IGNACIO VERDERA AND CANUTO BARRIENTOS, PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. JAIME HERNANDEZ AND GENERAL SHIPPING CO., INC., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

On May 18, 1955, a collision took place, off the coast of Occidental
Mindoro, between the M/S “General Malvar”, belonging to the General
Shipping Co., Inc., one of the respondents herein, and a sailboat,
named “Rogelio”, of petitioners Ignacio Verdera and Canuto Barrientos.
The latter having filed a marine protest, the corresponding inquiry was
conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry and, in due course thereafter
the board rendered a decision, dated February 21, 1956, clearing the
officers of the M/S “General Malvar” of any responsibility for the
accident. Copy of this decision was, on March 3, 1956 received by
petitioners’ counsel who, on April 2, 1956, filed with said Board a notice of their intention to appeal from the decision to the Secretary of Finance.

In a 4th indorsement dated April 26, 1957, the Commissioner of
Customs ruled, however, that “as no appeal was perfected and filed in the Office of the Secretary of Finance
within thirty (30) days after the promulgation of the decision as
required by Section 1198 of the Revised Administrative Code”, the
aforementioned decision “became final and the matter was already,
closed. The alleged notice of appeal was considered of no consequence”.
Petitioners appealed from this ruling to the Secretary of Finance, who,
on January 16, 1958, sustained the aforementioned view of the
Commissioner of Customs. Once more petitioners appealed, this time, to
the Office of the President, which, on March 26, 1958, upheld the
action taken by the Secretary of Finance. Soon thereafter or on May 12,
1958, petitioner filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
present action for certiorari, upon the theory that respondent
Secretary of Finance had abused his discretion in holding that their
appeal from the decision of the Board of Marine Inquiry had not been
duly perfected, and praying, therefore, that said respondent be
directed to give due course to the aforementioned appeal. After
appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered judgment for
respondents herein and dismissed the petition, without special
pronouncement as to costs. Hence, this appeal by the petitioners.

The appeal, as well as the case, hinge on the question whether or
not petitioners herein had appealed from the aforementioned decision of
the Board of Marine Inquiry as provided in Section 1198 of the Revised
Administrative Code (which is substantially reproduced in Section 605
of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines, which became effective on July 1,1957), the
pertinent part of which reads:

“* * * The decision of the Commissioner of Customs
based upon the findings and recommendation of the hoard, reprimanding a
licensed marine officer or suspending or revoking any marine
certificate on account of professional misconduct, intemperate habits,
negligence or incapacity shall he final, unless within thirty days
after its promulgation, an appeal is perfected and filed in the Office
of the Secretary of Finance, who may confirm, revoke, or modify said
decision. * * *.”

Assuming that petitioners are entitled to appeal under this
provision—on which we need not, and do not express any opinion—it
should be noted that, pursuant thereto, the decision of the
Commissioner of Customs— which the parties herein seemingly take to be
that of the Board of Marine Inquiry—became final “unless within thirty
(80) days after its promulgation an appeal is perfected and filed in
the office of the Secretary of Finance * * *.” Two (2) steps must,
therefore, be taken for the perfection of said appeal, namely: (1) the
appeal must be perfected and filed in the Office of the Secretary of
Finance; and (2) this must be done within thirty (30) days after
promulgation of the decision appealed from. The lower court held that
neither requirement has been fulfilled by petitioners herein, because
the decision of the Board of Marine Inquiry was promulgated, in its
opinion, on February 21, 1956, so that more than 30 days had elapsed
before the notice of appeal was filed on April 2, 1956, and said notice
of appeal was never filed with the Office of the Secretary of Finance.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that the said decision should
be considered promulgated, not on February 21, 1956, the date it
bears,.but on March 3, 1956, when notice of the decision was served
upon counsel for petitioners herein, and that the filing of their
notice of appeal with the Board of Marine Inquiry should be considered
as a filing with the Office of the Secretary of Finance, inasmuch as
the Bureau of Customs is under the supervision of the Department of
Finance.

The second part of petitioners’ pretense is clearly devoid of merit,
for, although subject to the “executive supervision” of the Department
of Finance (Sec. 81, Revised Administrative Code), the Bureau of
Customs, of which the Board of Marine Inquiry forms part, is,
obviously, distinct and separate from the Office of the Secretary of
Finance. The provisions of our Revised Administrative Code governing
the two offices deal with the same as two different offices. The very
power of executive supervision of the Secretary of Finance over, inter
alia, the Bureau of Customs, upon which petitioners rely, proves
precisely that the two offices are distinct from each other. Otherwise,
it would have been unnecessary to provide for an appeal from the
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs to the Secretary of Finance.
And this is borne out by the interpretation given to said Section 1198
of the Revised Administrative Code by the Commissioner of Customs, the
Secretary of Finance, and the Office of the President of the
Philippines, the views of which, as the administrative agencies called
upon to enforce and apply said provision, carries weight and should not
be disregarded by the courts of justice, unless manifestly erroneous.
In the case at bar, said interpretation is in accord with the plain
meaning of the above quoted provision.

Since, petitioners’ notice of appeal has never been filed with the
Office of the Secretary of Finance, it is unnecessary to pass upon the
question whether the decision of the Board of Marine Inquiry should be
deemed promulgated on February 21, 1956, the date it bears, or on March
3, 1956, when notice of said decision was received by petitioners
herein.

Wherefore, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.