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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FRANCISCO TARUC @ TARUC, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.R E S O L U T I O N

G.R. No. 185202. February 18, 2009 February 18, 2009

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People versus Taruc

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Francisco Taruc, a criminal case for murder decided by the Supreme Court on a petition for review after the Court of Appeals had affirmed the conviction. The case matters for one reason above all: it fixes the rule on what happens to an accused who escapes from jail and stays at large while his conviction travels through the appellate courts. The Court holds that flight is a waiver of the right to appeal, and that the appeal of a fugitive is dismissed. It is a procedural case with a heavy doctrinal payload, and examiners return to it whenever the question is whether an escaped convict may still ask the courts for relief.

Procedural History

The accused was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 3. Upon arraignment, assisted by a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office, he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted him of murder, qualified by treachery, and sentenced him to death. It also ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim actual damages, civil indemnity, and moral damages.

Because the penalty imposed was death, the case went to the Court of Appeals on automatic review. Before the prosecution witness Randy Espina could be cross-examined, the accused escaped from the Bataan Provincial Jail. The trial court treated the escape as a waiver of the right to cross-examine that witness, and it promulgated its judgment of conviction while the accused was at large. Before the Court of Appeals, the Public Attorney's Office moved for an extension of time to file the appellant's brief and disclosed that the accused had escaped and that counsel had no means of knowing his whereabouts. The Warden confirmed the escape. The Court of Appeals nonetheless granted the extension, because review of death penalty cases is mandatory, and it eventually accepted the briefs of both sides and decided the case. It affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, in view of the law abolishing the death penalty, and adjusted the awards of damages. The accused, still through the Public Attorney's Office, filed a notice of appeal, and the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appeal and forwarded the records to the Supreme Court. Hence this petition for review.

Facts

On or about the eighth of November 1998, in the barangay of Puting Buhangin, Orion, Bataan, the accused Francisco Taruc shot Emelito Sualog, known as Elmer, with a forty-five caliber pistol, inflicting mortal wounds that caused his death. The Information charged murder, attended by treachery and evident premeditation.

The accused was committed to the Bataan Provincial Jail, but at about eleven o'clock in the evening of the twenty-third of August 2002, he escaped. He was never recaptured. He was absent when the trial court promulgated its judgment of conviction, and he did not surrender and ask for leave to avail of the remedies against that judgment within the fifteen-day period allowed by the Rules.

He remained at large for most of the proceedings before the trial court, for the entire pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, and even while his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, all the while through counsel filing pleadings on his behalf.

Issues

  • Whether or not an accused who escapes from prison and remains at large loses his right to appeal his conviction.
  • Whether or not the Court of Appeals could still review the case despite the escape of the accused, given that the penalty imposed was death.
  • Whether or not the appeal of the accused before the Supreme Court should be dismissed.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 120, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.

This is the provision that stripped the accused of his remedies, because he failed to appear at promulgation without justifiable cause and did not surrender within fifteen days.

Rule 124, Section 8 of the same Rules provides:

The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.

This is the provision authorizing dismissal of the appeal of an appellant who escapes during the pendency of the appeal.

Rule 125, Section 1 of the same Rules provides:

Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the procedure in the Supreme Court in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as in the Court of Appeals.

This extends the dismissal rule for escaped appellants from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that by escaping from prison the accused impliedly waived his right to appeal. The right of appeal is granted solely for the benefit of the accused, and he may waive it expressly or by implication. When an accused flees after the case has been submitted for decision, he is deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested within fifteen days from notice of the judgment against him. Having escaped, he loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. The Court stressed that by putting himself beyond the reach of legal processes, the accused showed contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal, a conduct the Court called intolerable and undeserving of leniency.

On the second issue, the Court held that the escape did not preclude the Court of Appeals from exercising its review jurisdiction, because what was involved was capital punishment. Automatic review being mandatory, it is not only a power of the court but a duty to review all death penalty cases. The Court of Appeals therefore rightly took cognizance of the case, and upon review it modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

On the third issue, the Court held that the appeal before it must be dismissed. The accused had remained at large throughout, and he could not hope that his appeal would succeed. The Court dismissed the appeal and remanded the records to the trial court for the issuance of the mittimus.

Doctrine

First, the right to appeal is not a fundamental right that cannot be waived; it is granted solely for the benefit of the accused and may be waived expressly or by implication. Second, an accused who escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail, or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal loses his standing in court and is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief, unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court. Third, under Rule 120, Section 6, an accused convicted and absent at promulgation without justifiable cause loses the remedies available under the Rules, subject only to the fifteen-day window to surrender and move for leave. Fourth, the mandatory and automatic review of death penalty cases is a duty of the appellate court that survives the escape of the accused, so the Court of Appeals may still review the conviction even as the accused is a fugitive. Fifth, by Rule 125, Section 1, the dismissal rule for escaped appellants applies with equal force in the Supreme Court.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Francisco Taruc and remanded the records to the trial court for the issuance of the mittimus, so that the conviction and the modified penalty of reclusion perpetua would stand.

Remember This

Memorize the line: an accused who escapes loses his standing in court and is deemed to have waived his right to appeal unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court. Examiners use this case in criminal procedure, often paired with the rule on promulgation of judgment in absentia and the mandatory review of death penalty cases, to test whether a fugitive convict may still seek relief from the appellate courts.