ESMERALDO C. ROMULLO, PEDRO MANGUNDAYAO, MAXIMO ANES, ELVIRA BONZA, ROBERTO BELARMINO, TELESPORO GARCIA, BETH ZAIDA GIMENEZ, CELSO LIBRANDO, MICHAEL DELA CRUZ, AND ROBERTO ARAWA…

Romullo versus Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound Homeowners Association

The Case

This is the case of Romullo versus Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound Homeowners Association. A homeowners association sued several of its own members to recover possession of the lots it had allotted to them under the government's Community Mortgage Program, after those members stopped paying their dues and amortizations and were expelled. The members resisted, insisting that the real dispute belonged to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, not to an ordinary court. The case matters because it draws a clean line between an ejectment suit, which turns only on physical possession, and an administrative case about membership and beneficiary status, and because it reminds us that jurisdiction in ejectment is fixed by the allegations of the complaint alone.

Procedural History

The association filed a complaint for ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina City. The Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because of a pending case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board involving the same parties and issues, and it likewise dismissed the members' counterclaims for lack of merit. The association appealed to the Regional Trial Court, which reversed the Metropolitan Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court declared the association the lawful possessor, ordered the members to vacate and surrender possession, to pay one thousand pesos each per month as reasonable compensation from February 19, 2004 until possession is restored, and to pay twenty thousand pesos in attorney's fees plus costs. The members then went to the Court of Appeals by petition, asking for a restraining order and injunction, and arguing that the Regional Trial Court erred in not affirming the dismissal. The Court of Appeals ruled for the association, holding that the complaint sufficiently alleged unlawful detainer and that the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction. It denied the members' two motions for reconsideration. Hence this petition before the Supreme Court, filed under Rule 65.

Facts

The association was qualified to avail of the benefits of the Community Mortgage Program, and it secured a loan from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation Development Fund to purchase a parcel of land known as Bayanihan Compound in Santan Street, Parang, Marikina. The land was to be distributed to the association's members and beneficiaries under its housing program. After the sale, two Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in the association's name, and the land was distributed in portions to its members.

The petitioners were among those allottees. Over time, however, they refused to pay their monthly dues and legal fees, as well as the deposits and amortizations for their respective lot allocations, despite demand. The association responded by approving a resolution expelling them as members and disqualifying them as beneficiaries, and another resolution substituting them with qualified members in accordance with the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Community Mortgage Program.

Despite notice of disqualification, the petitioners continued to occupy their lots and refused to execute a waiver of their allotments. The matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation, but no settlement was reached. Final and formal demands to vacate and surrender possession were made, and the petitioners still refused. The association then filed an ejectment case, invoking the Implementing Corporate Circular of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation Development Fund under Republic Act Number 7279, and praying for the petitioners' eviction and for three thousand pesos as reasonable compensation until they vacate. The petitioners answered that the board resolutions were void because the terms of the directors who passed them had already expired, and that the case should be suspended because of a prejudicial question raised by their separate suit before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.

Issues

• Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction to try the ejectment case, jurisdiction being determined by the allegations of the complaint.
• Whether or not the ruling of the Regional Trial Court must be set aside because of the pendency of a case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board involving the same parties and issues.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court defines who may bring an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer and when:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. -- Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

This provision supplies the four elements the Court uses to test whether a complaint states a cause of action for unlawful detainer, and it fixes the one year period and the proper court.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. It cannot be made to depend on the defenses set up in the answer, nor on the exclusive characterization of the case by one party. The test is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer. The Court laid down the elements of a sufficient complaint:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

All four were present: the petitioners received their lots as members and beneficiaries, their refusal to pay amortizations led to expulsion and loss of recognition, no settlement was reached at the barangay, and the complaint was filed within a year of final demand. The Court also noted, at the threshold, that the petitioners availed of the wrong remedy, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which alone warranted outright dismissal.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the claim of litis pendentia. The requisites are identity of parties, identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for founded on the same facts, and identity of the two cases such that judgment in one would amount to res judicata in the other. While there was identity of parties, the causes of action and reliefs differed. The Board case sought reinstatement as members, annual meetings, elections, an accounting, and annulment of the board resolutions; the ejectment case concerned only the better right to physical possession of the lots. The Court also observed that the Board case had already been dismissed and that dismissal affirmed on appeal, rendering the matter moot.

Doctrine

First, jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint, not by the defenses in the answer and not by one party's characterization of the suit. Second, a complaint sufficiently alleges unlawful detainer when it recites the four elements above, and the action must be brought within one year from the last demand, with the issue limited to the right to physical possession. Third, litis pendentia requires the concurrence of identity of parties, identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, and identity such that judgment in one would be res judicata in the other; an administrative case on membership and beneficiary status does not bar an ejectment suit over physical possession. Fourth, a judgment of the Court of Appeals must be elevated by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the wrong remedy and merits outright dismissal.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed and the Court of Appeals decision was affirmed, with no costs; the association prevailed and recovered possession of the lots.

Remember This

Memorize the line that jurisdiction in ejectment is determined by the allegations of the complaint, not by the answer or the defenses. Examiners use this case to test the four elements of unlawful detainer, the requisites of litis pendentia, and the distinction between a Rule 45 appeal and a Rule 65 petition.