HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY JENNIFER R. MARQUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES CARLOS AND ELIZABETH ABACAN, RESPONDENTS.

Holy Trinity Realty versus Abacan

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation against the spouses Carlos and Elizabeth Abacan, arising from a summary action for unlawful detainer over a parcel of land in Malolos City. The corporation had won a final and executory judgment of ejectment, and the spouses resisted its enforcement by claiming that they had since acquired ownership of the land through emancipation patents. The case matters because it fixes two rules a reviewee must carry into the examination room: that the hierarchy of courts bars a petition for certiorari against a first level court from being filed directly with the Court of Appeals, and that the subsequent acquisition of ownership is not a supervening event that will stay the execution of a judgment in an unlawful detainer case.

Procedural History

The corporation filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Malolos City. Judgment was rendered in its favor, ordering the occupants to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable rent, attorney's fees, and costs. The spouses moved for reconsideration, which was denied as a prohibited pleading in summary proceedings. They appealed, but the appeal was denied due course for having been filed out of time, the period not having been stayed by the motion for reconsideration. The judgment thus became final and executory, and the trial court ordered execution.

The spouses then tried to stop enforcement through several actions in the Regional Trial Court, all of which were dismissed, and none of which they appealed. When the trial court issued an alias writ of execution and an alias special order of demolition, the spouses moved to quash both, invoking emancipation patents allegedly issued in their favor. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the acquisition of ownership was not a supervening event that would bar execution.

From that denial, the spouses went directly to the Court of Appeals on a special civil action for certiorari. The appellate court granted the petition, recalled and set aside the trial court's order, quashed the alias writs, and made its preliminary injunction permanent, holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The corporation then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review under Rule 45.

Facts

A parcel of land in Sumapang, Malolos City was registered in the name of Freddie Santiago. In August 1999, Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation acquired the property from him, only to find that the lot was already occupied by several individuals, among them the spouses Carlos and Elizabeth Abacan.

The corporation first filed a complaint for forcible entry, but withdrew it to verify the exact location of the property, which the occupants claimed was covered by emancipation patents issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. The corporation then commenced a complaint with that Board for cancellation of the emancipation patents. While that case was pending, the occupants' possession was tolerated. In April 2002, the provincial adjudicator ordered the cancellation of the patents, and the Board later affirmed.

In November 2003, the corporation filed its complaint for unlawful detainer and damages. It alleged that it had no immediate need for the land until the need arose, after which it made verbal and written demands, the last on 17 June 2003, and the occupants still refused to vacate. The trial court ruled for the corporation. After the judgment became final, the spouses produced emancipation patents allegedly issued in their favor during the pendency of the case and moved to quash the alias writs of execution and demolition. The trial court refused, and the Court of Appeals reversed it.

Issues

• Whether or not the spouses violated the hierarchy of courts in filing their petition for certiorari directly with the Court of Appeals instead of the Regional Trial Court.
• Whether or not the Municipal Trial Court in Cities committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the alias writs of execution and demolition.

Applicable Provisions

Section 18 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, as quoted in the trial court's order, provides:

The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the parties respecting title to the land or building.

This provision is the anchor of the ruling: because an ejectment judgment touches possession only and does not bind title, a later claim of ownership cannot undo it.

Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, invoked by the Court on the timeliness of a petition for certiorari, provides:

A petition for certiorari must be filed not later than sixty days from notice of the judgment.

This provision explains why the spouses could no longer attack the ejectment decision itself, which had long become final.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the spouses erred. Although the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, parties are not given unbridled freedom to choose between court forums. The Court restated the rule of judicial hierarchy:

Petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level inferior courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.

The petition was therefore dismissible outright on procedural grounds.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The spouses' motion rested on a single ground, a supervening event, namely their acquisition of ownership through emancipation patents after judgment. The Court held that this is not a supervening event that will bar execution, because the sole issue in ejectment is physical or material possession, independent of any claim of ownership. Both parties now claim ownership, the corporation by a deed of sale from the registered owner and the spouses by the patents, but that question belongs in a full-blown proceeding, not in a motion to stay execution of a summary ejectment judgment. The Court also noted that the petition before the Court of Appeals was directed only at the denial of the motion to quash, not at the ejectment decision, which had become immutable.

Doctrine

First, the hierarchy of courts is a mandatory rule of procedure: a petition for certiorari against a first level court must be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and one against the Regional Trial Court with the Court of Appeals, notwithstanding the concurrent jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs.

Second, the sole issue in unlawful detainer is physical or material possession, independent of any claim of ownership. Consistent with Section 18 of Rule 70, the subsequent acquisition of ownership by a party is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the ejectment case. A claim of ownership must be ventilated in a separate full-blown proceeding, not in a motion to quash or stay execution.

Third, a judgment that has attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be attacked through a petition for certiorari filed beyond the sixty-day period under Section 4 of Rule 65.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the order of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities denying the motion to quash the alias writs of execution and demolition.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the subsequent acquisition of ownership is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in an unlawful detainer case, because ejectment touches possession only. Examiners use this case to test the hierarchy of courts and the distinction between possession and ownership in ejectment.