NILO T. PATES, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND EMELITA B. ALMIRANTE, RESPONDENTS.

Pates versus Commission on Elections

The Case

This is the case of Pates versus Commission on Elections, a petition brought by Nilo T. Pates against the Commission on Elections and Emelita B. Almirante. The petitioner asked the Supreme Court to set aside the dismissal of his earlier petition for certiorari, which he had filed two days beyond the period fixed by the Rules of Court. The case matters because it draws a firm line between the special thirty-day period under Rule 64 for reviewing rulings of the Commission on Elections and the ordinary sixty-day period under Rule 65, and it tells every reviewee that the so-called fresh period rule does not cross that line.

Procedural History

The case began before the Commission on Elections. Its First Division issued a resolution on the first of February 2008, which the petitioner sought to challenge. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, and the Commission en banc denied that motion in a resolution dated the eighteenth of September 2008. The petitioner then went up to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 64.

On the eleventh of November 2008, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition outright for late filing under Section 3 of Rule 64. The petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration, reiterating his plea for a temporary restraining order. The Office of the Solicitor General asked to be excused from filing a separate comment, which the Court granted, while the respondent Almirante filed her own comment opposing the motion. The Court then resolved the motion for reconsideration in this decision.

Facts

The material dates tell the whole story. On the first of February 2008, the Commission's First Division issued the resolution that the petitioner wanted reviewed. His counsel received a copy on the fourth of February 2008. Four days later, on the eighth of February 2008, the petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration.

The Commission en banc denied the motion on the eighteenth of September 2008, and the petitioner received notice of that denial on the twenty-second of September 2008. Counting thirty days from that notice, the last day fell on a Saturday, the eighteenth of October 2008. Since the petitioner had already used four days in preparing and filing his motion for reconsideration, only twenty-six days remained, and the last day effectively moved to Monday, the twentieth of October 2008.

The petitioner filed his petition with the Supreme Court on the twenty-second of October 2008, two days late. Hence the dismissal, and hence this motion for reconsideration invoking the fresh period rule.

Issues

• Whether or not the fresh period rule, which counts the full period anew from notice of the denial of a motion for reconsideration, applies to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 challenging a ruling of the Commission on Elections.
• Whether or not the Court should liberally construe the rules and suspend their application in favor of the petitioner, whose counsel mistakenly relied on the wrong provision.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Time to file petition. The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.

This is the provision the Court applied, and its remainder rule, not the fresh period rule, governed the petitioner's filing.

Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution provides:

Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

This constitutional command fixes the thirty-day period and explains why Rule 64 exists as a separate and stricter rule.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the fresh period rule does not apply to petitions under Rule 64. The petitioner never disputed that his petition was filed outside the period; he merely insisted that the fresh period rule under Rule 65 should likewise govern. The Court refused, because Rule 64 and Rule 65 exist as separate rules for substantive reasons. The most patent procedural difference is the special period in Section 3 of Rule 64, which grants thirty days from notice, with the intervening period used for a motion for reconsideration deductible from that period, instead of the fresh sixty days that Rule 65 provides. The Court noted that it had previously ordered a similar dismissal in Domingo versus Commission on Elections.

On the second issue, the Court declined to relax the rules. It stressed that every plea for liberal construction must be accompanied by an explanation of why the party failed to comply and a justification for the requested liberality. The petitioner offered none; he appealed only to history, uniformity, and convenience. The Court answered that any amendment of Section 3 of Rule 64 is an exercise of its rulemaking power, not its adjudicatory function, and that convenience and uniformity cannot outweigh the constitutional importance of the prompt determination of election results. It reminded the bar, quoting Lapid versus Laurea, that the first duty of counsel is to comply with the rules of procedure rather than seek exceptions as loopholes.

Doctrine

A petition for certiorari challenging a decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on Elections must be filed within thirty days from notice, under Section 3 of Rule 64, and the fresh period rule under Rule 65 does not apply to it. When a motion for reconsideration is denied, the petitioner may file only within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. The thirty-day period is constitutionally grounded in the need for the prompt determination of election results, so convenience and uniformity are not compelling reasons to modify it. Liberal construction of the rules is the exception, not the rule, and a party seeking it bears the heavy burden of explaining the failure to comply and justifying the requested liberality.

Disposition

The Court denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and declared its earlier resolution of dismissal final, with entry of judgment to be made in due course.

Remember This

Memorize the line that Rule 64 is not Rule 65: thirty days from notice, with the days spent on a motion for reconsideration deducted, and no fresh period. Examiners like to use this case to test the distinction between the two rules and the limits of liberal construction when counsel files under the wrong provision.