for
carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations
of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access to
plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her
pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had
to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving
P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support herself and her
baby; that due to defendant’s refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the
latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the
defendant to recognize the unbom child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her
not less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus
P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney’s fees.

Upon defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter
ultimately decided the case, holding with the lower court that no cause of
action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its
support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages,
premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing as
follows:

“ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.”

The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal
and directing the court of origin to proceed with the case.

Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach
of a promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the
rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30, 1960;
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs.
SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.

We find this appeal meritorious.

In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under
Article 21 above mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the
memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to
support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the
draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:

“But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined
or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in
the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed
it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil
Code the following rule:

‘ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.’

“An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: ‘A’ seduces
the nineteen-year old daughter of ‘X’. A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws,
there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any
civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action
for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such
a right of action.”

The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in
the Code Commission’s memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been
seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than
mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U. S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

“To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise
or Inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent Dig. tit. Seduction, par.
56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some
species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have
that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer” (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

“On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual
desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the
needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to
allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the
female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit.” (47 Am. Jur. 662)

Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material
allegations there are as follows:

“I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E.
Diliman, Quezon City,while defendant is also of legal age, single and residing
at 525 Padre Faura, Manila,where he may be served with summons;

II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other
sometime in December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started visiting
and courting the plaintiff;

III. That the defendant’s visits were regular and frequent and in due time
the defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for the
plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings;

IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant
as are wont of young people in love had frequent outings and dates, became very
close and intimate to each other and sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of
the defendant’s promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to the
former’s earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;

V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a
short period in December, 1958 when the defendant was out of the country, the
defendant through his protestations of love and promises of marriage succeeded
in having carnal knowledge with the plaintiff;

VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started
conceiving which was confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;

VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff
informed the defendant and pleaded with him to make good his promises of
marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the
defendant stopped and refrained from seeing the plaintiff, since about July,
1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has broken
their engagement and his promises.”

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his
embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the
alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfil his promises. Hence, we conclude
that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of
action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint.

Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever
actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the
defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement,
since the child’s own rights are not here involved.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.