G.R. No. 186070. April 11, 2011
CLIENTLOGIC PHILPPINES, INC. (NOW KNOWN AS SITEL), JOSEPH VELASQUEZ, IRENE ROA AND RODNEY SPIRES, PETITIONERS, VS. BENEDICT CASTRO, RESPONDENT.
NACHURA, J.:
January 7, 2009 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification the November 29, 2007 resolution[3]
of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which held that
respondent Benedict Castro was not illegally dismissed. The CA,
however, awarded respondent’s money claims, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 29 November 2007 and 23 January 2008
of the National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division) in NLRC CN. RAB-CAR-02-0091-07 LAC NO. 08-002207-07 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the monetary awards of Executive Labor Arbiter Vito C. Bose in his Decision dated 29 June 2007, as computed in
Annex “A” thereof, ONLY for holiday premiums of Php 16,913.35; service incentive leave pay of Php 8,456.65; overtime pay of Php
578,753.10; and rest day pay of Php 26,384.80 which [petitioners] shall jointly and solidarily pay to petitioner, are hereby
REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.[4]
The second assailed issuance of the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The facts:
Respondent was employed by petitioner ClientLogic Philippines, Inc.
(now known as shall hereafter be referred to as SITEL on February 14,
2005 as a call center agent for its Bell South Account. After six
(6) months, he was promoted to the “Mentor” position, and thereafter to
the “Coach” position. A “Coach” is a team supervisor who is in
charge of dealing with customer complaints which could not be resolved
by
call center agents. In June 2006, he was transferred to the Green
Dot Account.
During respondent’s stint at the Dot Green Account, respondent
noticed that some of the call center agents under his helm would
often make excuses to leave their work stations. Their most common
excuse was that they would visit the company’s medical clinic. To
verify that they were not using the clinic as an alibi to cut their
work hours, respondent sent an e-mail to the clinic’s personnel
requesting for the details of the agents who sought medical
consultation. His request was denied on the ground that medical records
of employees are highly confidential and can only be disclosed in
cases of health issues, and not to be used to build any
disciplinary case against them.
On October 11, 2006, respondent received a notice requiring him to
explain why he should not be penalized for: (1) violating Green Dot
Company’s Policy and Procedure for Direct Deposit Bank Info Request
when he accessed a customer’s online account and then gave the latter’s
routing and reference numbers for direct deposit; and (2) gravely
abusing his discretion when he requested for the medical records of his
team members. Respondent did not deny the infractions imputed
against him. He, however, justified his actuations by explaining that
the
customer begged him to access the account because she did not have a
computer or an internet access and that he merely requested for a
patient tracker, not medical records.
In November 2006, a poster showing SITEL’s organizational chart was
posted on the company’s bulletin board, but respondent’s name
and picture were conspicuously missing, and the name and photo of
another employee appeared in the position which respondent was
supposedly occupying.
On January 22, 2007, SITEL posted a notice of vacancy for
respondent’s position, and on February 12, 2007, he received a Notice of
Termination. These events prompted him to file a complaint for
illegal dismissal; non-payment of overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday
pay, service incentive leave pay; full backwages; damages; and
attorney’s fees before the Labor Arbiter (LA) against herein
petitioners SITEL and its officers, Joseph Velasquez, Irene Roa, and
Rodney Spires.[5]
In their position paper,[6]
petitioners averred that respondent was dismissed on account of valid
and justifiable causes. He acted
with serious misconduct which breached the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the company. He was duly furnished with the twin
notices required by the Labor Code and further, he is not entitled
to overtime pay, rest day pay, night shift differential, holiday
pay, and service incentive leave pay because he was a supervisor,
hence, a member of the managerial staff.
In a decision dated June 29, 2007,[7]
the LA ruled in favor of respondent by declaring him illegally
dismissed and ordering
petitioners to pay his full backwages and, in lieu of
reinstatement, his separation pay. The LA further awarded respondents
money
claims upon finding that he was not occupying a managerial
position. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all premises duly considered, [petitioners] are hereby found guilty of illegally dismissing [respondent]. As
such, [petitioners] shall be jointly and solidarily liable to pay [respondent] his full backwages from the date of his
dismissal to the finality of this decision, computed as of today at One Hundred Thirty Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty
Nine Pesos and 80/100 (P138,759.80) plus, Seven Hundred Sixty Three Thousand Two Hundred Forty Eight Pesos and 67/100
(P763,248.67) representing his separation pay at one month pay for every year of service, holiday pay and service incentive
leave pay for the three years prior to the filing of this case, overtime pay for six(6) hours daily, rest day pay and ten
percent (10%) as attorney’s fees.All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of evidence.
The computation of the foregoing monetary claims is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex “A.”
SO ORDERED.[8]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the NLRC which, in its November 29, 2007 resolution,[9]
reversed and set aside the decision of the
LA by dismissing the complaint for lack of merit on the ground that
respondent’s employment was terminated for a just cause. The
NLRC failed to discuss the money claims.
On September 1, 2008, the CA affirmed the NLRC’s finding that there was no illegal dismissal. Anent the money claims, the CA
concurred with the LA’s ruling.[10]
Petitioners and respondent respectively moved for partial
reconsideration, but their motions were denied in the CA Resolution
dated January
7, 2009.[11] From the said
denial, only petitioners resorted to this Court through the petition at
bar. Respondent’s failure to partially
appeal the CA’s Decision finding him not illegally dismissed has now
rendered the same final and executory; hence, the instant petition
shall traverse only the issue on money claims.
Petitioners argue in the main[12] that, as a team supervisor, respondent was a member of the managerial staff; hence, he is not
entitled to overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday pay, and service incentive leave pay.
We deny the petition.
The petition hinges on the question of whether the duties and
responsibilities performed by respondent qualify him as a member of
petitioners’ managerial staff. This is clearly a question of fact,
the determination of which entails an evaluation of the evidence on
record.
The alleged errors of the CA lengthily enumerated in the petition[13] are essentially factual in nature and, therefore, outside the ambit of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. The Court does not try facts since such statutory
duty is
devolved upon the labor. It is not for this Court to weigh and
calibrate pieces of evidence otherwise adequately passed upon by the
labor
tribunals especially when affirmed by the appellate court.[14]
Petitioners claim exception to the foregoing rule and assert that the
factual findings of the LA and the NLRC were conflicting. This is not
true. The labor tribunals’ decisions were at odds only with respect
to the issue of illegal dismissal. Anent, the money claims issue, it
cannot be said that their rulings were contradictory because the
NLRC, disappointingly, did not make any finding thereon and it
erroneously
construed that the resolution of the money claims was intertwined
with the determination of the legality of respondent’s dismissal.
Nonetheless, the CA has already rectified such lapse when it made a
definitive review of the LA’s factual findings on respondent’s money
claims. Agreeing with the LA, the CA held:
Article 82 of the Labor Code states that the provisions of the
Labor Code on working conditions and rest periods shall not apply to
managerial employees. Generally, managerial employees are not entitled
to overtime pay for services rendered in excess of eight hours a
day.Article 212(m) of the Labor Code defines a managerial employee as
“one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off,
recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively
recommend such managerial actions.”In his Position Paper, [respondent] states that he worked from 8:00
p.m. to 10:00 a.m. or 4 p.m. to 12:00 p.m. of the following day; he was
also required to work during his restdays and during holidays but he
was not paid; he was also not paid overtime pay, night shift
differentials, and service incentive leave. He was employed as call
center agent on 14 February 2005, then promoted as “Mentor” in August
2005, and again promoted to “Coach” position in September 2005,
which was the position he had when he was terminated. A “coach” is a
team
supervisor who is in charge of dealing with customer complaints
which could not be dealt with by call center agents, and if a call
center
agent could not meet the needs of a customer, he passes the
customer’s call to the “coach.” Clearly, [respondent] is not a
managerial
employee as defined by law. Thus, he is entitled to [his] money
claims.As correctly found by Executive Labor Arbiter Bose: “Employees are
considered occupying managerial positions if they meet all of the
following conditions, namely:“1) Their primary duty consists of management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision
thereof;“2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees therein;
“3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or their suggestions and recommendations as to the
hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight.“They are considered as officers or members of a managerial staff if they perform the following duties and responsibilities:
“1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies of their employer;
“2)
Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment;“3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a
managerial employee whose primary duty consists of management of the
establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof;
or (ii) execute under general supervision work along specialized or
technical lines requiring special training, experience, or
knowledge; or (iii) execute, under general supervision, special
assignment and tasks x x x.“[Respondent’s] duties do not fall under any of the categories
enumerated above. His work is not directly related to management
policies. Even the circumstances shown by the instant case reveal that
[respondent] does not regularly exercise discretion and
independent judgment. [Petitioners] submitted a list of the
responsibilities of ‘HR Manager/Supervisor’ and ‘Division
Manager/Department Manager/Supervisors’ but these do not pertain to
[respondent] who does not have any of the said positions. He was
just a team Supervisor and not [an] HR or Department Supervisor.”[15]
We find no reversible error in the above ruling. The test of
“supervisory” or “managerial status” depends on whether a person
possesses
authority to act in the interest of his employer and whether such
authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature, but requires
the
use of independent judgment.[16] The position held by respondent and its concomitant duties failed to hurdle this test.
As a coach or team supervisor respondent’s main duty was to deal
with customer complaints which could not be handled or solved by call
center agents. If the members of his team could not meet the needs of a
customer, they passed the customer’s call to respondent.
This job description does not indicate that respondent can exercise
the powers and prerogatives to effectively recommend such managerial
actions which require the customary use of independent judgment. There
is no showing that he was actually conferred or actually exercising
the following duties attributable to a “member of the managerial
staff,” viz.:
1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management of policies of their employer;
2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment;
3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial
employee whose primary duty consists of management of the
establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof; or
(ii) execute under general supervision work along specialized or
technical
lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge; or (iii)
execute, under general supervision, special assignment and tasks; and4) Who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours worked in a
work week to activities which are not directly and closely related
to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (1), (2),
and (3) above.[17]
According to petitioners, respondent also performed the following
duties, as shown in the company’s Statement of Policy of Discipline:
- Know and understand in full the Policy on Discipline including their underlying reasons.
- Implement strictly and consistently the Policy on Discipline.
- Ensure that the said Policy on Discipline is communicated to and understood by all employees.
- Monitor compliance by employees with the said Policy.
- Advise HR Manager on the state of discipline in their respective departments; problems, if any, and recommend solution(s) and
corrective action(s).
As correctly observed by the CA and the LA, these duties clearly
pertained to “Division Managers/Department Managers/ Supervisors,” which
respondent was not as he was merely a team supervisor. Petitioners
themselves described respondent as “the superior of a call center agent;
he heads and guides a specific number of agents, who form a team.”[18]
From the foregoing, respondent is thus entitled to his claims for
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, overtime pay and rest day pay,
pursuant to Book Three of the Labor Code, specifically Article 82,[19] in relation to Articles 87,[20] 93,[21] and 95[22] thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The September 1, 2008 Decision and the January 7, 2009 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 33-51.
[2] Id. at 64-65.
[3] Id. at 83-90.
[4] Supra note 1, at 48.
[5] Respondent’s Position Paper as cited in pages 2-4 of the CA Decision; supra. note 1, at 34-35.
[6] Rollo, pp. 128-161.
[7] Id. at 69-81.
[8] Id. at 79-80.
[9] Supra note 3.
[10] Supra note 1.
[11] Supre note 2.
[12] In their petition, petitioners ascribe the following errors to the CA:
I. REINSTATING THE LABOR ARBITER’S RULING THAT –
|
(a)
|
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT BENEDICT CASTRO’S DUTIES WITH THE COMPANY AS SIMPLY CHARACTERIZED AS, LIMITED TO, CATCHING A CUSTOMER’S CALL/COMPLAINTS WHEN THE SAME COULD NOT BE ADDRESSED BY CALL CENTER AGENTS; |
|
(b)
|
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT BENEDICT CASTRO’S DUTIES WITH THE COMPANY DO NOT MAKE HIM FALL UNDER THE CATEGORY OF A “MANAGERIAL” EMPLOYEE OR A “MEMBER OF THE MANAGERIAL STAFF”; |
|
(c)
|
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT BENEDICT CASTRO IS “JUST A TEAM SUPERVISOR” IMPLYING THAT HE IS NOT A SUPERVISOR CONTEMPLATED BY LAW AS BEING EXEMPT FROM PAYMENT OF HOLIDAY PAY, OVERTIME PAY, REST DAY PAY AND SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY; |
|
(d)
|
PRIVATE RESPONDENT BENEDICT CASTRO’S WORK WAS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO MANAGEMENT POLICIES;
|
|
(e)
|
SINCE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT BENEDICT CASTRO WAS PAID HIS 13TH MONTH PAY, THE SAME PRECLUDES HIM FROM BEING A “MEMBER OF THE MANAGERIAL STAFF”; |
II. IN RELATION TO THE FOREGOING, REINSTATING THE LABOR
ARBITER’S FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT BENEDICT CASTRO IS ENTITLED TO
HOLIDAY PAY, OVERTIME PAY, REST DAY PAY AND SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY.
III. FAILING TO CONSIDER ADMITTED AND OTHERWISE UNDISPUTED
FACTS ESSENTIAL AND RELEVANT IN THE DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO HOLIDAY PAY, OVERTIME PAY, REST DAY
PAY AND SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY. (Rollo, pp. ________)
[13] Id.
[14] See Diversified Security, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 152234, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 28, 293, citing Reyes v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 160233, August 8, 2007, 529 SCRA 487, 494.
[15] Supra note 1, at 45-48.
[16] Gonzales v. NLRC, 407 Phil. 486, 500 (2001); citing Magos v. NLRC, 360 Phil. 670, 676 (1998); see also A. D. Gothong Mtg.Corp. Employees Union-ALU v. Hon. Nieves Confessor, 376 Phil. 168, 173-174 (1999), citing Franklin Baker Company of the Phils. v. Hon. Trajano, 241 Phil. 432, 439 (1988).
[17] Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, Book III, Rule I, Sec. 2(c).
[18] Rollo, pp. 11-30.
[19] Art. 82. Coverage. – The provisions of this title shall apply to employees in all establishment and undertakings whether for profit or not,
but not to government employees, managerial employees, field personnel,
members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for
support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another,
and workers who are paid by results x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
[20] Art. 87. Overtime work.
– Work may be performed beyond eight (8) hours a day provided that the
employee is paid for the overtime work, an additional compensation
equivalent to his regular wage plus at least twenty-five (25%) per cent
thereof. Work performed beyond eight hours on a holiday or rest day
shall be paid an additional compensation equivalent to the rate of the
first eight hours on a holiday or rest day plus at least thirty percent
thereof.
[21] Art. 93. Compensation for rest day, Sunday or holiday work.
– (a) Where an employee is made or permitted to work on his scheduled
rest day, he shall be paid an additional compensation of at least thirty
percent (30%) of his regular wage. An employee shall be entitled to
such additional compensation for work performed on Sunday only when it
is his established rest day.
(b) When the nature of the work of the employee is such that he has no
regular workdays and no regular rest days can be scheduled, he shall be
paid an additional compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of his
regular wage for work performed on Sundays and holidays.
(c) Work performed on any special holiday shall be paid an additional
compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of the regular wage of the
employee. Where such holiday work falls on the employees scheduled rest
day, he shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least
fifty percent (50%) of his regular wage.
(d) Where the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable
employment contract stipulates the payment of a higher premium pay than
that prescribed under this Article, the employer shall pay such higher
rate.
[22] Art. 95. Right to
Service Incentive Leave. – (a) Every employee who has rendered at least
one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive
leave of five days with pay. x x x.