PAZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD G. BERNARDO, EMILIE B. KO, MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, R…

Bernardo versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Paz T. Bernardo, later substituted by her heirs, against the People of the Philippines. Bernardo was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City of five counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing five checks that were dishonored because the account had been closed. The case matters for two reasons. First, it settles that the ninety-day period for presenting a check is not an element of the offense. Second, and more importantly for the bar, it decides what happens to the civil liability of an accused who dies while her appeal is pending, where that civil liability rests not on the felony but on a contract.

Procedural History

After preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City found probable cause and charged Bernardo with five counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. She pleaded not guilty. The prosecution rested its case, and after repeated postponements and absences of Bernardo and her counsel, the trial court considered her right to present additional evidence waived and submitted the case for decision. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Makati City, rendered judgment on May 28, 2003, finding her guilty on all five counts, sentencing her to one year of imprisonment for each count, and ordering her to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of 460,000 pesos plus twelve percent interest and five percent penalty charges from December 1, 1991 until full payment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in its decision of August 31, 2007, but deleted the imprisonment and imposed instead a fine of 460,000 pesos, retaining the civil indemnity with twelve percent interest from the institution of the criminal charges. It held that the ninety-day period is not an element of the crime and that Bernardo was not denied due process. Her motion for reconsideration was denied on March 14, 2008. Bernardo then filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. During the pendency of the petition, she died on February 3, 2011, and her heirs were required to appear as substitutes for purposes of her civil liability.

Facts

In June 1991, Bernardo obtained a loan of 460,000 pesos from Carmencita Bumanglag, payable on or before November 30, 1991, evidenced by a promissory note in which Bernardo and her husband bound themselves solidarily, with interest at twelve percent per annum payable upon default. As additional security, Bernardo gave Bumanglag the owner's duplicate copy of a transfer certificate of title.

Before maturity, Bernardo took back the title to use as collateral in another transaction. In its place, she issued five Far East Bank and Trust Company checks posted on different dates in June 1992, aggregating the amount of the loan: four checks of 100,000 pesos each and one check of 60,000 pesos. In September 1992, Bumanglag deposited the checks, but they were dishonored for the reason account closed. She sent Bernardo a notice of dishonor, which went unheeded, and she filed the criminal complaint.

Bernardo's defense was that the checks were presented beyond the ninety-day period, that she never received any notice of dishonor, and that she had already paid the loan in cash in the aggregate amount of 717,000 pesos, although Bumanglag issued no receipts and never returned the checks. The trial court found her claim of payment unsubstantiated.

Issues

• Whether or not Bernardo was denied due process when the trial court considered her right to present additional evidence waived.
• Whether or not the presentation of the checks beyond the ninety-day period, and the absence of notice of dishonor, negate her liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
• Whether or not Bernardo's civil liability survived her death pending appeal, and may be enforced against her heirs in the same case.
• Whether or not Bernardo adduced sufficient evidence of payment of her obligation.

Applicable Provisions

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

This is the source of the civil liability arising from the offense, which is deemed instituted with the criminal action.

Article 1157 of the Civil Code provides:

Obligations arise from: (1) Law; (2) Contracts; (3) Quasi-contracts; (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and (5) Quasi-delicts.

This enumeration is the basis for the Court's distinction between civil liability arising from delict and independent civil liability arising from contract, which survives the death of the accused.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Bernardo was not denied due process. The records showed that the trial court granted repeated continuances, even after Bernardo and her counsel failed to appear despite due notice, and gave her a final opportunity to testify, which she did. When she and her counsel again failed to appear, the trial court was justified in considering her right to present additional evidence waived. The postponement of trial lies in the sound discretion of the trial court, exercised with a view to substantial justice, and Bernardo was trifling with judicial process.

On the second issue, the Court held that the ninety-day period is not an element of the offense. It is merely a condition for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds. Since Bernardo's death converted the action into a purely civil one, her Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 defenses ceased to be relevant.

On the third issue, the Court ruled that Bernardo's civil liability survived her death. As a general rule, death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes both criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the offense. But independent civil liabilities, such as those arising from contract, survive death. In Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action, so the contract based liability may still be enforced against the estate in the same case.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that Bernardo failed to prove payment. One who pleads payment bears the burden of proving it. The existence of the obligation was established by the promissory note and the checks, whose execution Bernardo admitted. Her bare claim of payment was unsupported, and had she truly paid, she should have redeemed the checks and the promissory note, which remained in Bumanglag's possession.

Doctrine

Three rules must be retained. First, the ninety-day period under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is not an element of the offense; it is only a condition for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds. Second, the death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes criminal liability and the civil liability arising from the delict, but independent civil liabilities based on contract survive and may be enforced against the estate, and in Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases this may be done in the same case because the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action. Third, the debtor who pleads payment carries the burden of proving it with legal certainty.

Disposition

The Court denied the petition for lack of merit, sustaining the civil liability of Bernardo's estate to Bumanglag in the amount of 460,000 pesos plus twelve percent interest, to be enforced against her heirs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: death extinguishes the criminal liability and the delict based civil liability, but not the independent civil liability arising from contract, which survives against the estate. Examiners use this case to test the effect of the death of the accused pending appeal and the nature of the ninety-day period under the Bouncing Checks Law.