LO CHI AND FELIX TINDUGAN, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. HONORATO J. DE LEON, DOROTEO L. SERRANO, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY AND TERESITA TUD TORRENTE, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

Lo Chi and Felix Tindugan versus Honorato de Leon

The Case

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, which dismissed a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction. The petitioners, Lo Chi and Felix Tindugan, were the employers of a mechanic-driver whose death gave rise to a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. They sought to nullify the award of a Hearing Officer and the writ of execution issued by a Regional Administrator. The case matters because it teaches two enduring lessons: that an appeal taken to the wrong body is no appeal at all, and that the power to execute an award is a judicial function that must be conferred by law.

Procedural History

Teresita Tud Torrente filed a claim for compensation with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor in Naga City for the death of her husband. Lo Chi and Felix Tindugan moved to dismiss, but the motion was denied. The case was heard by Hearing Officer Doroteo L. Serrano, who rendered a decision ordering the employers to pay compensation. The employers received a copy of the decision and filed a motion for a new hearing, which was denied. The following day they sent a notice of appeal to the Labor Standards Commission in Manila, furnishing a copy to the Regional Office in Naga City. Torrente moved for execution, and Regional Administrator Honorato J. de Leon issued a writ of execution, which the sheriff of Quezon City enforced. To forestall execution, the employers filed a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. On motion of the respondents, Judge Nicasio Yatco dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The employers then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Facts

A claim for compensation was filed by Teresita Tud Torrente under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the death of her husband, who died while performing his duties as mechanic-driver of Lo Chi and Felix Tindugan. The claim was lodged with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor in Naga City. The employers moved to dismiss, but the motion was denied, and the case proceeded to hearing.

On July 12, 1960, Hearing Officer Doroteo L. Serrano rendered a decision ordering Lo Chi and Felix Tindugan to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of 4,200 pesos as compensation for the death of Torrente's husband. The employers received a copy of the decision on August 1, 1960. On August 10, they filed a motion for a new hearing, which was denied in an order dated September 6, 1960, received by the employers on September 13, 1960.

The following day, the employers sent a notice of appeal to the Labor Standards Commission in Manila, furnishing a copy to the Regional Office in Naga City. Torrente moved for execution, averring that the notice of appeal was filed after the period for appeal and did not comply with the rules because it failed to state the grounds for appeal. Regional Administrator Honorato J. de Leon issued a writ of execution, which the sheriff of Quezon City proceeded to enforce. The employers then filed a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which dismissed the petition. Hence the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the decision rendered by Hearing Officer Doroteo L. Serrano had become final and enforceable.
• Whether or not Regional Administrator Honorato J. de Leon had legal authority to issue the writ of execution enforcing the decision of Serrano.
• Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Rizal erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 23 of the Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission provides:

Any party in interest who is dissatisfied with the award or decision of the Hearing Officer may within 15 days from receipt of notice thereof petition for review or reconsideration of said decision or award by the Commission.

This rule fixes the body to which an appeal from a Hearing Officer's decision must be taken, namely the Workmen's Compensation Commission, and the period within which it must be taken.

Section 46 of Republic Act 772 provides:

Claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission.

This provision vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Commission and confirms that only it may review the decisions of Hearing Officers.

Section 51 of Act 3428, as originally enacted, provided:

The power to enforce a final award made under the Workmen's Compensation Act was vested in any court of record in the jurisdiction of which the accident occurred.

This original text shows that the power to execute awards belonged to the courts, a point central to the second issue.

Section 4 of Rule 67 of the old Rules of Court, now Section 4 of Rule 65 of the New Rules of Court, provides:

A petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, if it relates to the acts or omissions of an inferior body or official should be filed in a court of first instance having jurisdiction thereof.

This rule determines the proper venue of the employers' special civil action and supports the dismissal of their petition.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the decision of the Hearing Officer had become final and executory. Although the employers filed their notice of appeal within the reglementary period, they lodged it not with the Workmen's Compensation Commission but with the Labor Standards Commission, a body with no appellate jurisdiction over the claim. The Court stressed that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that failure to perfect an appeal as legally required renders the judgment final and executory. The appeal was therefore totally inefficacious, and the decision of the Regional Office had already become final when the writ of execution was issued.

On the second issue, the Court agreed with the employers that the Regional Administrator had no legal authority to issue the writ. Originally the power to enforce a final award was vested in any court of record in the jurisdiction of which the accident occurred. Pursuant to reorganization legislation, the authority to enforce awards was transferred from the courts to the Regional Administrator and the Commission. But in a number of decisions, writs of execution issued by Regional Administrators and the Commission were nullified because the grant of such power was invalid, the Reorganization Plan being without legislative authority. The Court had ruled that an order for the execution of a decision or award is essentially a judicial power or function, and that judicial powers are vested only in the Supreme Court and in such courts as the law may establish. Only on June 20, 1964, with the enactment of Republic Act 4119, was section 51 of the Workmen's Compensation Act amended to vest in the Commission and the duly deputized officials in the regional offices the authority to issue a writ of execution. Since the writ in this case was issued on December 2, 1960, before the effectivity of that amendment, the writ was null and void.

Nevertheless, the Court held that the nullity of the writ did not affect the validity of the award, which had become final and executory and must be enforced. An erroneous or voided writ of execution will not preclude the issuance of another writ to carry out and satisfy a judgment or award, for the prevailing party shall not be prejudiced by the mistake or error of the issuing officer.

On the third issue, the Court held that the dismissal of the petition was correct. The acts sought to be restrained were those of the respondents in Naga City, and under the rule on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, the petition should have been filed in the court of first instance having jurisdiction over the persons of those respondents. A court of first instance is without jurisdiction to issue writs affecting persons outside its jurisdiction. The sheriff of Quezon City was only a nominal party.

Doctrine

First, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. An appeal taken to a body that has no appellate jurisdiction over the case is totally inefficacious and does not prevent the judgment from becoming final and executory.

Second, the power to execute a decision or award is essentially a judicial function. It may not be conferred on administrative officials by a reorganization plan without legislative authority. A writ of execution issued by a Regional Administrator before the effectivity of Republic Act 4119 is null and void.

Third, the nullity of a writ of execution does not affect the validity of the final award it seeks to enforce. An erroneous or voided writ will not preclude the issuance of another writ to carry out and satisfy the judgment or award, and the prevailing party cannot be prejudiced by the mistake of the issuing officer.

Fourth, a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus relating to the acts of an inferior body or official must be filed in the court of first instance having jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the order dismissing the petition, declared the writ of execution null and void, and remanded the records to the Regional Office of the Department of Labor in Naga City for the proper execution of the award in favor of Teresita Tud Torrente, with costs against Lo Chi and Felix Tindugan.

Remember This

An appeal filed with the wrong body is no appeal at all, and the judgment becomes final; but a void writ of execution does not destroy the final award, which may be enforced by another writ. Examiners use this case to test the jurisdictional nature of appeal and the rule that execution is a judicial function that cannot be delegated by mere reorganization.