GODOFREDO NAVERA, PETITIONER VS. HON. PERPECTO QUICHO, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

On January 24, 1961, the municipality of Ligao filed with the Court
of First Instance of Albay a petition under Section 112 of Act No. 496,
as amended, for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera, covering Lot No. 2793-A,
on the ground that a portion of 123 square meters was erroneously
included in said title during the cadastral survey of Ligao.

Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the relief
which petitioner seeks to obtain cannot be granted under Section 112 of
Act 496 because the same would involved the opening of the original
decree of registration. He contends that, under said section, the court
can only authorize an alteration which may not impair the rights
recorded in the decree, or one which will not prejudice such rights, or
one which is consented to by all parties concerned, or can authorize
the correction of any error or mistake which would not involve the
reopening of the original decree of registration. Here the petition
will have such effect, for it will involve the correction of the
technical description of the land covered by the certificate of title
in question, segregating therefrom the portion alleged to have been
erroneously included, which eventually will cause the amendment of the
original decree’ of registration. This cannot be done at this stage
after the lapse of 23 years from the issuance of the certificate of
title.

After hearing both parties, the court a quo issued an order denying
the motion to dismiss and requiring Navera to answer the petition
within the reglementary period. After his motion for reconsideration
was denied, Navera filed the present petition for certiorari disputing
the jurisdiction of the court a quo.

It is alleged by the municipality of Ligao that in the course of the
construction or repair of Navera street of said municipality it was
ascertained by a duly licensed surveyor that Lot No. 2793-A of the
cadastral survey of Ligao has encroached upon said street by depriving
the street of an area amounting to 123 square meters which was
erroneously included in Lot No. 2793-A now covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera.
Hence, the municipality prays for the correction of such error in the
technical description of the lot, as well as in the certificate of
title, with a view to excluding therefrom the portion of 123 square
meters erroneously included therein.

The court a quo, over the objection of Navera, granted the
petition even if the same was filed under Section 112 of Act No. 496.
The court predicates its ruling upon the following rationale:

“It is a rule of law that lands brought under the
operation of the Torrens System are deemed relieved from all claims and
encumbrances not appearing on the title. However, the law excepts
certain rights and liabilities from the rule, and there are certain
burdens on the lands registered which continue to exist and remain in
force, although not noted on the title, by express provisions of
Section 39 of Act No. 496, as amended. Among the burdens on the land
registered which continue to exist, pursuant to said Section 39, is
‘any public highway, way, private way established by law, or any
Government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate
of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway, way, or
irrigation canal or lateral thereof, have been determined.’ The
principle involved here is that, if a person obtains a title under the
Torrens System which includes by mistake or oversight a land which
cannot be registered, he does not by virtue of such certificate alone
become the owner of the land illegally included therein. In the case of
Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil., 769, the
Supreme Court laid down the doctrine that ‘the inclusion of public
highways in the certificate of title under the Torrens System does not
thereby give to the holder of such certificate said public highways.'”

Petitioner Navera does not agree with this ruling, invoking in his
favor what we stated in a recent case to the effect that, “the law
authorizes only alterations which do not impair rights recorded in the
decree, or alterations which, if they do not prejudice such rights, are
consented to by all parties concerned, or alterations to correct
obvious mistakes, without opening the original decree of registration”
(Director of Lands vs. Register of Deeds, 92 Phil., 826; 49
Off. Gaz. (3) 935). Navera contends that the purpose of the instant
petition is not merely to correct a clerical error but to reopen the
original decree of registration which was issued in 1937, and this
description in order that the portion erroneously included may be
returned to the municipality of Ligao. In effect, therefore, the
petition does not seek merely the correction of a mistake or error but
the return or re conveyance of a portion of a registered property to
respondent. This cannot be done without opening the original decree of
registration.

The theory entertained by the court a quo that if the portion to be segregated was really
erroneously included in the title issued to petitioner because it is
part of the Natera street which belongs to the municipality of Ligao
that portion may be excluded under Section 112 of Act 496 because under
the law^[1] any public
highway, even if noted on a title, is deemed excluded therefrom as a
legal lien or encumbrance, is in our opinion correct. This is upon the
principle that a person who obtains a title which includes by mistake,
a land which cannot legally be registered does not by virtue of such
inclusion become the owner of the land erroneously included therein.^[2] But this theory only holds true if there is no dispute that the portion to be excluded is really part of a public highway. This principle only applies if there is unanimity as to the issue of fact involved.

Here said unanimity is lacking. The claim of the municipality that
an error has been committed in the survey of the lot recorded in
respondent’s name by including a portion of the Natera street is not
agreed to by petitioner. In fact, he claims that that is a question of
fact that needs to be proven because it is controversial. There being
dissension as to an important question of fact, the petition cannot be
granted under Section 112 of Act No. 496.

“We are of the opinion that the lower court did not
err in finding that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present
petition for the simple reason that it involves a controversial issue
which takes this case out of the scope of Section 112 of Act No. 496.

While this section, among other things, authorizes a person in
interest to ask the court for any erasure, alteration,, or amendment of
a certificate of title ‘upon the ground that registered interests of
any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate,
have terminated and ceased’, and apparently the petition comes under
its scope, such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity among
the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the
part of any party in interest; otherwise the case becomes controversial
and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the
incident properly belongs. * * *” (Tangunan, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G. R. No. L-5545, December 29, 1953; See also Jimenez vs. De Castro, 40 Off. Gaz. No. 3, 1st Supp. p. 80; Government of Philippines vs. Jalandoni, 44 Off. Gaz., 1837)

Wherefore, petition is granted. The order of respondent court dated
March 8, 1961, as well as its order dated March 25, 1961, are hereby
set aside. No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

^[2] Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil., 769.