THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. EMILIO MANCHU ALIAS NONGNONG MANCHU AND JOHN DOES, APPELLANTS.

People versus Manchu

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Emilio Manchu, also known as Nongnong Manchu, together with several persons charged as John Does. It is a criminal appeal from a conviction for murder under the Revised Penal Code, arising from the hacking death of Roque Cupido in a farmhouse in Northern Samar on the night of August 5, 1998. The case matters for two reasons a reviewee should carry into the examination room. First, it is a clean illustration of conviction upon circumstantial evidence, where the accused was identified not as an eyewitness to the very act of killing but as the person seen entering the victim's hut at the time of the crime. Second, it corrects a common sentencing error: reclusion perpetua is not the medium period of a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, and moral and exemplary damages must be awarded separately, not in one lump sum.

Procedural History

Emilio Manchu was charged with murder by an Information filed in 1998 before Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Allen, Northern Samar. He pleaded not guilty, and trial on the merits followed. The trial court disbelieved his defense of denial and alibi and rendered a judgment of conviction, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim 50,000 pesos as indemnification for death and 50,000 pesos for moral and exemplary damages, plus costs.

The case was initially brought to the Supreme Court on automatic review. In November 2004, however, the Court ordered its transfer to the Court of Appeals, consistent with the ruling in People versus Mateo, which had enlarged the intermediate review in cases involving the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals, in a Decision promulgated in March 2007, denied the appeal and upheld the guilty verdict in its totality. The case then returned to the Supreme Court for review, with both the Office of the Solicitor General and the Public Attorney's Office filing their respective briefs.

Facts

Enerito Cupido, Junior, lived with his family in Barangay Enriqueta, Lavezares, Northern Samar. The victim, Roque Cupido, was his eldest brother. The appellant Emilio Manchu was the husband of their sister Salvacion. According to the prosecution, the appellant was idle and it was Salvacion who supported the family. This angered Roque, who fetched his sister and took her away from the appellant, saying that he took her because life was hard for her. When the appellant later tried to fetch his wife, the victim's mother refused, and this angered the appellant.

On the night of August 5, 1998, at around ten o'clock in the evening, Enerito, the victim, and the appellant's six year old child were at the family farm in Barangay Libertad. Enerito was near a banana plant about five arms' length from the farmhouse, while the victim was resting inside. Three persons arrived. Enerito hid himself. He clearly identified the appellant as the one who entered the house, while the two companions waited outside. A kerosene lamp was lighted inside the house, the moon was bright, and the companions beamed their flashlights toward the appellant. Enerito heard a knocking sound, and the companions then entered. Moments later, the three went out carrying the victim to a distance of about forty meters behind the farmhouse. The appellant did not harm his own son, who was sleeping inside.

Enerito cried, unable to do anything because the three were armed with bolos, and then informed his parents. They sought the help of barangay officials at around two o'clock in the morning and were advised to wait for daylight, as the victim was already dead. The following morning they found the body in the bushes, about forty meters from the farmhouse. The municipal health officer autopsied the victim and found the cause of death to be a hacking wound secondary to hemorrhage, a single wound beginning at the left portion of the neck and almost severing it, caused by a sharp heavy object like a bolo. The appellant's defense was denial and alibi: he claimed he was fishing at Barobungdo from five o'clock in the afternoon until four o'clock the following morning, corroborated by two companions.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the appellant of murder on the basis of circumstantial evidence, despite the alleged absence of positive identification.
• Whether or not the appellant's defenses of denial and alibi can overcome the prosecution's evidence of identification.
• Whether or not the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed, considering that the prescribed penalty for murder is composed of two indivisible penalties.
• Whether or not the awards of moral and exemplary damages were properly granted in one lump sum.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules on Evidence, as quoted in the decision, provides:

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

This is the provision under which the appellant's conviction was sustained, the Court holding that the established circumstances formed an unbroken chain pointing to him and to no other conclusion.

Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the decision, provides that when the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, and there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied. This governs the choice of reclusion perpetua over death, since the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death and treachery, being a qualifying circumstance, cannot also be counted as aggravating.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that direct evidence is not the only basis for a finding of guilt. Established facts forming a chain of circumstances can lead the mind to conviction. The Court quoted its earlier ruling in Baleros, Junior versus People, distinguishing two types of positive identification: a witness may identify the accused as an eyewitness to the very act, which is direct evidence, or may identify him as the person last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the crime, which forms part of circumstantial evidence. Here, Enerito positively identified the appellant as one of the authors of the crime. The claim of poor illumination was rejected, because Enerito was familiar with the appellant's face as the common law husband of his sister, and there was light from the flashlights, the kerosene lamp, and the moon. Enerito was hiding only about five meters away. The Court also stressed that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction even for murder, and that findings of the trial court on credibility deserve a high degree of respect.

On the second issue, the Court held that denial and alibi are inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive identification. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was elsewhere at the time of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene or within its immediate vicinity. The appellant failed to show this impossibility. The testimonies of his two companions were rejected as too perfect, revealing rehearsed witnesses, and their credibility was suspect because they were close friends of the appellant.

On the third issue, the Court held that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring reclusion perpetua to be the medium period of the imposable penalty. The prescribed penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death, which are indivisible penalties that do not provide for a medium period. Applying Article 63, and considering that there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and that treachery could not be considered aggravating because it was already considered as a qualifying circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed. The penalty imposed below was therefore correct, although for the wrong reason.

On the fourth issue, the Court affirmed the award of 50,000 pesos as civil indemnity, which in murder requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accused's responsibility. It held, however, that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages in one lump sum, since these are distinct and must be determined separately. Moral damages are awarded where the claimant experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, and similar injury as a result of the felonious act. Exemplary damages are warranted when the commission of the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. Accordingly, the heirs were entitled to 50,000 pesos as moral damages, and the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery justified 25,000 pesos as exemplary damages.

Doctrine

• Circumstantial evidence suffices for conviction when there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt, as Section 4 of Rule 133 provides.
• Positive identification has two types. A witness may identify the accused as an eyewitness to the very act of commission, which is direct evidence, or may identify him as the person last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the crime, which forms part of circumstantial evidence.
• The testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction, even for murder, and the trial court's findings on credibility are accorded high respect absent a clear showing of overlooked facts of weight and substance.
• Denial and alibi are inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive identification. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove both that he was elsewhere at the time of the crime and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene or within its immediate vicinity.
• Reclusion perpetua is not the medium period of the penalty for murder. The penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties with no medium period, and under Article 63, absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the lesser penalty is applied. Treachery, having qualified the killing, cannot also be counted as aggravating.
• Moral and exemplary damages are distinct and must be determined separately. Moral damages rest on the suffering and anguish of the claimant, while exemplary damages are warranted when the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals with modification: the appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and was ordered to pay the heirs of Roque Cupido 50,000 pesos as civil indemnity, 50,000 pesos as moral damages, and 25,000 pesos as exemplary damages.

Remember This

Memorize this line: positive identification is not limited to an eyewitness to the very act, for one who saw the accused at the scene on or about the time of the crime may positively identify him as part of circumstantial evidence. Examiners like to use this case on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence under Section 4 of Rule 133, on the weakness of alibi and denial against positive identification, and on the rule that reclusion perpetua is not the medium period of the penalty for murder.